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PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
INTRODUCTION
The existence of the problems of Presidential inability with their
many ramifications and far-reaching consequences presents one of the
most extraordinary facets of our political history. That remarkableuiess is accentuated not only by the absence of a solution but also
by the knowledge that this situation has continued from the days of
the Constitutional Conve nation. When John Dickinson, of Delaware,
asked his fellow delegates in the Philadelphia Convention what was
iuaant by the word "disability" and who would judge it the answering
silence echoed through the years.
It appears that congressional interest in the problem presented by
article 11, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution-that the powers and
duties of the Presidency should devolve upon the Vice President when
thie President is disabled-was first stimulated by the lingering experience of President Garfield's death. The legislative recognition of that
alarming incident consisted merely in an echo of the silence of the
Founding Fathers. The questions remained unanswered.
Except for the sporadic and noneffective efforts of a few Members
of Congress, the enigma of Presidential inability lay dormant in the
vague phiraseology of our Constitution. The protracted illness of
President Wilson aroused once more that giant of uncertainty in our
Constitution. The public apprehension and alarm produced several
legislative proposals but historical silence was the ohly report of the
Congress. Within a short span of time the pattern of lethargy which
has dominated this situation had been reinstated nor has it been
disturbed by the unsuccessful attempts to seek a solution in the form
of studies by congressional committees.
The recent sud-den illness of President Eisenhower has brought into
proper focus once again the enormous and frightening implications
of this problem. We believe, therefore, the people of this Nation
will not tolerate a repetition of the silence and stagnation of past
congressional action on this matter. To date providence has been
patient and benevolent to our Government in spite of a blatant disregard of its responsibility on the part of the Congress.
In view of the precarious condition of present world affairs and
the tremendous responsibility which world leadership has placed in
our hands, it ill behooves us to tempt providence once more by
inaction.
The time to strike at the heart of the problem is here. Clarification must supplant procrastination.
At a recent press conference, President Eisenhower. in answer to

a reporter's inquiry for his opinion on the question of Presidential
inability, is quoted as having said:
Well when you are as closely confined to your bed as I was for some time, you

think about lots of things, and this was one of the foremost in my mind.
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I do believe that there should be some agreement on the exact meaning of the
Constitution, who has the authority to act.
The Constitution seems to be clear that Congress cannot only make the laws of
succession, but it can determine what Is to be done and It says, "In the case of
so-and-so and soand-so," but it does not say who Is to determine the disability
of the President. And we could well imagine a case where the President would
be unable to determine his own disability.
I think it is a subject that, in Its broadest aspcts, every phase of it should be
carefully studied by the Congress, advised with by the Attorney General and any
kind of advice they want from the executive department, and some kind of a
resolution of doubt reached. I think it would be good for the country.

A preliminary analysis of the problem initiated several months
ago at my direction as chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, reached the same conclusion as thePresidont
did.

But the problem is far from simple; it involves intricate legal

questions and constitutional issues.
In order to insure a broad and impartial approach to the problem

a questionnaire on the subject matter was prepared and circulated

among eminent purists, political scientists, and public officials. The
motive behind that stop was to assemble authoritative opinions and
data for later use-not only by the committee but also by all Members
of the Congress.
P In this document the suggestions and opinions of those who have
replied are set forth. Another similar publication will be forthcoming
inithe near future containing additional news.
Further implementation of this project was the appointment of a
special subcommittee to study Presidential inability composed of the
ranking members of the Committee on the Judiciary. It will be the
responsibility of this subcommittee to decide what future definitive
ste ps and measures will be undertaken in the course of the study.
The initiation of this entire project was predicated upon the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary over Presidential succession
and matters relating to the office of the President which jurisdiction
is conferred thereon by the Legislative Reorganization Act and the
Rules of the House of Representatives.
THs STUDy
CHAIRMAN CELIER'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

DEAR ..........

Since the Jurisdiction of the Cominittoe on the Judiciary embraces constitutional
questions and matters relating to the office of the President I as chairman of the
committee, have concluded that it Is Imperative to direct the attention of the
committee to a study of the delicate and vexing problem of Presidential inability
arising from the Inconclusive language of the Constitution.
I, therefore, have invited the consideration of the attached questionnaire by
men eminent in the fields of political science and constitutional law. It is planned
to compile the resulting answers and to publish them together as a House
document.
It has been many years since this unresolved area has been seriously analyzed
and it is my purpose, In this undertaking, to formulate such legislation as may be
necessary to reach a sound resolution of this unanswered problem which has
existed since the adoption of the Constitution. It Is hoped that you will fool free
to give your views, making such recommendation, explanation, and argument
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as you deem fit. I hope you will not feel circumscribed by the questionnaire but
will make such departures from It which, in your opinion, may be necessary.
Your conclusions may help to determine what subsequent action may or can be
taken. Will you advise Ie of your willingness to cooperate with nmo in this study
and let me know the approximate time 1 can expect to receive a reply to this
questionnaire?
In appreciation, I amC
Sincrel

yorsEMANUEL

CIOLLER,

Chairman.

P. 8.--I shall al)proclato receiving from you at the tino you answer the questionnairo a short biographical sketch which should include mention of published
material.
TIHE QUESTIONNAIRE,

lIoUss OF II1I'RV, SHNTATIVRO, U. S.
COMMITTim0 ON Tlll1 JUDICIARY
WASJIINOTON, D. 0.

84th Congress, lot session
QUF:sTIONNAIRu'-PRFIlslrNTIAL INABILITY

I. What was intended by the term inabilityt" as used in article 2, action 1
clause 0, of the Constitution? Shall a definition be enacted into law? If so
will you set forth a workable definition? Shall such a definition encompass
physical and mental disability as well as the duration thereof?
II. Who shall hh
itite the question of the President's inability to discharge the
powers and duties of his office?
(a) The Cmigrss.
b The Vice President.
(c) The Cabinet by majority vote.

(d) Any other group, including indielendnt agencies.
(0) Shall (d) be of a continuing or temporary nature?

11I. Once raised, who shall make the determination of inability?
(a) The Congmess.
(b) Tihe Vice President.
(e) The Cabinet by majority vote.
(dOAny other group, Including indelendent agencies.
(e) Shall (d) be of a continuing or temporary nature?
IV. Are there any constitutional prohibitions relative to questions II and III?
V. Shall dual au'thorlty, both to initiate the question and to determine the
question, be vested fi the same body?
VI. Shall the determination of d"bility set forth the-

a Permanent nature of the disability?
(b Temporary nature of the disability?
(VI0If temporary, extent of?
VII. if temporary, who raises the question that the disability has ceased to
exist? Once raised, who shall make the determination of cessation?
VIII. In the event of a finding of temporary disability, does the Vice President
succeed to the powem and duties of the omco or to the office Itself?
IX. In the event of a finding of permanent dimbility, does the Vice President
succeed to the powers and dutim of the office or to the office Itself?
_X. In the event of a finding of a permanent disability, dooe the language of the
Constitution, namely, "--or a President shall be elected-" demand the Immediate election of a new President? If so, would the election be for a 4-year
term or for the unexpired term of the disabled President?
XI. Does Congress have the authority to enact legislation to resolve any and
all of these questions, or will a constitutional amendment or amendments be

necessary?
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ARTICLE II, SECTION 1, CLAUSE 6, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of him Death, Resignation or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same
shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for
the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such
Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall
be elected.

REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
REPLY OF STEPHEN K. BAILEY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
DEcEMunER 12, 1955.

Hon.

EMANUEL CELLaIR,

Chairman, C(ommittee on the Judiciary,

flouse of Representatives, Washington, D. 0.
DEAR CoonGEssMAN CELLFR: I am gratified that you are planning to make

a study of Presidential inability. It is, as you point out, a most "delicate and
vexing problem." The replies to your questionnaire arc made tentatively because any highly systematic answer to your questions would Involve more time,
study and knowledge than I have at my disposal.
I. I do not know, and I am not sure that anyone knows, what the Founding
Fathers really meant by the term "Inability." I doubt that a definition should
be enacted into law. In marginal cases the experts would probably quibble over
any definition which received legal sanction.
TI. My own feeling is that the initiation of the question of the President's
Inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office should come from a con.
current resolution of the United States Congress. Obviously, such a resolution
could not be passed unless there was majority agreement that the Issue should
at least be looked into.
11. In order to remove the question of Presidential inability as far from
partisan politics as possible, I should recommend that the Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court be empowered by the concurrent resolution initiatIng the Issue of Presidential inability to appolnt an ad hoc body of 7 private citizens, not more than 3 from any one party and including at least 2 men of outstanding reputation in medicine and psychiatry. At least 5 members of said
body after deliberation and investigation should agree on the President's Inability,
and even their certification of Inability should be finally decided upon by tne
Supreme Court of the United States.
IV. These procedures would necessarily involve constitutional change.
V. No (see above).
VI. The determination should set forth (a), (b) and (c).
VII. The Supreme Court, again acting upon the recommendations of the ad
hoc body referred to above In 1I.
VIII. In case of a temporary disability, the Vice President should succeed~only
to the powers and duties of the office.
IX. In case of permanent disability, the Vice President should suoced to the
office itself.
X. I believe that in case of permanent disability, a now election should be
called only if loss than 2 years of a President's term had been served. In any
case, the election should be for the unexpired term of the disabled President.
XI. I believe a constitutional amendment would be necessary to enact the
above procedure.
At your request, I am submitting a short biographical sketch Including an
Indication of some of my published materials.
STNPHN K. BAILDT, Director.
Very sincerely yours,
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REPLY OF EVERETT 8. BROWN, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
DECMUDER

L2n,
CELLR,
Hon. EMANUE•L

28, 1956.

Chairman, Committe on the Judidiary,
house of Representalive, Washington, D. C.
l)EAn MR. CELLLUU: I am enclosing certain materials and comments which I

hope may be pertinent to yourstudy of Presidential Inability. Since the historical
background of the problem has been discussed In earlier committee hearings; In
articles in various periodicals, Including one by me in collaboration with Ruth C.
Silva (copy submitted herewith); and elaborated at considerable length In Miss
Silva's Presidential Ritecossion (University of Michigan Press, 1951), 1shall omit
further comment on that phase of the problem.
It is not easy to discuss Presidential inability without going into the entire
question of the executive branch of the (Government. I have touched on a number
of related questions in earlier books and articles listed in the enclosed bibliography.
In the present instance however, I shall attempt to confine my comments to the
Immediate questions raised In your questionnaire.
I have not entered upon a discussion of the manner in which Inability of State
executives has been cared for by constitutional and legislative provision. This
Chase of the problem will be treated by my colleague Professor JoMeph E. Kallenbach, who has made a special study of it.
EvRnTT S. BnowN.
Sincerely yours,
PIUESIDENTIAL INABILITY

By Everett S. Brown, professor of political science, University of Michigan
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONNAItI

I. (a) For the Intended meaning of the term "inability" as used in article 2,
seotion 1, clause 6, of the Constitution see: Everett 8. Brown and Ruth C. Silva,
Presidential Succeslon and Disability, Journal of Politics XI (February 1949)
236-256; and Ruth C. Silva, Presidential Succeslon, Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Pres, 1951.
(b) Adefinition of "inability" should be enacted Into law. Such a law should
provide for both physical and mental disability, permanent and temporary.
Temporary absence from the country is not noeesarily an "inabilit "; however,
the capture of a President In time of war could readily lead to a crisrs i Government unless proper provisions were irade for such an emergency.
1I. In my opinion Initiation of the question of Presidential inability should
be made by the Cabinet and the Vice President. In case of physical disability
only, the President himself milght suggest that the Vice President act in his place.
If former President Hoover s proposal of an appointive chief assistant to the
President, to relieve him of many unnecessary functions, were enacted into law,
such an officer might be added to those already named to initiate the question
of Presidential Inability, since he would be in a favorable position to assist in
the determination.
III. Determination of Presidential physical and mental inability might well be
left to the Vice President, the members of the Cabinet, and the presiding officers
of the House and Senate, after consultation with proper medical experts. The
latter need not be required in case of enforced absonce of the President from
the country.
IV. I fall to see an insurmountable constitutional prohibitions relative to
questions II and III.
V. Sme answers to II and III.
VI. I think it would be advisable to set forth the nature of the disability in all
instances. It would allay doubts and fears in the public mind and dispense with
many ill.founded rumors.
VII. If temporary, the question of cessation of disability should be raised by
the agency mentioned in the answer to II.
Determination of cessation of temporary disability should be made by the
agencies named In the answer to III.
VIII. In the event of temporary disability of the President, the Vice President
succeeds to the powers and duties of the office.
IX. The same as in VIII.
f82854--2
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X. I do not think an immediate election Isrequired. If one were provided for,
it would be preferable to have it for the unexpired term. To those who claim that
thie Constitution required that such an emergency President be elected for a term
of 4 years, attention miglit be called to the case of Senators. The Constitution
provides that their election shall be for a term of 6 years yet legislation and
precedent have established 2 and 4 year terms for some Senators from States
newly entering the Union, in order to maintain the division of Senators Into 3
classes, one-third of whom go out of office every 2 years, as provided by the
Constitution.
As a matter of historical fact, Congress by act of March 1, 1792, provided that
the first Presidential term should be reckoned from the fourth day of Marela
next succeeding the date of election. Since Washington was not inaugurated
until April 80, the act of Congress shortened his first term by nearly 2 months.
XI. In my opinion any and all of the questions raised in the questionnaire
could be settled by legislation.
P8E•5iD1lNTIAL SUOCE5I'BON AND INABILITY
By Everett S. Brown, University of Michl an, and It1th C. Silva, Poelsylvalia
State Cofloge
Senator Lodge, of Massachustts, recently called the problem of Premidontial
disability to the attention of the Commission on Reorganization of the Executive
Branch. As the Senator pointed out, twice a President of tile United Statos
has been In ill health and tile fact of his infirmity has lid a marked effect oil
national policy.' The Conlstitition provides that the powers and (Iuties of tile
Presldncly shall devolve upon the Vice Presidont In case of the President's
inability to dischargo then, and that ani oflicor designated by the Conlruss shall
act as Prcsideont in case of ronmoval, denth, resigiiatitoi, or inability of both the
President and Vice Prosideint.' 'he Constitution does not lhowevor, exlressly
answer three major questions which arseo iii connection with inaibility: What fA

the status of one who acts ais President because of the Inability of the President?
What constitutes inbility to discharge the powers and duties of the Presidential
Office?

Who is to (ltermine when all liability exists and whoma It ceases?

The

rulatlonship of these (liestlois to the geiimral oie of Presidential succession is
such that none cap be treated without first considering tile moro iasic problems.

The Vice President, or tile officer designated by the Con gross may be called
to act as Proeident either ioeaimse of vacancy in the office of Chief Executive or
because of hbahility of the incumbent. Iii tile case of death, resigiiatioii, or

removal, the Presidential Office is vacalnt; anid, colnseqeloiily, the problem of
restoring the President to his powers (does imot arise. In case of inability, how.
ever the Prsidoency Is not vacant; and, therefore, the problem of reinstating
the Prisidlent i pre•snted. This unavoidably raises questions relathig to Presldential status and tentire: Does the successor become President? What is the

status of the dlisabld Presidcent? Is the President to resume the exercise of
Presildotial power when his inability passes?
8oon after Tyler succeeded to the Presidency in 1841, Senator Allen of Ohio,
objected to establishing the precedent of the Vice President's becoming President
upon the death of the latter, because he thought that it would unnecessarily coinp licate the situation on some future occasion when the President became disabled.'
n the only two cases of Presidential Inability to date, the Vice President was not
called to act as President because of the fear that lie would become President and
thereby supersede the disabled President for the remainder of the term. As a
result, the affairs of tile executive branch were allowed to drift. In effect there
was no Chief Executive. The problem of providing for the exercises of Proel-

dontial power during a period of Inability would not be solved by enactment of a
statute by means of which the disability could be decided. Unless the President's
supporters were certain of his status following the inability, they would probably
resist any attempt to establish Inability, regarding It as equivalent to an action
for removal of the disabled President froin office. The first question, therefore
is whether or not one who acts as President becomes the President by virtue of
the powers and duties devolved upon him.
Study of the records of the Federal Convention shows that it was never Intended
that the Vice President or designated officer should become President under tile
succession clause.

When the draft Constitutlon went to the Committee of Style,

Congreilonal Iecord 80th Cong., 2d smis., vol, 04 (May 13, 11i48);

Art. II, sem. clause .
I Congresionaf Globe ,k7th Cong., 1t sss., vol. 10 (Juno 1, 1841).
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it contained two provisions dealing with Presidential succession, one providing
that "the Vice President shall exercise those (the Presidential) powers and duties
and the other empowering Congress to designate an officer to "act as President"
in certain cases. Each was modified by an adverbial clause limiting the tenure of
the acting President to the duration of the inability. The Committee of Style,
which was authorized to put the draft into clear and concise language but notr
alter substantive provisions, substituted "the same" for "powers and duties" and
"devolve" for "exorcise"; so the Constitution, as reported by the Committee,
provided that "the same shall devolve on the Vice President" and that the
designated officer "shall then act as President." 4 All other records of the Convention similarly indicate the Intended antecedent of "the Same" as used in the
succession clause to be "Powers and Duties of the said Office" rather than "said
Office." I Thus the argument that the Presidential Office rather than its powers
and duties devolves on the Vice President, whio thereby becomes President, has
no foundation in the records of the Constitutional Convention.
Agahi, it was tho efforts of the Committee of Style at consolidation which
resulted in combining the two succession provisions and in using tile limiting
clause, "until the Disability be removed," only once, instead of using it to modify
each of the preceding clauses separately. The coinnlttee changed the semicolon
to a commna, however, so the limiting clause would be part of a continuous sentence

and, therefore, refer alike to the succession of a Vice President and an "officer"
designated by Congress.6 Other provisions of the Constitution lend support to

tisIhtorpjretatioit. They do not once say that the Vice President shall become
President but rather that he shall act as Presidehn, Ihit the Presidential wers
shall devolve upon him, and that he shall exorcise Ilie olbeo of PresidentJ Tie
delegates in the ratifying Conventions and Ilamillto In The Federalist, used the

samne guarded language.' If any of tiem had thought the President's successor
would actually become tile President, it would have been easier to have said
becomee President" than to have engaged In clrcumnloution.
Seemingly oblivious to the intent of the Constitution all seven Vice Presidents,
who havo succeeded to the Presidency, have Wtken the Presidential oathl and have
been getnrilly recognized as Prosident of the United States. Willia•nl Henry
Harrison was the first, Ilresidcnt to die it offilee and It was then decided that the
Constitution provided that Vice President John tyler should become the President
and svrve utntfil t(ih end of the term for whiclh lharrison and lip had he'en ,lelotd.
Exactly how and by whom the decision was made is uncertain but all evidence
IndlcatAm that the abibinot, whose ranking nmember wa Ditunil Webster, a coll.

stitutional lawyer of no mean repute, so decided.9 Although Tyler thought

4 Roo note A,Infra. Fow a Inore detailed eonsluloratlon of the fra•lin of the succession clause, Oeean un'
publlqhod ,loetoril ,ll4,wrtaitlon, Rutllh '. Slh.e ,'resllentJill 8ku(VMJlon (JYliver-Aity of MichlhIhR, 14d), Ch. I.
Max Parrand, The Ittlori of the Fedleral Conmntiot of 1787 (New flavon, 1107), vol. 3, pp. WO, 6258
Vol 2 pl,.14, 1,72, IM1,
4U5, 4.01.
Til e Iraft sapearm in tle left Column amd the clause as reported In the right:
ART. X, Sti 2"1'$ * and in case of Ilia reuoval
ART. II, 8 hc.
1: "111c0 of the RGemoval of the
as aforesaid, death, absencroerignationor Inability President from OfMice, or of hi Death, Itel'tnation
to discharge the ilowern
duties of ht office the or Inability to discharge the Plowcrs and Duties of
Vice Presldent shall olv'o those powers and duitles the said OfFico, the Saeto shall devolve on the Vimes
unitli another. President be chosen, or wittl the In. President, (roinia) anit the Coitress many by Law
ability of the Preident removed.'
provide for the .Cise of Removal, Death Rtes nation
Avir. X, Sit. I: "The le,•~lature 'nay declare iby or Inablilty, both of the President nil Vimce
law what otilcor of the Untied States shall act as President, declaring what Om(fr altal then act as
President In me of the deth, resignation, or dis President (commue) and such OMcer shell ot
ability
of the
l'residont
annVioe
l'rPldent; (suntil
el. 0cordlngly,
untilbetheelected."
isaMIhlltyIbId.,
b remove,
a
Vol. 2, orpp.
president shall
act accordlnnly,
colon) and
such
O1oor shall
suob dlaiblilty be removed, or a Prosdlont shall be 898-4,
M21.
elected." Ibil,, Vol. 2, pp. 378, 573.
1Art. I, see. 3,clause a; art. 11,seW.
I, clause O;anlendlintlls XII And XX.
1 Amendment proi•mo
by IN,, New York (flnvenlion, Jonathan Elliot, 1The 1)chates II thle BSveral
states (211ed., lVhlhlelphi, I0), Vol 2 p 408; Monroe and Mdilson, ihi41, Vol. 3, pp. 417-410; Mirtlin,
ibld vol 1,p. 878 U. C' IAdIW (,d,) The Fedelrallst (New York 1192), No. 69,Pp. 427-428.
vol. 2, 8.
6?
'Vlia,
op. Cit., pp. •-? M(leorgo Tieknor Curtis, Life of IDaniel Webster (New York, IM170),
note. Thomas KwIngl1t, thefrindson of liarrison's Seretary of the treasury , wrote In &letter to tile Pew
York Times D)eo. 10, 1921: " r. Weister expreal the opinion that even tihouah tie P'resldent survived
during the terni for which
the period of inability and became vopable of Iwrformling tite duties Of his office
he was elected, lie would not displaeo the Vice President who had assumed the dutli of that off•e." Then
speaking of President Wilson's illn1es, Attorney Vwinl mldi: "If that opinion iscorrect there could be no
tciporary dlaplsoement of the Proident. This of ourlrp ONts greatly to theirseriousness of the step in the
eVent th•at the Presldent tias not died hilt Is merely nhmpaeltated"." At this Minle Vwlng wrote this letter,
W in
he l'•oawss•d over 70 boxes, btarrls, and suitcases of his graflcdftlher's pIlx,r, 'heso paiprs have been
the pomsesslon Of the LiMbrary of Congress shimic
No•evmber 1146, hut have not been sorted, indlexed, or made
available for research purlxose. Dr. Elirabeth McPherson, a Ineniber of tile Library's statf, examined 0
letter books, 200) unbound letters, and a 5.1page journal Covering the period of the elder Pwing's service in
the 11arrison.'rylor Cabinet, but found no reference to president il succssion. Whet her the younger .wlnl
based his letter on these papiers s not known; but correspondence with the HwIngt family confirms that he
was familiar with the paper.
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himself qualified to exercise Presidential power without any oath other than the
one he had taken as Vice President, he took the Presidential oath so doubt could
not arise concerning the legality of his acts as Chief Executive.' 0 Apparently
Webster thought this was the proper procedure, because it was he who offered
the resolution in 1850 for the two Houses to assemble for the administration of the
Presidential oath to Millard Fillmore."
Not all of Tyler's contemporaries approved of the decision that he had become
President. Many of the newspapers at the time viewed him merely as the Vice
president who was aotin as President. They did not, however, object to his
taking the Presidential oath, but no one argued that the taking of this oath actually
made him the President." Among those who agreed that Tyler had not become
President were John Quincy Adams, and the man who hoped to be the power
behind the throne during the regency of John Tyler, none other than Henry Clay
himself." Clay must have chatnge• his mind, for he voted with the majority
8 weeks later wtonit both Houses of Conigress, over the strong O)psitlion of ,John
MeKeon William Allen, and Blenjamin Tanpleu, recogiiized John Tyler as Presi.
dent of the United 8tates.14 Within a few weeks after Congrers approved Tyler's
succession, the whole matter was practically forgotten.
'rhe precedent set by Tyler has since been confirmed six times. The status and
tenure of Fillnore, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Collidge, and Truman have
never been seriouosly questioned. At the time of Johnson's imJpeacliineinl, how.
ever, his Presidential -itatis was disputed; but nobody suggested calling a 'pedcal
election to choose a President who would displace him before the end of Lin coln's
second torm, The original resolutinn providing for the impeaehment of O'.hhlson
styled him "Vice President and acting President of the United States." It
seemed necessary, however, to recognize Johnson as the President In order to
remove him; 11 but It was Senator Fes)enden's conviction that ho had become
President, which saved Lincoln's successor from removal.'0 Actually the prece.
ItJames D. Richardson, Masagn and Paper of the Preside•ts, 180-1897 (Washington, 187, vol. 4,
&Pl8-32Hearbert
y'Ier,
%im
Letters W.
andR~OMw%
Times The ?msoos of/the Amnerican Constitution (dilagow 1I2)pp772 yo

of the Tyler, (Richmond, 3585)
2,p., 12; Samuel tyler Ienioir of Rogter
Brooke Taney (altimore, 1872) pp. z95-m9; Peter It. Levin,vol.Seven
by Chance; Acclidntal Presidents
(Now York. 194), pp 27-28.
ItWebtster's roeoution provided that both Houses should assemble for the administration of the oath
prescribedd by the Oonst tution to Che late Vice President of the United States, to enable hilm to discharge
the powers and dulisof the office of President of 'he United States, devolved onhim bytldeathoZahr
Talo
. od . 31st Coasg., lit sem.
(Ju ylIO 50, Wao,
bstar's phrasoology,r'nta.
of Zachar
Implies that thought Fillmore was already the
P-resildent even though hie hid not yet taken the oath.
The most nearly correct view probably Isthht the taking of the
onth
does
not
make
anyone
the
President.
It isCorwin's thlesis that taking the oath by one elected to the l'rcsitdency does not make time
man President,
but Ismerely his first duty. Corwin thinks time
man Isalready fin olike when he takes thfe oath, and points
out that the Constitution says it isthe Presidlent, not the President elect, who takes the oath. As Vorwin
mentions, the act of March 1 1792 tasumed that Washlington became President on March 4,1789 although
he did not take the oath unti ApRl30. Edward S.Corwin The President: Oficeo
aid Powers ow York
11), pp. 59, 148-149 341 In any cse, sucedig Vice Presidents must have thought the Presidentia•
oath Important, for MIl
sen.en of them took It, and Arthur and Coolidge took It twice. Harper's Weekly,
vol. 28, p. OW
(t1881j
New York Tiemes, Febrlary
r 3,1932.
ItFor example! aotsburg Int•llienncer (Whig reprinted In the Daily National Intell ancer April 12,
1-41; Richmond Enquirer (omocrat roprt
oni
ia
tI e Washington (Uob, Apnil 12,u1841; Nelw ork Evening PosI (Democrat) reprinted In Niles National Register,
April 24 1841
oChuale Francias AMaIws (ad.e
,Themoi.m
ofJohn uonnyAdams(hllmleiphla 1878)
10, pp.460t) ;
vTol121 hi
a7
le; rLn
o cit, vol. 2, p. 80;lCilvin Colton (ed)uTeo Woerks A vol
Ienry Vlay (Neow
t oar .ton, a 27th Cong ontsn,
spp vol.thot
(Mat 3hos
noth 1 e,) t
he
P proid
it
IllIf John wre
ot the President, 6n1 Juutice,
rla C
would preside at the tr odte Pred
pro
tempore of ep Senate, Den Wade, whose vote was necsar
conviction wouln be a voting member of
the oourt. rost,the other band,J ohnson we merie the V cefor
President
W
ewould pride and whether
be would have avote or not was questionabn Alt otih WVaded
woultl have become
the acting President
if Johnson had been removedl, he not only sat Isa member of time impe-achiment
court but he also voted for
remnoval.sDavid Miller Dewnit, The Imlpachment an rial of Andrew Johnston (eewYork, 1903),
pp.
162~890,, 382 63, 8678
tar ofe chief charge against Johnson was that lie had violated the Tenure of Offie Act by removing Score.
tam o War Simon, a Lincoln appoint", without the consent of the Sonate. The act provided that such
rem uotvasdupnot be made without nmnatorial
usent, butt an appointee'& title to o csexpired I month1
after
Ilithe
term
oft ewaPresident whe0.r was appointed If Johnson were sill
thee•'cthe expiration
Presidentl,
hehad
violet
d he b&w o n thothr oby
Johnsn
hadeco me the President,
Stanton's tenure had expired, sil thus Johnson had not violated tseat. Although floutwell
arue th'at
Johnson was the President when the Impeachment court was being established, he later argued
that the
termnofPresident wasi years, and thatriot theoftleand ilts tn, but the loers and dutieusof the President
had devolved upon Johnson We said Johnson had no term, and It wsdrnLiol'sendterm thai
Stanton had been removed. Dewitt, op. oft.,pp. 1117-329 411, 42428 senator Fessenden's vote was
necessary for removal. But the Senator from Maine thought Jo nson hdbcme President and, there.
foew had not violated the Tenure of Offce Act. Co nseqnly he votedd for acqulital. Francis Feesenden,
William Pitt Fessenden (New York, 19W), vol. 2,pp.=10ra,
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dent according to which the Vice President becomes President was confirmed by
the impeachment of Johnson as President."
Such was the established rule of succession in 1881, when the first serious case
of Presidential Inability occurred. During the 80 days of Garfield's fatal illness,
ho performed but I official act, the signing of an extradition paper. The daily
bulletins of lis physicians are sutfficient evidence that he was unable to perform
the duties of his office. While the President was disabled there was muoh urgent
business calling for the immediate attention of the Chief executive. There were
mail frauds; there were officers to be commissioned' the country 's foreign relations
the
were deteriorating; but only routine business, which could be handled15by The
department heads without the President's supervision, received attention.
question that most complicated the problem was whether or not Vice President
Arthur would become the President for the remainder of the term if called to act
in that capacity. Some respected le gal opinion held that the Vice President
would assume the office in ease of inability Just as in case of vacancy, and the
powers and duties once devolved could not be returned to the President when the
disability was removed."9 Although the great weight of opinion favored the
President's resumption of his powers and duties when he recoveredN the Cabinet
was impressed by the arguments to the contrary.
and discussedf
Garfield
recover,agreement
the Cabinet
it appeared
on met
the desirability
waswould
unanimous
theWhen
inability
question.thatThere
having Arthur act its President during Garflold's recuperation; but 4 of 1e7
Cabinet members thought there could be no temporary devolution of Presidential
power on the Vice President. In view of this conflicting opinion, the Cabinet
concluded that it would be unfair to advise Garfield to Invite Arthur to act its
President without first presenting all the questions for the President's consider.
tion, because it might mean that they were asking the President to abdicate for
the rest of the term, All agreed that the President was too Ill to have these
questions presented to him. The cabinet thought the shook of taking iny
action on the matter might cause his death, so the question wits dropped.$ Gar.
field's demise made it unnecessary to solve the dilemma fit 1881, and the problem
wafs not raised again until Wilsoo', fell ill in 1919.
Wilson's Inability was prob)zbll more detrimental to the public Interest than
Garfield's, not only because it lasted for a longer period but also because it occurred
during the struggle for the League of Nations. There can be no question that
Wilson was unable to perform his Presidential duties much of the time from 8op.
timber 25, 1919, to March 3, 1021. During the special session of the 60th Congross, 28 acts became 2law owing to the President's failure to pass on them within
the requisite 10 davs. ' Wilson did not meet his Cabinet for 8 months during his
illness.1 The Senale Committee on Foreign Relations was unable to get any action
from the President on the matter of the Shantung settlementt" The Constitution
says that the President shall receive the representatives of foreign states, but
Viscount Grey, the British Ambassador, spent 4 months lit Washington without
seeing the President once?. At one time Senator Hitchcock, the Democratic
leader in the Senate, thought he might 1)0 able to get the Republicans to compromise on the Versailles Treaty, but Wilson's physicians refused to let him see
the President and, its Hlitchcock' said, he had to consult with the President before
the Democratic Senators could do anything?' Although it was reported 5 days
it feorge .loutwell, Iternliiiscenees of 00 Years it Public Affairs (New York 1902), vol 2 p. 113.
is(eorge P. Howe, ('hester A. Arthlur (New York, 1934), toe. 152453, iRI' boston Evening iraTnscrpt,
r
&,ptemtlier 1., 1551: New York Times, August II, 1881,
Atougst 2A, 1891; New York Iternl,

I For exaiolesTheitrlor, O)wllt,i'rvuntIodrol Imlublity, No. Amt.Riev., vol. 133, p. 430 (1881); Judge
l)litenlxfer, N.eW York flerrld, Repienirnbr 13. Mi1.
(1881); Thomas
Por examnlle: Denjaminim Iltitler, l'rrsldentlal inmbility, No. Am. Rev., vol. 133, ).
F
M. Cooley, Presi~lntirl Iniahillit. Ibid. 422, LJyman Trtmbuml, l'rishl,,ntil Intability, IhhI., 417; (leorge
(131
(1I);
fornier
Attorney
General
1mna04llty,
flarlWrs
Weekly,
vol.
25,p.
Ticknor Culrtis, I'repihebntlal
Jerenmiah lllmwk Governor LIittlefleld of Imhoile Island, and governorr Bligelow of Connecticut, New York
IhenIt, 0eptcrneer 6. 1ta1; Jutgtes lyman 'rni'bmll and KIsos Grlswold, ibid.. September 9, 1851; former
Attorney General Behoomninker, iid4., SptItmlx-r 17, 1881.
It New York Ilemld, Se'ptemnber 2,1981; New York Tribune, September 2, Iktl. On September 4, 1881
tile New York Tinm reported that kecretry of $late Mlaine, Secretary of t(ie Navy ihunt, and Wcretiry of
War Linmoln thought the Vice Presi dent could temporarily aet as President; blut Attorney (enerld Mse.
Ve h, Post,'uaster generall Jares, Secretary of the Treasury Windom, and Secrrtsry of the Interior Kirk.
weoo were of tlme contrary Opinlon.
it Lindy RIogers, The President's Illness, American Political Science Review, vol. 14, pp. 87-88 (1920).
" Davidlouston, l•itht Years with Wilson's Cabinet (New York. 10M, vol. 2, pp. W8-0; Davkk
Lawrence The True tNry of Woodrow Wilton (New York, 1924), p, 2%.
14New York Times. October 14, 1919.
t Ilorwl1l, 01) cit., pp. 80-1.

I New York Times, November 80, 1919.
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later that Hitchcock had seen the President 3 times,"7 It was plainly evident that
there was an unable President in the White House. Many students of the period
agree that public business in general, and the fate of the treaty in particular, were
affected by the President's isolation from public opinion, from his advisers, and
from congressional leaders.' 8
Public affairs were conducted much as they had been during Garfield's illness.
Either Presidential powers and duties were not discharged or were handled in such
manner as the Cabinet, the President's family and his personal entourage could
devise. There seems to be almost unanimous agreement that state papers were
given to Mrs. Wilson first. If she had any doubt as to the effect they would have
on her husband, she submitted them to Dr. Grayson. If Dr. Grayson thought
the President was strong enough to pass judgment on them without injuring his
health, they were shown to dhim. If not, they were deferred or passed on to
Secretary of the Treasury Houston, or a few others in whom Mrs. Wilson had
confidence.3' That this situation existed was rather widely known at the time;
yet there was no serious movement for the devol'ition of Presidential power on
Vice President Marshall.
The possibility of inviting Marshall to act as President was discussed several
times. On March 1, 1920, the House Committee on the Judiciary held bearings
on 3 bills and I proposed constitutional amendment for the declaration of such an
inability. The hearings served only to bring out almost insurmountable consti.
tutional problems, the most difficult of which was whether or not the President
could be restored to his powers and duties when he recovered. Authorities wore
the committee could reach no conclusion
cited on both sides of the question, but
and reported none of the measures.30 At another time, the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations sent Senators Fall and Hitchcock as a special subcommittee
to interview the President to determine the truth or falsity of the many rumors
that he was in no physical or mental condition to attend to important public
found him in bed but men.
business. They were with the President 40 minutes,
tally vigorous, and the visit came to nothing.83
'1he Cabinet also considered asking the Vice President to act as President; but
V Lansing suggested this possithe White IHouse circle fought the move." When
bility, Turmulty, the President's secretary, was indignant and reproached the
Secretary of State for his lack of devotion to Wilson. Tumulty quotes himself
as saying: "You may rest assured that while Woodrow Wilson is lying in the
White House on the broad of his back I will not be a party to ousting him. He
has been too kind, too loyal, and too wonderful to me to receive such treatment
at my hands." " rTutnuity s objection to the devolution of executive power on
the Vice President seems to have been based on the thought that it would displace
Wilson. The President apparently took the same view. Tumulty( quotes Wilson
as declaring on the occasion of Lansing's forced resignation: "Tumulty, it is never
the wrong time to spike disloyalty. When Lansing sought to oust me, I was on
my back. I am on my feet now and I will not have disloyalty about me." 34
'Because of the fear that a succeeding Vice President displaces the disabled
President, the Cabinet in the case of Garfield, and the White House circle, in
the case of Wilson, decided on the basis of personal loyalty to the disabled President whether an inability existed or not, and on both occasions the decision was
contrary to fact. Tihe usage by which the Vice President is transformed into a
President has practically nullified the constitutional provision for the administration of the executive branch of the Government when a President becomes
incapacitated. It is important, therefore, to consider the reasoning by which the
11hild

December 8. 1910.

UCharles Reymour (editor), The Intimate Papers of Colonel Rouse (Boston, 1926-28), vol. 4, pp. w06-M07,
W59-5i2; LAwrence, op. elit., p. 299; Edith (. Reid, Woodrow Wilson (Now York, 1934), pp. 224-23P0: Wlllia3m
Woodrow Wilson (hoston; 1925), pp. 448-460; John K. Winkler, Woodrow Wilson (Now York,
Allen Whie,
pp. i86-299.
1933),
N Mrs. Wilson herself confirms much of this. Edith Rolling Wilson, My Memoir (Indianapolis, 1939),
pp. 288-290, as does Hlouston, the Cabinet n'ember In whom Mrs. Wilson had the most confidence; op. oli.,
vol. 2, pp. 60-"6. Sile also Irwin Hoover, Forty.two Yeaq in the White Rouse (Boston, 1934), pp. 106106; Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 29-3q9; Reid, on. eit., p-). 224-230; Winkler, op. cit., pn. 247-288. See especially
Joseph P. Tuimulty, Woolrow Wilson As f Know Him (New York, 1921), pp. 437-438. Committee on the
N earings on It. R. 12M09, 12629, 12(47, and It. J. Rms. 297; House of Representatives
Judiciary 6th Cong., 2dd.( ss. (1020).
8' New VorkTfri,,l)eceniberf, 1919. ee also Hitchcock's account of this incident, InJohn M. Mathews
and Clarence A. Terdahl, l)ocuments and Readings In American Government (New York, 1928), pp.
111-113.
n Houston, op. clt, vol. 2,pp. 37-39; Tumulty, op. cit., pp. 443-446.
.
-3 'rmulty, op. cit., p. 444. Italic supplied.
31Ibid., p. 445. (Italic suppllled In 188, Wilson wrote that the Vice President's importance consists
in that he may cease to ho Vice President. Congressional Government (New York, I5SM), pp. 240-241.
See also Reid, op. cit., p. 223.
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has been sustained in case of the President's death, and by what logo
thas been extended to the case of his inability.
In substantiation of the thesis that the Vice President becomes President when
there is a vacancy or inability in the superior office it is said that the Constitution
itself provides that the Presidential office, not merely its powers and duties, shall
devolve upon the Vice President." The argument runs that not only is this
true grammatically but that the framers of the Constitution intended it to be
the case. In answer to this assertion, it can be pointed out that syntactically
"the same" as used in the succession clause may refer to "powers and duties of
the said office" as well as to "said office." 36 In reply to the contention that the
framers of the Constitution intended the office as well as its powers and duties
it is necessary only to point to the records of the
to pass to the Vice President,
Federal Convention.' 7 Although the framers of the Constitution intended "the
same shall devolve on the Vice President" to be equivalent to "the Vice President
shall exercise those powers and duties," the difference in the language used in the
two parts of the succession clause is frequently cited to buttress the proposition
that the Vice President becomes President when called to act as such. It is
claimed that in case of single vacancy, the office devolves upon the Vice President
for the remainder of the term, but in case both the Presidency and Vice Presidency
are vacant, the designated officer acts as President ad interim.
It has been asserted that the adverbial clause, "until the disability be removed,
or a President shall be elected," modifies only the clause providing for an officer
to act as President. Some have even gone so far as to say that the limiting clause
is separated by a semicolon from the clause providing for the succession of the
Vice President and refers, therefore, only to the officer who might be designated
to act as President. In consequence, they argue, once the Vice President succeeds, he takes the office without limitation for the remainder of the term. It is
absurd to hold that the adverbial clause, "until the disability be removed," limits
the tenure of a designated officer who acts as President but does not apply to the
Vice President who becomes President. As the New York Tribune asked editorially: What kind of sense does it make to say that, if the President becomes ill,
the Vice President replaces him for the rest of the term; but if the Vice President
who has succeeded the President, becomes ill, also, he can assume the exercise of
presidential power when he recovers? U
Some have tried to escape this conclusion by arguing that the office devolves on
the Vice President in case of vacancy in the Presidency, but in case of disability
only its powers and duties devolve on him for the duration of the inability." The
difficulty is that the Constitution makes no distinction between the status of one
who succeeds because of vacancy and40of one who succeeds because of inability.
Others have tried to evade this difficulty
The same thing devolves in both cases.
by saying the Vice President becomes President in case of inability just as in case41
of vacancy, but that he ceases to be President when the disability is removed.
The trouble with this position is that it creates the anomaly of two Presidents at
once or necessitates the removal of the disabled President. It also requires the
removal of the second President at the termination of the first President's Inability;
3e
For a general Cxpsition of the thesis that the Vice President actually becomes the President, se for
example: Wiso and Walker, Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., lat sess., vol. 1) (June 1,1841). Jones, Con.
Taylor, Congressional Record,
(December18,•19,1881);InHannis
Cong.,e cm vol.13
47th
Record,
p onal
In latchford Merriam v. Clinch, 17 Fed. 68, 70.
Justice
os voln
3d ostsess.,
van,
Con
supra.
cited in1918);
note 19,
and Dwight,
ittonhfr
Bcesealso
nit is a rule of Latin grammar that the Immediately preceding noun tsthe antecedent of the relative
which follows, Inwhich case "the same" would refer to offico. Accepted english usage, however, does not
always conform to this rule, nor did It In the period when the Constitution was written. In English the
antecedent Is frequently the lasqt grammatical unit used as a substantive, In which cuse the antecedent
would be "powers and duties of tfhe said omce."1 Sir James Murray, A New English Dictionary on His.
torical Principles (oxford, 1859-19,), vol.5, rt. 2,p. 76.
It For a general exposition of the thesis tha the successor does not become President bat merely acts as
such, see for example: McKeon, Allen Tappen, Congre.qionai1 Globe, 27th Cong., 1st seat, vol. 10 (May
Record, 47th Cong., lst seu, vol. 13 (December 14, ISRI)- Lapbam,
3i, June 1,1841); Maxey, Congressionai sass,,
vol. 14 (January 6,1883); Henry H. D~avis 'Inability of thet
Congressional R;ecord, 17th Cong., 2d
President, S. lDoc. 308, 65th Cong., 3d seas.; John B. Leavitt, A Solution of the Presidential Inability
Problem, American Bar Association Journal, vol. 8, pp. 189-90 (1922.
U5August 18, 1881.
ItSee for example: Cooley, op. cit., pp. 122-124; George Ticknor Curtis, Presidential Inability, Harper's
Weekly, vol. 28, p. 58 (2108i- Alexander Fulton, Presidential Inability, Albany Law Journal, vo . 24,
pp.286-287 (October 8, 1881)- tfe olloquy between Representatives Walsh and Fesa, Hearings op cit.. -,.40.
4;None of the various drafts of the Constitution distinguished between the status of one wh~o silcet s In
ease of vacancy and of one who succeeds because of Inability, nor Is there anything in the records of the Con.
vention to Id icato that such a distinction was Intended. All of the records show that the devolution of
Power In case of Inability was intended only for the duration of the inability. Farrand, op. cit., vol. 8,
P.600; vol. 2,pp. 172, 186,495, 499, 532, &35, 573, 50-59. 659.
41See for example: Judge Griswold, New York Herald, September 9, 1881.
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yet the only method for removal of a President from office is impeachment by the
house and conviction by the Senate.
If one holds that a succeeding Vice President does not become President, he is
not troubled by these inconsistencies. He does not have to explain why seven
"Presidents" have had a term of less than 4 years while the Constitution provides
a 4-year term for the President unless he dies, resigns, or is removed before the
expiration of that term. There is no need for distinguishing between a Vice
President upon whom Presidential power devolves and an officer who acts as
President, There is no need for distinguishing between vacancy and inability.
In all cases the successor merely acts as President ad interim. This view greatly
simplifies the problem of handling cases of disability because it allows the Vice
President to act as President for the duration of the inability without displacing
the President or without causing the anomaly of two Presidents. It allows the
Vice President to discharge the presidential functions as a part of his Vice
Presidential duties and to do so tinder his oath as Vice President. As Senator
Lapham said in 1883, the Vice President commits himself solemnly to discharge
all the duties of the office of Vice President, one of which is to perform the
functions of the Presidency when they devolve upon him because of vacancy or
inability In the superior office.42
The objection to this Inte~rprtation of the succession clause is that the Constitution vests executive power in the President and thus by Implication forbids its
exercise by anyone who is not actually the President. The Constitution commands
that the President shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Specific
grants of executive power made by the Constitution are made to him. Attorney
General Caleb Cushing thought the President, the man holding the presidential
office, and he alone, could exercise the executive powers specifically granted in the
Constitution; that the act of signing and vetoing bills was a personal act of the
President and could not be exercised by any other.'3 Although the Supreme Court
has upheld the delegation of certain powers by the President to the department
heads and has said that their acts are presumed to be his and are binding within
the sphere of the President's legal and constitutional authority," the courts have
which from the nature
denied anyone the right to exercise for the President a power
of the case requires the President's personal judgment.4' A study of the cases in
which the delegation of executive power has been upheld will show that in every
case, the power in question was one granted to the President by statute. Not once
has the Court upheld the delegation of power directly vested in the President by
the Constitution. As Professor Corwin says, the CIonstitution- knows a single
executive power, that of the President, whose duty it is to see that the laws be
a duty which, legally, it is his obligation and power to execute
faithfully executed,
4
personally. 4
The argument that the vesting clause, as interpreted by the courts, requires
one to become President in order to exercise those powers vested in the President
alone is not unanswerable. The restrictions laid down by the courts apply to the
delegation of executive power by the President to his subordinates, and should
not by analogy be extended to the devolution of this power in such a way as to
defeat the purpose of the succession clause. The records of the Federal Convention give no indication that the framers of the vesting clause would preclude the
possibility of an acting President. in case of vacancy or inability in the Presidency.
Their sole purpose in writing the vesting clause appears to have been the establishment of a single, as contrasted with a plural, executive.'" The purpose of the
succession clause seems to have been to provide a substitute for the President in
well
certain cases, not to provide for the creation of another President. The rule i,%
established that the different clauses should be given effect and reconciled if
41Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 2d weas., vol. 14 (January 6, 1883). The Constitution requires the
President to take the oath: but In the ease of an acting Presidentone may ask whether his taking the oath
Isa legal obligation or mere custom. It seems to be assumed that the taking of the Presildential oath Isa
ere Isto to the exercise of Presidential power and that this oath transforms a Vice President Into a
P dent
butItis contended at the same time that the officer designated by the Congress would not bA.
come the President although, presumably, the same oath would be a prerequisite to his exercise of PrA .
dental power also. Bce note 11, supra.
464-470 18M).
41Op. Att. Oen. vol. 7,ppm.
4411 lloz v. Jackseon, 13 Pet. 499, AlN (1839); United States v. ?.lkmaon, 16 Pet. 291, 302 (1842); Wlliams V.
United Sesta, I How. 290, 296-297 (1843); Confiscation Cases, 20 Wall. 92, 109 (1874); Wsdoey v. Chapman,
101 1. B.753, 76•7-70 (1870); Punkle v. Ndited tales, 122 U. 8. 513. 557 (1987): UniteMR talea v. Fletcher, 148
U. S. 84, 88-"1 (1893); United Males a rel. French v. Weeks, 250 U. 5. 320, 334 (1922); and Caleb Cushing,
op clit., pp. 453-4W0.
* Expert, Field, 9 Fe•. cus. 1,5 (1862): RPenkle v. United ,941t, 122 U. 8. 543, 537 (1887); United Stalees v.
Pae 37 U B.
.673, 680-"81 (1891); United Sta1t. v. Fletcher, 148 6. S. 84, 88-91 (1893).
op. elf., pp. 76-82.
4 (orwin
' Farrand, on. cit., vol. 1, pp. 21, 63, 70, 72, 73, 79, 89, 90, 02, 93, 06, 105 10(, 100 225, 230, 231, 244, 247,
234,261 266, 272, 292; vol. 2, pp. 22, 29, 100-101,116, 132, 134, 135, 145, 3M. i71, 155, 401, 372, 697, 67; vol.3
pp. 132, 347; vol. 4,pp. 17, 46.
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possible.' The conclusion is, therefore, that the clause vesting executive power
inthe President should be construed in such a way as to allow for an acting President, who will exercise executive power in case of the President's removal, death,
resignation, or inability until the disability passes or another President is elected.
Ifit isrecognized that the Vice President does not become the President in case
of the President's disability the problem of what constitutes inability is less
formidable, since the disabled President is not thought to have forfeited his office.
Nearly all of those who hold that the Constitution provides only for an inability
of a permanent character extending throughout the remainder of the term hold
also that, once the inability Is established, the Vice President becomes the President for the unexpired portion of the term. If the Vice President actually dis.
places the incapacitated President for the duration of the term, only the most
extended disabilities should be held to fall within that class of inabilities which
devolves presidential power on the Vice President. If the Vice President merely
acts as President for the duration of the inability, however, restriction to liabilities
extending throughout the entire term seems unnecessary. Even if this limitation
on the meaning of inability is ruled out there still is no unanimous agreement on
its definition. Some hold it is limited lo mental incapacity, while others believe
it covers any disability whatever the cause.
During Garfield's illness there was an impressive body of opinion which held
that the only disability recognized by the Constitution was intellectual incapacity.
Theodore Dwight, professor of constitutional law at Columbia College, applied
the common law which defined the term as mental inability. He said that It
was such an incapacity as a civil court would recognize as unfitting a man to make
a grant, but not including physical disability such as an arm injury making it
necessary to have a deputy sign for him .4 Former Senator Eaton, a recognized
authority on the Constitution, stated that the succession clause provided for no
disability of which the President could be aware and was amazed at the suggestion
that the President could decide his own disability. The "inability," he held,
must be one such as insanity, which is patent to everyone except the President.
As long as the President possesses reason, said Eaton, he is not disabled in the
constitutional sense.M0 Secretary of the Interior Kirkwood likewise thought the
Constitution provided only for mental inability, an opinion with which Senator
McDonald of Indiana, Governor Cullum of Illinois, and Judge Trumbull agreed.st
There is an equally respectable body of opinion which holds that inability is
not restricted to mental incapacity but that if the public interest suffers because
the President is unable to exercise his powers whatever the cause a case of
inability exists. Benjamin Butler, writing with reference to Garfield's illness,
said that inability is obvious to any right thinking person. If an emergency
arises and the President is unable to act, the Vice President is to assume presidential power." Among those who have thus broadly defined "inability are
Congressman George M. Robeson, Judge Elias Griswold Senator Elbridge G.
Lap ham, George Ticknor Curtis, and Attorney John Broos Leavitt.4 There Is
an abundance of conflcting opinion on the meaning of the term, but none is
authoritative. The records of the Federal Convention and the commentators on
the Constitution throw no light on the question. Since there are no authorities
to whom one can turn for a definition of "Inability," the term must be defined on
the bases of general principles of law and rules governing constitutional Interpretation.
To restrict the meaning of inability to mental incapacity would deprive the
United States of a Chief Executive In case of the President's physical disability,
of his capture by the enemy In time of war, and on other occasions when the
President is mentally competent yet physically unable to exercise his powers.
Adefinition of inability which fails to provide for the exercise of Executive power
at all times Is contrary to the legal principle that Executive power is a continuing
one, never ending never dormant never allowed5 to lapse, and that there must
be someone at all times to exercise the power. ' The courts say that, where
it Sfhick v. UnUied att, 198 U.8.6 , a (1000.
41Dwight, ipncit., Pp. 4•M .
0 New York "'mes,September 2,1881. July 16, 1881; McDonald, ibid., August 19, 1881; Cullum and
I Krirkwood, Boston Evening Transcript$
Trumbull New York Herald, eptember 9,1881.
-. als1HY 1. Cole, "To What Extent Can the President of the United Statets
u Loo. @lt., 428-43.
Perform the Duties of His Oftie While Abroad." Mass. Law Qurvol. 4,pp. 180, 191-193 (1919).
ItRobeson, New York Tribune September 2, 1881; Grlswoluda, ?ew York Herald September 9 1881

Lapham, Congressional Record, 4M oons., 2d ses., vol. 14 (January 8,1883);-eavidt, too. cit., p. 10 anM
his letter to the New York Times, December 6, 1921; CurtI, o0. cit., p. W83.
Rarrdtv. Duff, 114 Kan. 220, 223 (1923); • paett• ump, 1 Pac. 42833- (1913); Et paert# lawkins,
136 Pae, 991, 993 (101i); Inre ac Ad Ibe,rnIn# Alcoholic Rearates, 130 N. 3. L. 123,129 (1943).
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words admit different meaning, the one consonant with the object in view is to
be selected, that words are to be taken In their natural and obvious sense and not
in a sense unreasonably restricted, and that the Constitution must receive a
practical construction." These well established rules point to a definition of
'inability" which covers all cases in which the President is in fact unable to
exercise a power which tile public interest requires to be exercised. The cause
and duration of the inability are immaterial- the question is one of fact.
This conclusion would nmean that some illnesses and absences are inabilities
while others are not. In time of war, for example, an illness of a few days may
be more serious than one of several months at another time. With the developiment of rapid communication and transportation, absence would not usually be
an inability in fact. Although the records of the Philadelphia Convention show
that the Vice President was intended to exercise presidential power during the
President's absence, usage has established that mere absences from the United
States is not a disability within the meaning of the Constitution." This is not to
say however, that some absences might not be liabilities. The answer In a
particular case would depend on the facts. Even if it possesses the power Congress probably cannot define inability before its occurrence in such a way as to
cover every contingency." The most Congress can do is to declare that the
term "inability" shall cover all cases in which the President is in fact unable to
exercise the powers and discharge the duties of his office'. The only effect of a
declaration would be to put the congressional approval on well-established
principles of law and constitutional Interpretation, and to guide those who must
decide if an inability exists in a particular case,
The final problem concerns who shall decide when a disability on the part of
the President exists. The records of the Constitutional Convention do not
reveal the intention of the framers of the succession clause on this subject.
John Dickinson raised the question, but none of his colleagues offered an answer.$
In 1881, when President Garfield was Incapacitated, the great weight of opinion
favored the theory that the successor Is to determine when the President is
disabled. Adherents of this position say that the Vice President is obligated
to exercise the power and perform the duties of the Presidency, just as It Is his
duty to preside in the Senate, and no enabling action by the courts, the Congress, the Cabinet, or the President Is necessary.U Judge Trumbull said there
[s no need for providing a formal means of determination. In Trumbull's
opinion, the inability must be so notorious that no one can reasonably doubt its
existence. In such a case, he said, the Vice President is authorized to assume
the Executive power if important public business requires Executive action.
When these conditions exist, continued the Judge, the Cabinet should notify
the Vice President Just as In case of the President's death, but there Is no constitutional requirement for this notification. It is only custom In case of the
"Aldrich v Kinney 4 Conn. 3R0, 385 (1822); People v. Dawell, 25 Mich 247 281 (1872); Railroad Co. v.
Phiston, 18 *all. 5,31 (1873); Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and T'rust Cb,, 15 U. A.601, 618 (1895).
' The succession clause as referred to the Committee of Style provided for five cases; removal, death
absence, resignation and Inability. Farrand, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 675. The provision for the exercise of
Presidential power Auring the President's absence was deleted by the committee; and there is no record
that the Convention was aware of this change. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 598-599. Since absence is not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution, the question Iswhether or no t Is covered by the term "inability." For
a ensideration of this question, see Silva, op. clt., pp. 140-155.
*There has never ben unanimous agreement on the power of Congress to deal with inability. One
position Is that the only power granted to Congress isto declare what officer shall act as President In case
of vacan" or inability in both the Presidency and Vice Presidency and under the rule of incluslo units,
exoluslo aterlus, Congress has no other powers In the field of presidential succession. See W. W. Wil.
loughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (New York, 1929, vol. 3, pp. 1407-1408; Butler,
op cit. pp. 431-433; 3. Hampden Daugherty Presidential Succession Pro lems, Forum, vol. 42, pp. 523,
Assoc. Jour., voUS,
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President's, death and desirable In case of inability. It is extralegal and adds
nothing to the Vice President's right to exercise Presidential jpower.0
Trumbull is probably correct in saying that the decision belongs to the sitecessor in the first instance. Since the duty of acting as President tinder certain
conditions of fact is imposed upon him, his official discretion extends to the
determination of whether the condition exists or not. It is a well-establishied
rule of law that in contingent grants of power, the one to whom tile power is
granted is to decide when the emergency has arisen. Thus tile Vice President
or the officer designated by law to act as President is constituted the judge of
the Executive's inability in the first instance and is bound to act according to
his interpretation of the facts. Someone must decide whether the President is
disabled; and since the Constitution mentions only the successor, he is the judge
of the facts.Ol If past experience can be taken as a reliable indication of the
attitttde of future successors, the danger of their msvtrping the President's powers
on the pretext of inability is slight indeed. The judgment of both Vice Presidents
Arthur and Marshall was conditioned by their sense of propriety. These two
cases indicate that the real problem is not how to guard against the successor's
abuse of the power, but how to relieve him of the embarrassing duty of taking
the initiative.
It seems almost certain that no court has power to issue a writ of mandamus to
the Vice President, or designated officer, directing him to act as President during
the latter's inability, because a court can only order the performance of a minis.
trial function.#3 Perhaps the courts can pass on the validity of some executive
action taken by the successor and indirectly on the inability of the President if
properly raised in a case involving individual rights- 3 but this would do nothing
to alleviate the Vice President's delicate position in making the determination
in the first place. Whether Congress has power either to determine actual
inability or to provide a means for deciding such cases is questionable. Opinion
on tile matter is divided, but the weight of opinion seems to be that Congress has
no such power. Congress is given the power to name a successor to act as Presi.
dent after the Vice President and this probably excludes all other congressional
power to deal with Presidential succession.14
The Congress could relieve the successor of the embarrassment of taking the
initiative, however, by passing a concurrent resolution requesting him to act as
President or by authorizing some officer or officers to enquire Into the President's
inability and report thereupon to the successor. The actual decision would still
rest with the successor where the Constitution vests it, and his decision would
not await or be bound by the report. The investigation could properly be made
by the Cabinet, because the Cabitiet consists of the President's appointees who
would not be eager to displace him and the Cabinet is in the best position to know
the facts. Once it is recognized that the successor does not supersede a disabled
President for the remainder of the term, the President might usually invite his
successor to act for him for the duration of his inability. But if tile President
could not or would not do so, the successor should decide on the President's
inability with or without a report from the Cabinet.
This would answer the questions John Dickinson raised in the Constitutional
Convention: what is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to be the
Judge of it? Not only can the inability problem be thus solved, but it car. be
solved without resort to the difficult process of constitutional amendment.
1Trumbull, loc. cit., ).420-421.
,1 Martin v. Molt, 12 vheat. 19, 31-32 (1827); rhe Aurora v. Untied .Ralee, 7 Cranch 382 (1913); Field v.
(1891), haminpon and Co. v. United .late, 276 U. S.391,405-410 (1928). See also
Clark. 143 U. S. 649, (82-6%N
)isabillity of the Presldent, Law Notes, Vol. 23, pp. 141-142 (1910).
62 (Ia inca v. Thompion, 7 Wall. 347 (1869;) Dudley v. Jarnes, 83 Fed. 345 (1897); Alinissippi v. .Iohn on, 4
Wall. 475 (1807); Carrick v. Lamar, 116 U. d. 423 (186). See ulso Cole, toe. cit., p. 194.
61 hi cases in which Individual rights dopmnd on executive action, the individual has the right 0 resort to
Madison,mranch, 137,170 (i8O); UnitededaltA ez rd. Beileston. Blame,
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4
139 U. 8. 300,320 (1O91; It re Cooper 143 U. S. 472, 56(1892). hut the question tuust arise in a casi Involi.
ing actual litigants. clouoh v. Curtis, 134 U.8.301,872(180W). On the other hand, the courts niglh, decide
that the question was political and submitted to the successor's discretion alone. If the courts doecids this,
they will hold that they are hound to follow the successor's tlecistn. Luther v. itorden, 7 llow. 1 (1819).
64ee
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REPLY OF EDWARD S. CORWIN, PRINCETON, N. J.

Hon. EMANUEL CELLER,

DECFJMDRz

7, 1055.

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.
DEAR MR. CELLER: Enclosed you will find two copies of my answers to the

questionnaire which you submitted to me in your favor of November 29.
Under another cover I am sending you a copy of National Review which contains my answers to a somewhat similar questionnaire submitted to me recently
by the editor of that publication.
I am unable at the present writing to provide a short biographical sketch. You
can easily have one compiled from the current Who's Whoin America.
I shall be happy to be kept abreast of the committee's deliberations.
Sincerly yours,
EDWARD 8. CORWIN,
UESTIONNAIRM ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY FOR HousE oF REPRESENTATIVES,
CoMMIrTTE ON THE JUDICIARY

1. What was Intended by the term "inability" as used in article 2, section 1
clause 0, of the Constitution? Shall a definition be enacted into law? If so, will
you set forth a workable definition? Shall such a definition encompass physical
and mental disability as well as the duration thereof?
Anewer.-On account of the variety of human circumstances capable of affecting
such a question, I greatly doubt the possibility of framing a sure-fire definition of
Presidential "Inability." In fact, such a definition might easily operate to embarrass determination of the matter In many actual situations.
2. Who shall Initiate the question of the President's inability to discharge the
powers and duties of his office?
a. The Congress
b. The Vice President
c. The Cabinet by majority vote
d. Any other group, including Independent agencies
e. Shall (d) be of a continuing or temporary nature?
Answer.-It Is undoubtedly within the power of the Vice President to do this,
since he is the one upon whom rests the constitutional duty to take over the
powers and duties of the office of President when the President is incapable of
discharging the same; and clearly anybody which may be authorized by Congress
to determine whether "inability" exists in fact ought to have the right to raise
the question.
8. Once raised, who shall make the determination of Inability?
a. The Congress
b. The Vice President
c. The Cabinet by majority vote
d. Any other group, including independent agencies
e. Shall (d) be of a continuing or temporary nature?

Answer.-Somebod'y designated by Congress whose determination of the
matter may be fairly expected to be accepted as conclusive- e. g. the Cabinet or
the National Security Council, enlarged perhaps by the Chfef Justice et al.
4. Are there any constitutional prohibitions relative to questions 2 and 8?
Answer.-No constitutional prohibitions are pertinent to questions 2 and 8
so long as It Is kept In mind that it Is the Vice President and nobody else upon
whom the duty falls to take over the powers and duties of a disabled President.
5. Shall dual authority, both to initiate the question and to determine the
question, be vested In the same body?
Anewer.-There Is no reason why not, one purpose of such an InquIry being to
enlighten the Vice President as to his constitutional duty and to protect him from
Im utations of overambition and rashness.
Shall the determination of disability set forth thea. Permanent nature of the disability?
b. Temporary nature of the disability?
e. If temporary, extent of?
Answer.-Yes, if Congress so desires, Its power under "the necessary and
proper" clause to inquire or to authorize Inquiries Into situations which Involve
a widespread public Interest being practically unlimited. The classic Instance
Is Its creation In February 1877 of the Electoral Commission, which by deciding
the presidential election of 1876, possibly averted a civil war.
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7. If temporary, who raises the question that the disability has ceased to exist?
Once raised, who shall make the determination of cessation?
Answer.-Tho President may undoubtedly raise the question, which should
be determined by the same body as found him previously to be disabled.
8. In the event of a finding of temporary disability, does the Vice President
succeed to the powers and duties of the office or to the office itself?
Answer.-See question 9.
9. In the event of a finding of permanent disability, does the Vice President
succeed to the powers and duties of the office or to the office itself?
Answer.-T hse questions (along with the 7th) call attention to the ambiguity
of the terin "the same" in section 6: does it refer to "the powers and duties of
the said Office," or the Office itself. On account of the fact that hitherto all
Vice Preside ts
have succeeded to "the powers and duties" of the Presidency In
consequence of the death of the President., they have also succeeded to the office
Itself. "Office is a public station
*'re Th termn embraces the Idea of tenure
duration, eynolument, and duties." United Staces v. Ilartwell (0 Wall. 385 390
(1808)). But succession on account of the temporary "Inability" of thle P~resident Is obviously something different and would not, necessarily, 8ignify successioni to the office of President and hence could, and to mny mnind slioufd, terminate
with the disability which gave rise to It.
10. In the event of a finding of a permanent disability does the language of
the Constitution nawnely, "* * * or a President shall be elected * * *" demand
the immediate election of a new Preeident? If so, would the elytion be for a
4-year term or for the unexpired term of the disabled President?
Anawer.-Tihe clause of section 0 beginning "and the Congress" deals with the
situation which exists when there is neither a functioning President nor ja functioning Vice President. It has been dealt with In a series of so-called succession
acts, the one now iii force having been enacted in 1947. The election referred to
Is undoubtedly the next regular presidential election, Congress never having teen
empowered to provide for any other.
11. Does Congress have th'o authority to enact legislation to resolve any and
all o' these questions, or will a constitutional amendment or amendments be
necessary?
Answer.-No constitutional amendment seems to me to be required to enable
Congress to do anything above suggested for It to do.
REPLY OF CIIARLES FAIRMAN, LAW SCHOOL OF HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
DECEIIBPJR
27, 1058.
D2,

Representative

EMANUEL CIMAI,,

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Mouse of Representatives, Washington, D. C'.
DEAR, MR. CaILE: I respond to your letter of November 29, wherein was
enclosed a questionnaire on Presidential inability.
The committee has In view a study of the delicate and vexing problem of
Presidential inability. In the context of this present moment one thinks of Inability resulting from impairment of the President's health. in addition to the
case of President Eisenhower, the instances of President Garfield's lingering before
death and of President Wilson's long Illness come to mind.
At the outset, however, I would invite attention to another danger, one that
should be anticipated as an incident of any atomic attack made upon this country.
The problem of providing for effective Presidential leadership and for the maintenance of an adequate Congress, notwithstanding casualties and notwithstanding
the Impracticability of conducting regular elections seems to me even more Important than that of providing for an inability resulting from illness. We know
that the country can carry on somehow, even though the President lies ill: that
problem should be met, but still the matter is not so critical as a possible knockout
of national governmental leadership, perhaps both executive and legislative,
by a hostile power.
so I urge that, when the committee studies legislation and the possible need for
a constitutional amendment, it consider the entire problem of providing for continuity of governmental leadership under all contingencies. There Is one entire
problem: Better to envisage It as a whole than to think only of the aspect that
President Eisenhower's illness has suddenly brought to mind.
The matter of Presidential leadership and the maintenance of an adequate
Congress in the event of an atomic attack is discussed in a paper on Government
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Under Law in Time of Crisis which I prepared for Harvard Law School's Marshall
Bicentennial Conference. f enclose a copy, and invite attention in particular to
sections II and III.
Considering the matter of Presidential inability in this larger framework, I
come to the points raised in the questionnaire.
I. "Inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office" (art. II,
sec. 1,clause 0). In the Constitutional Convention, Mr. Dickinson asled, "What
is the extent of the term 'disability' and who is to be the judge of it?" 2 Farrand's
Records of the Federal Convention, 427. These questions went unanswered.
I have not undertaken extended research to uncover what may have been said
about the construction of "inability" in the course of our constitutional develop.
ment. I doubt whether such research would lend much aid to understanding.
Here the question is not of finding the meaning in 1787 of some old term of law,
but rather of applying the constitutional provision in any future eventuality.
The words, it seems to me, aptly express the essential thought- the difficulty lies
rather in the application. It is 'inability" to discharge the "powers" and
"duties" of the officee": these words contemplate a factual situation wherein the
incumbent has become unable effectively to discharge the tasks a President must
discharge. One looks on the one hand to the actual impairment that; has occurred,
in relation, on the other hand, to the tasks of the office. Consider first the impairment. The President may have been stricken by sickness. Sickness has
many forms. It might, as with a heart attack, place the President in such a
condition that, in order to protect his life, he must be relieved from all work for
asi indefinite period of time. How long? The duration might be so indefinitely
long that-in relation to the tasks of the office-the President would have become
unable for a considerable period at any rate, to discharge his office. The sickness might strike at essential powers-to see, to hear, to speak, to move, etc.-to
Stich a egree as to impair his ability to perform his tasks, to the point of producing "inability." The President might lose his mind, or suffer such loss of mental
vigor as would amount to inability. Very certainly the Constitution contemplates
the continued possession of full capacity to delierate and decide. The President might fall under the power of the enemy-or be kidnaped-or be lost, as in
the disappearance of an airplane. Inability is a compendious expression.
Next, it is "Inability to discharge the powers and duties" of the office. It
should be recognized at once that the actual magnitude of the office, and the
degree of attention required to discharge its powers and duties, has increased
through the years, and varies, too, with the demands of the moment. Wash.
ington, Adams, and Jefferson could retire from the seat of government for considerable periods and vet, communicating by means of horse and boat, could
effectively direct the administration. Today the powers and duties require a
more prompt and constant attention. Consider how the actual demands vary
with conditions of the moment. An enormous danger, sudden and unforeseen,
would call for crucial decisions to be taken at once: If the President were so
circumstances as to be unable to act then and there it might amount to inability,
even though under normal conditions the Executive might have carried on accordin to standing orders.
The Constitution contemplates that the executive branch of the Government
shall at all times be effectively led by the President. Inability is a practical
concept-an impairment such that the powers and duties cannot effectively
be discharged.
I urge that no attempt be made to enact a definition into law. The text
accurately expresses the constitutional concept. It is not for Congress to enlarge
or to contract-and in any event the Constitution's own words would remain
the test. It is for Congress to provide the means for ascertaining inability in
any doubtful case. It is to that matter that the committee's questions turn.
I. Who shall initiate the question of inability?
I suggest, first, that the "Inability" might be self-evident. Suppose, for one
example, that the President were captured and held as a prisoner of the enemy.
(Recall that a President in the prosecution of his duty might need to go overseas
in time of war, and might come into proximity to Aostile forces.) In such a
case, surely there would be no need to initiate the question: There could be no
question but that "inability" had occurred. So, too, no doubt, if the person
in the Presidential Office totally lost his mind and had been committed.
Again it is conceivable that the President himself might authentically determine
his own inability. He might suffer such an impairment of strength as would leave
him competent to form an accurate Judgement to the effect that he was no longer
competent to discharge the powers and duties of his Office. (This is not on any
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theory that he would be ceding a property right, as when one grants Blackacre:
the Presidential Office is not the subject of ownership or of grant.) If the one who
bears alone the responsibility of the office were solemnly to declare, I find I am
no longer competent to discharge it-that certainly should settle the matter.
(Of course, the President could resign if he chose-but the hypothesis above is
otherwise.)
The various suppositions above should not be dismissed as fanciful: when one
considers legislation to meet eventualities, one should reckon with every con.
ceivable eventuality and seek a complete solution.
Consider the less unlikely situations, where "inability" or no was a matter to
be determined by inquiry. Here let us recur to the Constitution. It provides
that "in Case of * * * Inability," etc., "the Same shall devolve * * *." (No

matter, for the moment, what is the antecedent of "same"-whether it is the
Office, or only its powers and duties. In any event, at least the powers and duties
shall devolve.) Mark, the provision is not permissive and optional: if in truth
there is inability, then the powers and duties shall devolve by the Constitution's
own command. So any initiating and any determining will)only be the means
for carrying out the peremptory provision.
Evidently tihe Vice President should be able to set the inquiry in motion, for
he is under a solemn duty to rise to the occasion if Inability occurs. It would not
do for hili to refrain on the ground that "nobody has yet told me": the Constitution has spoken directly as to what shall be done, although it has not provided
the means. The Vice President, at a moment when the President I,; Ill is, howvr
in a delicate position, where lie well may hesitate to take the initiative1.owvr
The Cabinet, too, should be able to set the inquiry in motion. The principal
officers of the executive departments would be peculiarly well situated to know
when the Chief was no longer giving effective direction. It should be recognized,
realistically, however, that the natural tendency of a staff is to cover up their
Chief's inadequacy and to pretend hopefully that all goes well. So if the Cabinet
took the initiative in alleging inability, that would show pretty certainly that that
condition had arrived; but the natural reluctance to act should be foreseen.
Surely a mere majority of the membership should suffice.
Initiative should also lie within the Congress. It is the great representative
assembly, the bearer of residuary powers In the American Government. It
might, however, be impracticable for the Congress to act: the apparent "Inability" might occur when the Congress was in adjournment, and the hypothesis
excludes a calling of a special session by the President. The statute should, I
believe, provide that certain designated leaders of the Houses of Congress would
be authorized to initiate an inquiry into "Inability."
I11. Once raised, who shall determine the question of "Inability"?
What is to be desired, as most In accord with the Constitutiop s coticept, is an
objective determination of "Inability" to discharge "powers and duties"-a judgment whether the incumbent remains competent, notwithstanding apparent impairment, physical or mental. The inquiry, it seems to me, is somewhat com-

p arable to one to determine whether a person is, or was, competent to act sul

uris. That is a familiar type of judicial question. The inuqliry is, it seems to me,
to be distinguished, rather than to be analogized to the process of impeachment.
The impeachment process is derived from ancient historical roots: an officer is
accused of wrongdoing; traditionally it is a matter for political bodies, the lower
and upper branches of the legislature; the object is to purge the public service.
Impeachment is accusatory, unfriendly, a matter of culpability as viewed through
the eyes of persons performing representative and political functions. An inquiry into "Inability," on the other hand, would be concerned with actual capability, physical and mental, to discharge the tasks of office. The inquest would
be calm in mood, friendly and sympathetic; it would proceed In a spirit of sorrow
and not of indignation. It would not in a true sense be adverse the Public versus
the Incumbent. So I would not analogize to impeachment: tiiat is an unsound
comparison and puts the problem in a false setting.
The foregoing analysis does not rest on any assertion that Senators and Representatives would approach the inquiry with partisan or self-seeking motives.
It rests rather on the thought that the extraordinary function to be performed is
more like the function of jtudging than it IRlike the functions of the Congress. A
Congress composed of two Houses, with 96 and 435 members, respectively, is ill.
suited to taking the testimony of physicians or other witnesses who had observed
a stricken President, to take an obvious example.
Furthermore Congress might not be in session. If it were adjourned, how
could it be summoned when, by hypothesis, "Inability" had already occurred?
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Suppose the contingency most to be dreaded, all atomic attack upon this country:
it might be impossible to assemble; there might not even survive a quorum of
each House, at a moment when instant action was requisite. The body charged
with determining "Inability" should be one certainly capable of convening and
deciding promptly.
If, as has been argued, the task is most like judging where should it be lodged?
One thinks, in particular of the Supreme Court. hut the jurisdiction of tihe
Supreme Court has already been defined, by article III, section 2, clause 2-and
the determination of "Inability" is not within that enumeration. It is familiar
that the Court's jurisdiction may not be extended to other matters by statute:
Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch 137 (1803)). To vest this extraordinary jurisdic.
tion in the Supreme Court would thus require a constitutional amendment.
If it seemed good to Congress to propose an amendment to make provisions for
the incident* of an atomic war, then one provision might well make the Supreme
Court the judge of Presidential "Inability." If an amendment is not to be
sought, then a satisfactory alternative is next to be considered.
Congress might provide that the question of "Inability," when properly raised,
would be determined I)b an extraordinary Commission-the statute providing
how such Commission would be constituted. The statute might provide that
the Commission should Include the Chief Justice-(who might well be designated
as the one to call the Commissioners together)--and the Associate Justices. It
might be provided that, for want of the requisite number, active judges of the
Inferior courts be summoned in order of seniority, as was found practicable.
If Congress thought it desirable to include some of its own members In the extraordinary Commission, that might be done. For example, the two available
senior members, majority and minority of each Committee on the Judiciary.
(It seems evident that the Speaker and'tie President pro tempore of the Senate
should be exclutded from serving as Jtudges of Presidential inability, inasmuch
as they themselves stand high In the order of succession.
We have had considerable experience in the course of our history, with Judges
serving as Commissioners-sometimes in accordance with a statute, sometimes
merely by Presidential appointment. The most memorable example, for present
purposes. is the Electoral Comm~ion created under the act of January 29, 1877
(19 Stat. 227), on the occasion of the disputed election. Five Justices served on
that extraordinary body. While it is to he conceded candidly thet the use of the
incumbents of Judiciel office as Commissioners to perform tasks outside the courts
of law is generally to be avoldtd, that remedy is here suggested for want of a more
appropriate solution. There are r good meny instances that may be drawn in
precedent. It is confidently to be expected that, in the event an apparent case of
"Inabilitv" did arise, the judges called by the statute to serve as Commissioners
would proceed to act. Their determination would carry greater assurance of
objectivity than could be obtained by any other mean that occurs to the writer.
IV. Constitutional prohibitions.
The limitation on the Supreme Court, drawn from article I1, has been mentioned above.
V. Dual authority in a single body?
Even supposinh that to be objectionable, it has been avoided by the method
proposed above.
V. Determint tion of permanent or temporary nature of disability.
Evidently the sorts of disability that would give trouble are such as could not
at the moment lx detcrnuined to be more then temporary. One can conceive of
nonfatal impairments that could be found to be permanent, such as incurable Insanity; but so to sickness, a wounding, disappearance, or capture-how could it be
said In advance that the disfbility might not be removed?
VII. Determination of cessation of disability.

The President seeks to resume the powers and duties of his office. If the temporery place-holder steps aside, that I,.the end of the matter. But suppose it is not

apparent that the disability has ceased, and suppose that accordingly a determination of the matter i in order. The body selected to make the determination-

qucstion III supra-would ba the appropriate body to determine whether the

liability was at an end.
VIII. In case of temporary disability, does the Vice President succeed to the

Office, or only to its powers and duties?
It would seem a contradiction in terms to have at one moment two Presidentsthe one temporarily disabled, the other in office. It seems to me that a Vice
President acting in the Presidential Office during the temporary "Inability" of
the President would be only the Acting President. It must be conceded that, as
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a inere matter of grammar, the words ",the Same" In article 11, section 1, clause 0
takes no distinction between death and resignation on the one hand and "In-

ability"-which might be temporary-on the other. The sense of the matter
however, should be evident. When the elected President is definitively out of
the ofince-as by death, or resignation, or an Inability that patently isfperenanent-the Vice Prosident would enter upon the office definitively. Inpractice,
we have known only the ease of death-and practice has firmly established that
the Vice President becomes President. In envisaging an inability that might
be removed, the situation of the placo-holder woult evidently be otherwise:
ho would hervo as Acting President.
IX. In case of permanent disability, does the Vice Prsident succeed to the
Office?
For reasons given above, I would reply "Yesn." Presumably the public good
would not be served by withholding from the definitive succenor to the powers
and duties the added moral authority that goes with the title of "Pres dent."
If he Is the only President we are going to have for this 4-year period,it. 1 better
to accord him all that makes for strength.
X. Construction of the -phrase, "or a President shall be elected."
The earliest statute on P residential succession of March 1,1702 (1 Stat. 239),
made the line run to the President pro tenpore of the Senate and then to the Speaker,
and provided that If both of those offices were vacant., electors should be chosen
to elect a new President and Vice President. This was the work of the Second
Congress-whose members were close to the drafting of the Constitution. Yet
that statute went In the teeth of the consideration that thereby the Presidential
term would have been out. of accord with the Constitution's synchronizing of
Presidential and congressional terms. The act of 1792 remained the law until
1886.
For practical reasons set out in the paper on "Government Under Law in Time
of Crisis," cited earlyin this letter, it Is believed important to maintain the view
which te act of 092 recognized: that it Is within the power of Congress to
provide for the choice of a new President, in cae both President and Vice President
are lost. In particular,in the event that war came and that the Presidential Offcee
became vacant., it. would 1)0 most Imp~ortant. to find a now President best. qualified
to lead the Nation.
My response to question Xis; that the language of the Constitution does not
demand an immediate election, but. does recognize the power of Congress to provide for the choice of a President to flir
out the term- and that the synchronization
of Presidential and congressional terms should not. he broken.
XI. Legislation, or constitutional amendment?
The foregoing discussion has Indicated throughout what can be done by statute,
and what would require at change in the Constitution. The method for determining "Inability" recommended above could 1)0 provided by legislation. If,
however, the more Inclusive problem of providing for governmental continuity
during an atomic war Is to be considered, then at. some points It will be found that
constitutional amendment is Involved. I urge that Presidential succession-and
provision for the continuity of Congress as well-be viewed In this larger
perspective.

Sincerely yours,

CIARLIs FAIRMAN,

Professorof Late.

REPLY OF DAVID FELLMAN. THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
DEComDER 12, 1056.
CELLUR,

Congressman EMANUE1
ltouse Offic Building, Washington, D. C.
Dz•A CONGRESSMAN CELLER: I am writing In response to your letter of November 29, in connection with your questionnaire on Presidential Inability. It Is
interesting to note that the questions raised therein are almost Identical with those
raised i)y Chester A. Arthur In his first annual message to Congress, December 6,
1881. See Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (vol. 8, p. 05).

His questions arose from the fact that President Garfield was utterly Incapacitated
for some 2½ months before his death. He was shot on July 2, 1881, and died on
September 19. Mr. Arthur did not undertake to discuss, much less to answer, the

questions he raised.
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Before coming to your specific questions, I want to make the preliminary point
that the British have a specific procedure for determining the disability of a
reigning sovereign, and that we can learn much by examining it. It is of course,
in any system of government a delicate problem which is extraordinarily difficult
to resolve, and any solution is bound to be something less than perfect, nut
nevertheless the problem is not Insolunle by any means.
The British statute was adopted on March 19, 1937, and is entitled tile Regency
Act of 1937. (The citation is 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, ch. 16.) This statute was the
result of apprehensions, which Parliament itself acknowledged, arising from the
illness of George V in 1928 and In January 1936. Those sections of this act which
deal with a regency while the sovereign is under 18 years of age need not concern
us "(1)
here. But section 2 of the act is pertinent. It reads as follows:
If the followingpersons or any three or more of them, that is to say, the
wife or husband of the Sovereign, the Lord Chancellor the Speaker of the tlousc
of Commons, the Lord Chief Justice of England and the Master of the Rolls,
declare in writing that they are satisfied by evidence which shall include the
evidence of physicians that the Sovereign is by reason of infirmity of mind or
body incapable for the time being of performing the royal functions or that they
are satisfied by evidence that the Sovereign is for some definite cause not available
for the performance of those functions then, until it is declared in like manner
that his Majesty has so far recovered His health as to warrant His resumption of
the royal functions or has become available for the performance thereof, as the
case may be, those functions shall be performed in the name of and on behalf of
the Sovereign by a Regent."
Section 6 of the act is also pertinent. It reads as follows:
"(1) In the event of illness not amounting to such infirmity of mind or body as
is mentioned in section two of this Act, or of absence or intended absence from
the United Kingdom, the Sovereign may, in order to prevent delay or difficulty
in the despatch of public business, by Letters Patent under the Great Seal, delegate, for the period of that illness or absence, to Counsellors of State such of the
royal functions as may be specified in the Letters Patent, and may in like manner
revoke or vary any such delegation."
Subsection (2) of section 6 designates who shall serve as counsellors of state:
the wife or husband of the Sovereign (if the Sovereign is married) and the four
persons next in line of succession to the Crown. This portion of the statute was
amended on November 11, 1043 (6 and 7 Geo. 6 ch. 42) to provide that the heir
apparent shall be one of the counsellors of State iRover 18 years of age.
Should like to focus attention on the principal features of this statute, particularly in the light of the questions raised in your questionnaire.
1. A committee of five Is created to make the decision concerning the
Sovereign's disability.
2. The committee need not be unanimous, but may act by majority vote.
3. One member of the committee is the Sovereign's wife or husband; two
are high-ranking Judges holding office for life, the Lord Chief Justice, who is
the presiding Judge of Qeeon's iencih, and the Master of the Rolls, who
presides over the court of appeals; the Lord Chancellor Is at, once a Cabinet
minister, the presiding officer of the House of Lords, head of the judicial
system, and a leading figure in the majority political party; the Speaker of the
House of Commons presides over the elective body of Parliament, but it is
important to note that unlike our Speaker in the House of representatives,
the English Speaker is a nonpartisan presiding officer who enjoys something
approaching life tenure, since he is usually reelected to the House of Commons
by his constituency without opposition, and is reelected to the Speakership
by the House, whatever may have been his original party affiliation, and
whatever may he the party situation in the House itself. Thus of the five
persons who are eligible to serve on this committee, only the Lord Chancellor
may be regarded as a party man. But it is Important to note, in this connection that the Sovereign is not a party man either.
4. Te committee is required to make a finding of inability in writing on the
basis of evidence which must Include the evidence of physicians. The number and identity of the physicians are not steecified.
A. The statute covers infirmity of both mind and body.
6. Tncapability of performingthe royal functions is not defined.
7. The possibility that the Sovereign may be incapable for some reason
other than Infirmity of mind or body by not being available to perform his
functions is also taken into consideration. What might lead to such unavailability is not specified. Presumably capture by a foreign enemy would be an
example.
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8. The statute recognizes that the Sovereign may overcome his disability
by becoming well, and the committee declares that he has recovered hIs
health so as to warrant resumption of the royal functions In the very same
way that it acts to make a finding of disability.
9. In the case of less serious illness, or absence from the kingdom, the
Sovereign may delegate such powers as may be necessary to carry on the
public business to a group of five counsellors of state, his spouse and the four
people next in the line of succession, but he may revoke the delegation in the
same manner that he made it.
I come now to the questions put down it the questionnaire.
I. I do not know what the atithors of the Constitution intended by the term
"inability," except that they obviously Intended to have the Vice President serve
as Acting President during a period of Presidential disability. Disability was
never defined, and was mentioned only once iii the debates of the Constitutional
Convention. A search of the Records of the Federal Convention, edited by Max
Farrand (New Haven: Yale University Press, rev. ed., 1937), does not yield much.
It is of interest to note that on August 27, according to Madison's Notes, Mr.
Dickinson expressed the thought that the section under discussion was "too
vague." lie asked: "What is the extent of the term Idisability' and who is to be
the judge of it?" But so far as we know no one answered the questions, and the
matter was then postponed. All other references to the disability clause are in
the successive drafts of the document as it developed in the deliberations of the
Convention. So far as I can discover, there is no evidence that the Convention
ever discussed the questions raised by Mr. Dickinson. Whether anything was
said on this subject in the State ratifying conventions I do not know, but Ihave
not searched the records on this point. Perhaps sonicone should do Just, that.
I think it would be extremely unwise to try to define the term "inability" in
legislation. Any attempted definitlon woulA, I believe, do more harit *than
good, and the more prolix the definition, the worse it would be. Any attempt
to spell out just what is meant by disability would either be tautological, repetitious, or misleading, and in any *event, a sure basis for unnecessary disputation.
But the law is full of undefinea and utudefinable terms, e. g., "reasonable man,"
"due process of law," "right and equity," etc. But certainly commonisense
dictates that disability may be due either to bodily or mental finfirmity, and if
there is any possible doibt about it, then the law should say as much. It is
certainly common knowledge that mental disability occurs, anid that it can be
as crippling as physical disability. If a special group or committee is created to
make a finding of disability, the law should provide that (1) the finding should
be in writing; (2) the findig should be based on evidence; (3) the evidence should
include the testimony of physicians.
Clearly the Constiltution'contemplates that the President may get over his
disability, since it uses the phrase ' until the disability is removed." Obviously
a sick man may get well, and the law should he clear on this point, that the
President regoimps all of his powers when his disability is ended.
II. I think any member of the group or committee which would be authorized
by law to determine the question of the President's inability to discharge the
powers and duties of his office should be eligible to initiate the question. I do
not believe Congress should undertake to perform this function, mainly because
the question may arise suddenly when Congress is not in session. Nor do I
believe that such a numerous assemblage of men and women is equipped to make
a specific decision bearing upon the qualifications of a single person upon the
basis of evidence. I should think it highly improper to entrust the Vice President
with the initiative, since his personal stake in the decision precludes general
confidence In the objectivity of any affirmative step he may take. Since the
Cabinet Is made up of personal appointees of the Presidend who serve at his
pleasure, I would regard the Cabinet as wholly unsuitable to make a decision of
the sort under discussion. So far as the Cabinet is concerned, the cards are
stacked so heavily In favor of one disposition of the issue and against the other
that an objective answer based entirely upon pertinent evidence cannot be expected In all cases.
III. I think Congress ought to provide for a procedure to deal with the problem
of Presidential inability. For the reasons given above the decision should not,
In my Judgment, be entrusted to Congress, or the Vice President, or the Cabinet.
I suggest the creation by statute of a special continuing committee which would
be empowered to make the critical decision of Inability. While I have not given
a great deal of thought to the matter of the makeup of the committee, and further
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reflection might suggest a somewhat different composition, I would tentatively
suggest as avbasis for further discussion, as follows:
L. The committee should be very small so that it can act expeditiously
and decisively. I suggest a committee of Ave.
2. The members of the committee could very well be the following:
(a) The President's spouse, or if there isnone, the next of kin, providing
he or she in an adult.
(ýb The Chief Justice of the United States.
c The senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
(d) The leader of the President's political party in the Senate.
(e) The leader of the President's political party in the House of Repro.
sentatives.
Thus, such a committee would include a member of the President's family,
2 life-tenure Justices holding positions of great prestige and public confidence,
and 2 ranking Members of the-Houses of Congress. I would insist that members
of the p olital party in opposition to the President should not be put in the position
of participating in the decision that the President is unable to discharge the duties
of his office. I think there will be greater public confidence in the participation
of two important members of the President's own party. Our situation is quite
different from that of Great Britain, whose Sovereign is required to be nonpartisan.
Our President is always a partisan, and it is right that he should be a party man,
since our governmental system rests upon the foundation of the party system. It
is therefore altogether proper that leaders of his own party should share directly
in the responsibility of making a decision of Presidential inability. Leaders of
the opposition party would necessarily act under a heavy cloud of suspicion about
their motives if they had a hand in the matter, however much their opinions are
grounded in objective weighty, and reliable evidence.
IV. I think a statute of the sort I have discussed in II and III is perfectly con.
stitutional. An act of Congress seems to be fully Justified by the language and
purposes of article II, section 1, clause 6, of the United States Constitution.
V. As I have indicated, I believe that the same body ought to have authority
both to initiate the question and determine its merits. 'I see no reason for setting
tip any ponderous or complex machinery. On the contrary, there is every good
reason to keep the procedure uncomplicated, so that a small group of responsible
people commanding public confidence can move swiftly and decisively. It miglt
be wise to authorize the Chief J.stle to take the lintlative of setting the machinery In motion, but I do not see why any one of the five Important people who
would serve on the committee could not request a meeting of the committee for
the purpose of making a decision. For example, under seine circumstances the
President's wife may very well be the most suitable person available to raise the
question of inability. I am sure that no one of the five persons I have in mind for
service on this committee would Initiate action Irresponsibly, partly from the very
nature of their positions, and partly because the public would not stand for irresponsibility In this connection.
VI. The committee should be free to declare that the President is permanently
disabled, if the facts warrant such a finding. Certainly It is common knowledge
that there Is such a thing as permanent disability. And there is no reason to
believe that a committee constituted as I have suggested would make a finding of
permanent disability if it were at all possible to avoid doing so. If the disability
is temporary, the committee should be authorized, by the same procedure utilized
to make a finding of disability, to make a finding that the President Is sufficiently
well to resume his duties and functions.
VII. If the disability is temporary, I think, as I have indicated, that any
member of the committee should be authorized to raise the question that the
disability has ceased to exist, Once the question has been raised, it should be
determined by a majority vote of the committee. As in the case of findings of
disability, a finding that the disability has ended should be made in writing, on
the basis of evidence, including the evidence of physicians.
VIII. The question whether, in the event of a finding of temporary disability,
the Vice President would succeed to the powers and duties of the office, or to the
office itself is in my judgment the critical question on the list. For there is a
wide gulf between what I think was the plain intention of the framers of the
Constitution and actual practice in the several instances when Vice Presidents
took over upon the death of a President. The Constitution declares, in article
II, section 1, clause 6, that "In ease of the removal of the President from Office
or of his death, resignation or inability to discharge the powers and duties of said
Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President * * *." Clearly, the term
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"the same" refers to "the powers and duties of said Office." If it was intended
that the Vice President should become President, it would have been a simple
matter to say so as it is said in section 3 of the 20th amendment. This view is
supported by other language in the Constitution. Thus in the same paragraph
it is provided that in case both the President and Vice President are unavailable
for the Office, Congress shall declare "what officer shall then act as President."
This language is consistent with the previous part of the paragraph; it does not
say that this officer shall be President, but only that he shall act as President,
"until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected." Note that this
clause does not say "until another President shall be elected," or "until the
next president shall be elected," but only "until a President shall be elected."
All other pertinent clauses in the Constitution are consistent with the language
of article II-, section 1, clause 0. The 12th amendment, taking note of the fact
that it might happen that neither the electoral college nor the House of Repre.
sentatives may succeed in electing a new President In time, provides that "the
Vice President shall act as President, as in the case of the death of other constitutional disability of the President." Article I, section 8, clause 5, of the Con.
stitution provides that the Senate shall elect a President pro tempore who shall
preside in the absence of the Vice President, "or when he silall exercise the Office
of President of the United States." Note that it does not say, "when he shall have
become President," which would have been very easy to say, if such had beell
the intention of those whQ wrote the Constitution,
The language of the Constitution, that the Vice President succeeds to the
powers and duties of the President, or acts as President or exercises the office of
President, supports the view that it was not intended that he should become
President. Furthermore, this is consistent with the requirements of a situation
where the President's disability Is only temporary. Obviously it makes more
sense to say that for the duration of such a disability the Vice President shall
act as President, than to say that for this period of time he shall be President,
for in the latter event we would have two Presidents at the same time, which
is ridiculous. But it makes sense if, while the President is too sick to discharge
his duties, we have an Acting President in the person of the Vice President. Of
course no such problem is pqsed if the President dies, or resigns or is removed
from office by impeachment, for in such cases he ceases to be President at all,
and no difficulty arises if the succeeding Vice President becomes President. The
real harm has been that because he is now regarded as becoming President, a
solution of the problem posed by temporary Presidential disability has been
frustrated.
It is only constitutional custom which decrees that when the Vice President
takes over, he becomes President. This custom, of course, is due to the fact that
in the seven instances where the Vice President has taken over, he did so on the
death of the President. The Presidency has never been vacated in any other
way. It will be recalled that when President William Henry Harrison died on
April 4 1841, only a month after his Inauguration, and Vice President John T'yler
succeeded him, there was considerable debate over the question whether Tyler
became President or only Acting President. But Tyler had no doubt abou it
and from the outset insisted that he was the President. The country accepted
the decision, and thus every succeeding Vice President who went to the White
House on the death of the President became President in the full sense of the term.
Thus, when President Roosevelt died, Vice President Truman became President
of the United States, and as every preceding Vice President in the same situation
did, he took a separate oath of office when he assumed the Presidency. This
point is fully canvassed in Herbert W. Horwill, The Usages of the American
Constitution (Oxford University Press 1925), chapter III Accidental Presidents.
Custom has established the p reposition that when a President dies the Vice
President becomes President. But since we have no custom dealing with a situa.
tion created by the temporary disability of the President, I think it is altogether
reasonable if a distinction is made by legislation between the two situations.
We can continue on the assumption that in case the President dies, the Vice
President becomes President, while at the same time we provide that in case of
a temporary disability he shall serve only as Acting President, and that upon his
recovery the President will reassume the powers and duties of his office. Legis.
lation to this effect would be clearly consistent with the language and intent of
article II section 1, clause 6. As Acting President the Vice President would
have all fihe powers of the office, such as the veto and appointive powers, but he
would have to relinquish these powers upon the recovery of the President.
IX. If a finding of permanent disability is made, I should think the Vice
President would succeed to the office itself, and not merely to Its powers and
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duties, Just as he succeeds to the office if the President dies, as is now decreed by
our "unwritten Constitution." It may of course be assumed that the committee
which is authorized to make findings of disability will In the nature of things be
extremely reluctant to make a finding of permanent disability, and that so long
as any ray of hope exists the country would expect that the disability be re arded
as temporary, If It is at all possible so to designate it. However, there Cstsuch
a condition as permanent disability and in that event I would think the existing
constitutional custom would control. There does not seem to be any very good
reason why it should not.
X. In the event of a finding of permanent disability, I believe the language
of the Constitution, "or a Presiden~t shall be elected", does not require but only
authorizes the immediate election of &new President. Clearly this claulse permits
Congress to say, for example, that If as much as 2 years of the term Still remain
there shall be a new election. Whether Congress ought to use this power, and
provide for Special elections, is therefore, In my Judgment a matter ofpollcy and
not of constitutional principle. My own feeling is that fn the light of our com.
plicated State and Federal laws dealing with elections, the pattern of primary
selections, the structure of party conventions, etc., our institutions are not geared
to holding presidential elections except according to the sequence of events that
occur according to the normal rhythm of the Constitution. But if there should
be a special election, I should think that it would be merely for the unexpired
term of the disabled President, for otherwise, the sequence of events upon which
the Constitution operates would be disturbed,
XI. I believe that Congress has authority to enact legislation on all the questions raised here under the Constitution as it now stands, and that constitutional
amendments are not necessary. Such legislation, based upon the language and
purposes of the relevant constitutional clauses, would be Justified by normal canons
of constitutional construction.
I would like to add several thoughts:
1. If legislation on this subject Is to be drafted, attention should be given to
the fact that a Vice President serving as Acting President may also become unable
to discharge the duties and powers of the position. The legislation should therefore extend to anyone serving as Acting President, whether it be the Vice President
or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, or the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate, or anyone else.
2. State constitutions usually provide for the contingency that the Governor
may be so II as to be unable to discharge ilis duties, and the Lieutenant Governor
isauthorized to act as Governor. This has happened often. The experience with
gubernatorial disability must by now be a considerable one, in the aggregate, and
perhaps there Is much we may be able to learn from such experience. I suggest
that the committee staff make a study of gubernatorial disability, or, alternatively
the Legislative Reference Service can be requested to do so. Such a study migh
very well shed a great deal of light upon the problem and tell us something about
what the American people are willing to put up with. I know of no such study
available in print today.
3. If legislation is prepared on this subject, I believe it would be wise to take
into the account the possibility that the President may be unable to discharge
his duties for some reason other than Illness. That Is to say, in the larger sense
the problem is one of unavailability as well as one of inability Inthe medical sense.
I do not believe that It would be either wise or necessary to try to spell out the
situations that might conceivably arise In which the President would be unable
to discharge the duties of his office. It is sufficient if the statute made some
provision on the subject so that the necessary adjustments can be taken legally,
andyith a minimum ok dispute or lost motion when necessary. Suppose, for
example, a President were kidnaped, or captured by an enemy army? I do not
anticipate either of these things ever happening, but since It is at least theoreticallyp6ssible for the Presiden to be unavailable for a variety of unforeseen and
pefiapi' unforeseeable reasons, the statute ought to cover such contingencies.
It caribe done in a simple phrase as It Is done in Mte English Regency Act.
It I can be of any further service to the committee, please do not hesitate to
call upon me.
Sincerely yours,
FF LMANc
S ProfessorDAVID
of P
Political
Science.

A
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REPLY OF THOMAS K. FINLETTER, ESQ., NEW YORK, 41,
N. Y.
JANUARY 4, 1950.
,,
l1on. EMANUEL CERT
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciarl/of the
llouse of Representatives on Presidential Inability,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.
DEAR Mn. CHAIRMAN: You were kind enough to write me on November 29

enclosing a copy of the questionnaire of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
house of Representatives on Presidential Inability. This letter Is my reply to
the questionnaire.
I. What was intended by the term "inability" as used in article 2, section 1
clause 6, of the Constitution? Shall a definition be enacted into law? If so, will
you sot forth a workable definition? Shall such a definition encompass physical
and mental dtsabilltyas well as the duration thereof?
I believe that the Phliladelplhia Convention deliberately did not define the word
inabilityty" The quality of the debates In the Convention was so higlh that I
cannot believe it was an oversight that they failed to be more specific than they
were. Indeed, even in hindsight after this long period of time, after more than a
century and a half of experience, It seeins to me wise not to attempt a definition.
My answer to the second sentence of question I is that I recommend against a
definition being enacted into law. l)isabilltv is a relative term. There are, of
course, rare cases where there is no doubt that'a man is disabled andi In every likeli.
hood will continue to be disabled. If such a case were to arise I believe that it
would be so generally recognized in the country that the President was In fact
permanently incapable of performing his duties that there would be no question
in the minds of anyone but that the provisions of clause 0 should take effect. In
that case a congressional definition of the term "inability" would add nothing.
The more usual ca.se, however, would be where there would be doubt whether
the President (a) was at the time incapable of performing his duties, or (b) might
recover from the Inability; and there are so many variations within these two
pOssibilities, ats well ats so many possible variations of circumstances and of personalitv that I believe it would bo unwise to try to cover all the possible situations
by a w'rltton definition.
Nor (to I think the situation can ',- met by setting up some expert person or
body to make the decision as to "inability."
II. Who shall Initiate the question of the President's inability to discharge the
powers and duties of his office?
Sa)The Congress.
b) The Vice President.
(c) The Cabinet by majority vote.
(d) Any other group, including independent agencies.
(e) Shall (d) be of a continuing or temporary nature?
Question III boars on the same point. It reads as follows:
III. Once raised, who shall make the determination of inability?
(a) The Congress.
(b) The Vice President.
(c) The Cabinet by majority vote.
(d) Any other group, including independent agencies.
(e) Shall (d) be of a continuing or temporary nature?
I 'have suggested that the inability of the President should be established by
public opinion and that the inability should not be held to exist except when the
facts were so obvious that there would be a general recognition by the people
that. the President was incapable of performing his duties. There are, however,
certain acts which by the Constitution or by congressional legislation must be
performed by the President, and if the President is disabled these acts cannot be

performed, as was the fact for a while in the case of President Wilson.

I suppose that for a while such a situation might be tolerated but if it continued
too long public opinion would develop rapidly, I should think and would demand
that "something be done." At this point it would seem to Ue the responsibility
of the Vice President to move or not to move, depending upon the circumstances.
Of course, if the President himself were capable of taking the decision that he
was not capable of carrying out his duties it would be appropriate for him to so

state and to delegate, temporarily, his responsibilities to the Vice President.
But under most circumstances of Inability it is likely that the President would
not be capable of this action- and the responsibility should then fall upon the
Vice President. He is the offioer designated by the Constitution to act in case
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the President cannot. I should not think that any other person or body should
initiate the question or make the decision. The Congress, it seems to me, would
be barred therefrom by the principle of the separation of powers. And I should
think that if the Congress attempted to act and the Vice President disagreed
with the action of the Congess the Vice President should prevail.
Nor do I believe that the (iabinct has any constitutional status to act. I realizeA
that it was proposed at the time of President Wilson's illness that the Cabinet hxe
given this power by an act of Congress. Nevertheless, I should have considerable
doubt about the constitutionality of any such law if it were passed.
The same comment applies to subsection (d) of question II. I should not
think that an independent agency should be given this power any more than the
Cabinet.
There is one other possibility which may be mentioned and that is a determine.
tion of the question by the Supreme Court of the United States. This, it seems
to me might arise in the ordinary course of litigation. If, for example, the Vice
President, believing anl inability existed, performed some act as Presid.ent tile

validity of his act might be challenged by some Individual litigant. If tihe quest.

tion then reached the Supreme Court of the United States I should think that a
decision as to whether or not an inability existed would have to be made by thp
Su premo Court.
There is the further question whether original jurisdiction might be given to the
Supreme Court to decide by way of declaratory judgment whether inability
existed.

This question seemingly has been piut to rest by Afarbury v. Madison (1 Cranch.
137 (1803)) which held that the original Jurisdiction of the Supreme (ourt as

described in article 3 section 2 clause 2 (which does not include the right to
determine the succession to the IPresidency) cannot be enlarged by congressional
legislation.
Nor, aside from obvious practical objections, may the inferior Federal courts
decide upon the succession by way of a declaratory judgment. Their Jurisdiction

is limited by article 3, section 2, clause 1, to "Cases" and "Controversies," and
I would not think that the matter of the Presidential succession was one or tie

other.

IV. Are there any constitutional prohibitions relative to questions II and III?

Article 2 section I, clause 0, may be divided into two parts. The first part
deals with 1he inability of the Presilent and says that If the President cannot act
the Vice President should succeed. Nothing is said In this part of the clause
about action by Congress. The second part of clause 0 deals with the case where
both the President and the Vice President cannot act and gives to Congress the
right to determine who shall succeed.

Congress thus is given the power to act in the case of the disability of both
officials but nothing is said about Congress in the case where it is the President
alone who is disabled.
From this I think it may be argued that there was an intent on the part of the
Philadelphia Convention that Co.ngress should act in the case of the inability of
both officials but should not have tile power to act with respect to the succession
where the disability was that of the President alone.
But apart from any inference that may come from clause 6, a definition by the
Congress of the word "inability" might be open to the conclusion that it would
constitute an invasion of the term of the Presidency and therefore violate the
principle of the separation of powers. This is of course an argument on principle
without reference to the facts of any particular case and I realize that a decision
of the Supreme Court on an actual case might well be influenced by the circum.
stances at the time. Nevertheless, I do think that the constitutional argument
is an important one against any attempt to define the term "inability."
V. Shall dual authority, both to initiate the question and to determine the

question, be vested in the same body?
I have suggested above that neither authority be vested in any body.
VI. Shall the determination of disability set forth thea. Permanent nature of the disability?
b. Temporary nature of the disability?
c. If temporary, extent of?

If the President or the Vice President were to assort that an inability existed

it should be recognized that the disability, no matter how serious it might appear
at the moment, might prove to be temporary.
VII. If temporary, who raises the question that the disability has ceased to
exist? Once raised, who shall make the determination of cessation?
The proper person, I should think, should be the President.
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VIII. In the event of a finding of temporary disability, does the Vice President
succeed to the powers and duties of the office or to the office itself?
My understanding is that It is now well established that in the case of death,
the Vice President succeeds to the office. The same, I suppose, would apply to a
case of resignation, for that Isa definitive act. I should think that there would be
ground for arguing that in tho case of the succession of the Vice President by reason
of the Inability of the President to act, the Vice President would succeed only to
the powers and duties rather than to the office. This for the reason that there is
always the possibility that the President would recover.
IX. In the event of a finding of permanent disability, does the Vice President
succeed to the powers and duties of the office or to the office itself?
I should incline to the same view in the case of a permanent disability. There
is always the possibility that a disability which seems to be permanent would
prove In fact not to be so.
X. In the event of a finding of a permanent disability does the language of the
Constitution, namely

"*

* * or a President shall be elected * * *' demand the

immediate election of a now President? If so would the election be for a 4-year
term or for the unexpired term of the disabled President?
In the procccdings of the Federal Convention on Friday, September 7, 1787,
the words "until the time of electing a President shall arrive" were stricken from
the language of what later became article II, section 1, clause 6, and the present
words, "or a President shall be elected," were substituted. The former language,
Madison argued, would prevent a supply of the vacancy by an Intermediate$
election of the President and Madison wanted to allow for such an Intermediate
election. This motion was agreed to, was later confirmed by an amendment to
the report of the Committee on Style on September 12, 1787, and again by the
Convention on September 15, 1787.
Nevertheless, it seems that even in the case of a permanent disability of the
President the Constitution does not call for the immediate election of a new
President. There are two reasons for this. One, that I think the words "or a
President shall be elected," may be Interpreted as permissive and not mandatory;
and two, I should think that this whole secondpart of clause 0 applies only to
the case where there Is a disability both of the President and the Vice President.
Section 3 of article 20 seems to support this view.
XI. Does Congress have the authority to enact legislation to resolve any and
all of those questions, or will a constitutional amendment or amendments be
necessary?
I think that a constitutional amendment would be necessary to give original
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court on this subject or to authorize the Congress to
determine the conditions which would constitute inability of the President to
discharge the powers and duties of his office.
THomAs . FINLr .
Vory sincerely yours,
REPLY OF JAMES HART, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
DECEMn~R 15, 1955.
CALLER,
Hon. EMANUEL

Committee or the Judiciary,

ltouse of Repreecniatics, IWt ahington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CILLER: In reply to your letter of November 29, 1055, IIndicated

by a brief note that I should be glad to cooperate with you by preparing a memo.
randum on presidential Inability.
In the meantiime I have given the subject Intensive study, and I enclose here.
with the resulting memorandum together with the brief biographical sketch which
you requested.
I should be glad to have you publish my memorandum in a House document
on the subject.
I am glad that you have undertaken an analysis of what you well call this deli.
cate and vexing problem, and I can only hope that my memorandum may be of
assistance.
If I can be of any further aid in the matter, please let me know.
JAMZs HART,
Respectfully yours,
Prof6eeor of PoLitic4l 0incn.
72282-56--5
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MEMORANDUM ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

By James Hart, professor of political science, University of Virginia
On this subject the Constitution is not only ambiguous about what Isto happen
but also incomplete In not Indicating who shall decide that it is to happen. But
there is no rule of construction that an ambiguous provision may not be carried
out until it is clarified by amendment. Those who operate under a provision
must attribute meaning to it ab best they may. It must thus be assumed that
the framers meant only to lay down principles and to leave it to the law to provide
the details and procedures. Insofar as meaning has not been supplied by practice
it may be supplied by Congress in the exercise of its delegated power to make all
laws which shall be necepsary and proper for carrying into execution the powers
vested by the Constitution in the President as an officer of the Government.
Congress may enact a permanent statute or it may legislate for a particular
case of inability after it arises. In the latter event the mental condition of the
President might prevent his acting upon the bill, and even If Congress could
have it technically presented to him and assume that it became law after the
10.day period, circumstances are readily conceivable in which the delay of a
week and a half would be dangerous.
But Congress might not be in session. It might have adjourned sinfe die;
and the time for the next annual session might be months away. What if in that
situation the President's mental condition prevented his signing a proclamation
to call a special session?
It does not follow that a permanent law is absolutely necessary. For in the
situation imagined leading statesmen and citizens of boili political parties would
presumably persuade the Vice President that it was his duty to "exercise the
office" of President. In less acute situations, moreover, instances might well
occur In which it would be better to muddle along for a while or even indefinitely
rather than substitute the Vice President. We have muddled along in the past
instances without disaster.
On the whole, however it would seem better to have an orderly procedure
prescribed in advance by jaw, if it is one which could be expected to produce a
finding of inability If thiat were necessary, but not otherwise.
What should such a law provide?
The term "inability" is clarified by the later use In the same clause of the
term "disability" as a synonym. The reasonable meaning Is clear in general;
and it may be doubted whether a definition should be spelled out in thle statute.
The attempt to define in specific terms types of situations In an area where e%
cry
case is apt to be sui generic might cause trouble by failing to anticipate some
future situation. On the other hand, any general language would probably have
to be so very general as not to be more ORa guide than common understanding
now is, An agency such as that proposed below should have the opportunity
to use its own best judgment unhampered by the words of a legislative definition
and guided only by the general intent of the Constitution.

The same objection arises with respect to writing a definition of the duration
of an Inability.
The important function of a permanent statute is to vest in some particular
body responsibility for investigation and factfinding. To whom should this
responsibility be given? Not to Congress which might have adjourned not to
convene for months unless called by a President who might be unable to sign the
necessary proclamation. Not to the Vice President, the principal party in interest
because his motive would not be above suspicion and for that very reason he would
probably hesitate to take the initiative even when it ought to be taken. Not to
the Cabinet, which is composed of subordinates of the President who would have
strong inhibitions against taking the initiative. Not to the courts, to whose
process the President Is not amenable in quo warranto proceedings.
No existingagency appearing to be suitable, it would be for Congress to create
one by law. It might be called the Commissioners on Presidential Inability.
These commissioners should not be appointees of the President. Congress
should vest their appointment in the Supreme Court of the United States, under
its authority to vest the appointment of Inferior officers in the courts of law. The
term "inferior officers" is not defined by the Constitution; and within the limits
of reason the matter is left to Congress. It could so classify commissioners who
would have no power at all except in special circumstances to make findings of
fact and do other things incidental thereto. Congress is authorized to vest in
the courts of law the appointment of "such inferior officers, as they think proper."
These will normally be the officers attached to the courts; but the language is
broad enough to allow Congress to include others for appropriate reasons,
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The qualifications of the commissioners should be stated in general terms
which would indicate that the Supreme Court is to take from private life persons
whose character and Judgment shall have won for them the respect of the Nation.
The Court could bo depended upon to carry out the spirit of such a provision.
There should be three commissioners, who should serve for life unless sooner
removed by the Supreme Court for inability or other cause. All three would be
required for a quorum; and they should make their findings by a majority vote.
At first glance it might seem desirable to have one body initiate and another
determine. But in tits matter thie question of when to raise the question should
be handled with the same judicial discretion as the question of how to decide
it. The commissioners should be authorized to investigate upon their own
motion with or without the formal or informal suggestion of others and to make
findings. Their composition would cause them to act when that became neces.
sary antl not to act unless it did become necessary. This arrangement would
also facilitate hasto when haste became essential.
At the outset it might be impossible to determine whether an inability was
temporary or permanent. There should be no such finding as one of temporary
inability, but only a simple finding of Inability, a finding of permanent disability,
and a Anding that the Inability has been removed. The original finding might
be one of inability or of permanent disability; and a finding of inability might be
superseded by a finding that the inability had been removed or by a finding of
permanent disability. But a finding of permanent disability should be made
only after a recital tVat the President appears beyond a reasonable doubt to be
permanently disabled. It should be p)roviee( that a finding of the commissioners
may not be questioned in any other place, and that a finding of permanent dis.
ability may not be reversed or modified by the commissioners themselves prior
to the end of the unexpired term.
The terms inability and disability, as used in the Constitution, are understood
to be synonymous; and the terms "Inability" and "permanent disability" are
to be contrasted In the statute only to distinguish sharply between an inability
which may or may not prove to be permaanent and one which is found beyond a
reasonable doubt to be permanent, and between the different consequences in the
two cases.
In the event of a finding of inability, the act should provide that the Alice
President should exercise the office of President under the title of President pro
tomporo (or Acting President, if that be preferred) of the United States of America.
The President would remain President. The analogy would be exact with those
laws which provide that an Under Secretary becomes the Acting Secretary of an
executive department in the absence of the Secretary. Just as the Under Secro.
tary remains Under Secretary while serving as Acting Secretary, so the Vice
President would remain Vice President. Ile would however, devote his;whole
tinmo to exorcising the office of President, leaving the President pro tempore of the
Senate to be the Presiding Officer of the Senate, as article I, section 3, clause 5,
contemplates.
The phrase in article II, section 1, clause 6, "until the disability be removed,"
refers grammatically to the further succession beyond the Vice President; but the
intent seems reasonably to apply it back also to the succession of the Vice President
If an inability turns out to be genuinely temporary the President should by a
finding of the conmmissioners be restored to his authority.
Only when the commissioners concluded, of course upon the basis of expert
medical advice, that there was a permanent disability bond a reasonable doubt,
would it be authorized so to find and then the Vice President would become
President, the Vice Presidenoy wouid become vacant, and the person found to be
permanently disabled would cease to be President. Nor could this finding or its
consequences be reversed or modified during the remainder of the term.
Now it cannot be conclusively shown what the intent of the framers was if
they had a clear intent. It is a matter of giving language a reasonable meaning
which acceptably reconciles the pertinent clauses, so far as possible. It is now
established by constitutional practice that upon the death of the President the
Vice President becomes President and the Vice Presidency becomes vacant.
This practice would presumably be followed also If the President resigned or
were removed. In all three cases the Presidency is ipso facto vacant. 1':ut
Inability is a different matter. The Constitution clearly envisions removal of
the inability and hence the Vice President could hardly become President prior
to a determination of permanent disability. A strong argument can be made
that In article II, section 1, clause 6, the antecedent of "the same" is "office"
rather than "powers and dutties" for the simple reason that it is elsewhere said
that the Senate shall choose a President pro temporo in the absence of the Vice
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President or when he shall "exercise the office" of President. This he would
do as President pro tempore of the United States from the time an inability
were found until the end of the unexpired term unless in the meantime there
were a finding that the Inability had been removed or that there was a permanent
disability.
What might seem dubious is for the Vice President ever to become President,
Instead of becoming only President pro tempore of the United States, in any
of the cases of succession. That however, is the very point which has been
settled by practice in the case of tAe death of the President. Instead of undoing
this settled practice, it seems both wise and legitimate to extend it by analogy
to the case of permanent disability. In defense of the reading here advocated,
it may be suggested that the admitted imprecision of the constitutional language
derives precisely from the framers' having provided in the same sentence for two
types of situation in which the Vice President is to exercise the office of President:
one in which a clear-cut vacancy has occurred, and the other in which the man
whose office he exercises may later have a claim to resume its exercise.
After a finding either of Inability or of permanent disability, the Vice President
before he enter upon the execution of the office of President, should be required
to take the presidential oath or affirmation prescribed by the Constitution.
rThe phrase, "or a President shall be elected," refers grammatically to the
further succession beyond the Vice President, but should reasonably be applied
back to succession of the Vice President. In the event of a finding of permanent
disability, this language would not demand the immediate election of a now
President. It has not led to an immediate election In the case of the death of the
President. I take It to refer to the next regular election of a President whose
4-year term would begin at the end of the unexpired term, or possibly also to a
special election to fill out the unexpired term, if Congress should provide for such
a special election. I should think, however, that Congress ought not to do so, at
least until the succession passed beyond the Vice President, unless it seemed'
desirable to do so In a particular case. Extra presidential elections are certainly
to be avoided except for urgent reasons. Even if Congress provided for a special

election, however, it could not give the person elected a 4-year term; for that

would upset the time schedule clearly intended by the Constitution to produce a
fixed relationship between the terms of Presidents' Senators, and Representatives.
This memorandum does not attempt to deal with succession beyond the Vice
President; but of course the Commissioners on Presidential Inability would be
empowered to make such findings of inability as might be involved.
Ido not call what follows a draft of my proposed statute, but only a sketch
from which a draft might be made; but I may say that I prefer the direct draftsmanship of the laws of the first session of the First Congress to the too refined
complexities of modern statutes.
Be it enacted, etc., (1) That three commissioners, to be known as the Commissloners on Presidential Inability, shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of the
United States from among those private citizens of the United States whose
character and Judgment shall have won for them the respect of the Nation. The
terms of the commissioners shall be for life, unless they be sooner removed by the
Supreme Court for inability or other cause.
(2) The commissioners are hereby charged with the responsibility and competence of investigating, upon their own motion with or without the formal or
informal suggestion of others, whether there exi its a case of (a) inability under the
Constitution of the President of the United State4 to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, or of (b)permanent disability under the Constitution of the
President of the United States, and if they conclude efter such investigation that
such inability or permanent disability exists, of so finding.
(8) Upon a finding by the commisloners of inability, the Vice President of the
United States shall forthwith exercise the office of President under the title of
President pro tempore of the United States of America; and while the Vice
President so serves the President pro tempore of the Senate shall be the presiding
officer of the Senate.
(4) After a finding by the commissioners of Inability, they shall have the further
responsibility and competence of investigating, upon their own motion with or
without the formal or Informal suggestion of others, whether the said inability
hes been removed, and, it they conclude after such Investigation that the ssid
Inability has been removed, of so finding; and upon their so finding the Vice
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President shell forthwith cease to be President pro tompore of the United States
of Anierice, and the President of the United States shell resume his office and the
full exorcise thereof.
(5) A finding by the commissioners of inability may not be questioned in any
other place, but may be superseded by a finding by the commissioners themselves
that the inability has been removed or by a finding by the commissioners themselves of a permanent disability, but not otliers ise.
(0) A finding of permanent disability may be made by the commissioners in the
first instance or by way of superseding a prior finding by them of inability, but
shall be made only after the recital by rte commissioners that the President of tile
United States appears beyond a reasonable doubt to be permanently disabled.
(7) Upon a finding by the commissioners of permanent disability the Vice
President of the United States shall become President of the United States, and
shall remain President for the remainder of the unexpired term, except In case of
his death, resignation, removal, or inability, unless the Congress shall have
provided, or shall thereafter provide, for a special election to fill the unexpired
oerm. At the same time the Vice Presidency shall become vacant, and the person
found by the commissioners to be permanently disabled shall cease to be President
of the United States.
(8) A finding by the commissioners of permanent disability may not be questioned in any other place, nor shall it be reversed or modified by the commissioners,
but shall stand until the end of the unexpired term.
(9) Whenever in case of Inability the Vice President shall exercise the office of
President under the title of President pro temlmore of the UnitedlStates of America,
and whenever in ease of permanent disability the Vice President shall become
President, he shall, before to enter upon the execution of the said office, take the
Presidential oath or affirmation prescribed by the Constitution.
(10) (In appropriate legal language the Commissioners on Presidential Inability
should be au thorized to make sutch other decisions as may be necessary and proper
as incidental to the responsibilities and competencies vested in them by this act.
formal
to hold
make their investigations
should
be emp!owered
They
subpenaorand
administer
ltblic to
or confidential
proceedings, toinformal
hearings,
to conduct
oaths to wittuesses, and to call for relevant books, papers, and documents. It
should be made the express duty of all officers of the United States to give such
testimony and to furnish them such information and such books, papers, and
documents, as niay be relevant to their investigations. A quorum should consist
of all three commissioners; and in deciding all questions they should act by a
majority vote.)
REPLY OF ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
11,
CLLR,
Hon. EMANUEL

D•EcIMmEa 19, 1955.

Committee on the Judiciary,
Iloiuso of Rcpresenlttztz,', lV1ashington, D. C.
DEARt CON(0IR'ss.MAN CR:IAX.It: Hferewith are my answers to your questionnaire
on Presidential inability as promised in my letter to you dated December 17.
1. The intention of the framers of the Constitution, I believe, was to make
clear the power of the proper authorities to provide, when necessary, for the
performance of the duties of the office of President by some other person than
the President himself. The omission of a definition of the torn "inability," as
umsed in article II, sectlon 1, clause 6, was deliberate. The framers, conscious of
their inability to anticipate ill the different circumstances in which the President
might be nunible to perform the duties of his office, intended that each case should
be decided as It night arise in the light of reason. The important questions are
those which you yourself raise tin the questionnaire under the second heading
thereof. Before answering these questions however, I wish to add to my answer
to question No. I that, in my opinion, it is not desirable that a more precise
definition of "inability" be enacted into law. I believe that the framers showed
sound judgment in refusing to try to anticipate nil the contingencies that might
arise in a distant and uncertain future. We should not be improving their work
but impairing it if we should undertake to do what they so wisely refused to
attempt.
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2. The person who should Initiate the question of the President's inability to
discharge the power and the duties of his office is the Vice President. He might
be prompted to raise this question by a request from the Cabinet or a resolution
of the Congress but in my opinion that is not necessary since it is the duty of the
Vice President to act in case of the President's Inability. It is clear that it is his
duty to raise the question if In his opinion such action may be necessary.
3. While the Vice President should raise the question, lie certainly should not
make the final determination of inability. In my opinion it Isthe Congress which
should make the final determination. It can do so quite informally simply by
consenting to recognize the Vice President as the proper person with whom it
should deal in matters Involving the exorcise of the Executive power under the
Constitution. I see no reason why either the Cabinet or any other group, Inclid.
Ing
independent
agencies, should 1)e con8sulted except in an informal manner by
way
courtesy.
4. of
I do
not know of any constitutional prohibition relative to questions No. 2
and No. 3 except those implied In the basic principles of the separation of powers.
The question whether the Vice President should discharge the powers and duties
of the office of President seems to me to be a political question. There would be
no reason, therefore, for appealing to the Supreme Court from a decision by the
Congress. The decision of the Congress to recognize or not to recognize tile
Vice President as acting for the President would seem to me to be final and not
subject to any appeal execpt such as might be taken to the people of the country
at the next ensuing gei'eral election.
S. 1 see no reason why the Congress should not initiate the question as well as
make the final determination, if the Vice President fails to act in good season.
The real difficulty is, of course, a practical one. The Congress may not have
confidence in the Vice President, as perhaps was the case at the time of President
Wilson's illness, and it is not permissible under the Constitution to sot the Vice
President aside and put some other person in his place merely on the ground of
lack of confidence in his capacity to perform the duties of the office of President.
0. 1 see no reason for recognizing any disability In advance as permanent
except in the case of death. In other cases, it is a fair presuimption at the outseol
that the disability may happily he only temporary.
7. The answer to this question I think is the sa4m as tile answers to No. 2 and
No. 3. The Vice President may raise the question whether disability has ceased
to exist, but, whether he does or not, in my opinion it is the Congresswhich should
make the determination of cessation. bf course, there is the possibility that
the President himself may raise the question. In that ease, also, If there should
be a difference of opinion between him and the Vice President, it would be the
Congress that would eventually have to decide whether the disability had ceased
to exist. I draw this conclusion from article I, section 8, clause 18.
8. My belief is that the Vice President succeeds to the powers and duties of the
office and not to the office itself in the event of the President's temporary disability.
There was originally strong support for tile opinion that this would be the case
also in the event of permanent disability, but general acquiesclence in the action
of Vice President John Tyler In claiming tile office of President after the death of
William Henry Harrison has settled the point that in ease of permanent disability
the Vice President may succeed to the office itself.
9. I think this question has been settled at least by Implication by the precedent
established by John Tyler.
10. I do not think tho Constitution requires the immediate election of a new
President inder the Indicated circumstances. My belief is that the Congress has
power to provide by law for this contingency.
11. Congress happily possesses a general but limited Authority to enact legislation necessary and proper to resolve any and all of these questions, subject to
review by the Supreme Court of the necessity and propriety of such legislation as
Congress might enact. I do not believe that any constitutional amendment is
necessary in order to perfect the provisions of the Constitution relating to this
matter as they came from the hands of the framers.
Respectfully yours,
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE,
Profeesor of the Science of Government, Emeritus, Harvard University.
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REPLY OF HON. HERBERT HOOVER, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TnE WALDORF-ASTORIA TowERs,

New York, N. Y., December 8, 1965.
Hon. EMANUEL CE•LIJR,
Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary,

Washington, D.c.

DEARI Mn. CELITR: I have your Inquiry of November 29.
It Ismy understanding that under article II, section I of the Constitution, the
Congress has the power to determine who shall take over the Executive powers in
cue of the inability of the President to serve.
In my view the determination of disability and Its termination should rest with
the Cabinet, and the Executive powers should be executed by the Vice President
during any such period.
Yours faithfully,
HERBERT HoovR..

REPLY OF MARK DEW. HOWE, LAW SCHOOL OF HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
Hon, EMANUEL SELLER,

JANUARY 19, 1956.

Committee on the Judidarp,

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

My DEAR CONGRESSMAN: Since receiving your questionnaire on Presidential
Inability I have been turning the probleon over In my mind. It Is not, I am
sorry to say, a question on which I feel myself peoullarly qualified to speak and
my thoughts, accordingly, are essentially 'casual. Because you have asked for
an expression of my views, however, I shall do my best to fornulate them.
Of basic importance, in my judgment, is recognition of the fact that any
attempt to find a single answer to the unpredictable contingencies of the future
would be seriously mistaken. This principle loads me to bellovo that It would
be most unfortunate to attempt by any means to define "inability." It teems
to me that it is better to preserve the vagueness of the constitutional provision
than to attempt to achieve an undesirable, and perhaps an unattainable, precision.
It seems to me, for instance, that an "inability" which might present major
problems if it should occur at the beginning of a'President's term of office might
involve no truly significant issues for the Government if it should arise during
the concluding months of his administration. To produce a single definition
and to seek a single answer for problems which the accidents of tinme make
essentially different would seem to me most unfortunate. I should, therefore,
be opposed to an effort to define "inability" by statute, constitutional amendment,
or otherwise.
To say this, however, is not to say that no action is desirable at the present
time. In my judgment it is desirable that Congress by joint resolution or by
statute, but in any case with the President's concurrence, should assert one basic
principle concerning the problem of "inability." That principle is that the power
to inquire and ultimately to decide whether "inability,' temporary or permanent,
exists, is to be exercised by the Congress. In my judgment the Vice President is
clearly disqualified for interest from initiating or determining this issue. I
realize that the size of the Cabinet would, on the face of it, make it a more appropriate body than Congress to determine whether the President Is able to execute
his powers. On the other hand, I believe that the intimate association between
the President and his Cabinet makes it an inappropriate body to decide the
matter. I should see no reason why the Cabinet might not initiate congressional
action, but I take it that no statute or resolution need assert that right. I
believe it important however, that Congress should, before the issue arises,
assert its responsibility to determine the fact of "inability" and its determina.
tion that the consequences of "inability" will be resolved by congressional action,
within the Constitution, in the light of circumstances as they exist when action
is required.
From what I have said I take it that you will understand that I believe that it
would be unwise to attempt in advance to state by whom the President's powers
are to be exercised during his "inability." A solution appropriate when the
Nation is at peace might be totally inappropriate when it is at war. As I have
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already suggested, the course advisable at the beginning of a President's term
of office might well be entirely unsuitable if his "Inability" should occur near the
end of his term.
Behind my particular answers to your questions lies a strong conviction with
respect to our constitutional system. That is the belief that the framers of the
Constitution showed great wisdom in their fidelity to generalities. I feel sure that
if we now seek to provide rules for matters which they preferred to dispose of
by principle we will jeopardize the future. It isfar wiser to leave some questions
unsettled for in doing so we preserve for later generations the power to resolve
their own problems in accordance with their own needs, I should allow this
principle to govern action with respect to the problem of the nature of the Vice
President's powers when the Congress has determined that the President Is per.
manently or temporarily disabled. I therefore believe it unwise to seok a present
resolution of the 8th, Oth and 10th questions presented in our questionnaire.
From everything that I have said you will realize that I believe that the Con.
gress possesses today the sole power which it seems to me to be desinrJle for it to
exercise. That is the power to assert an exclusive authority over the matter of a
President's "inability." I believe that such an assertion of authority, concurred
in by the Presldent,'would serve usefully to clarify an important issue and would
do so without imposing unftunawt.linitations on an authority which should be
largely unlimited.
MARK DoW. Hewn,
Respectfully yours,

Profresor of Law.
REPLY OF RICHARD G. HUBERj TULANE UNIVERSITY
ON T118 JUDIOIARY2
CHAIRMAN, Comui'rru

DBcEMU~N 22, 1955.

House of Repreaentatives, United States Congress,
Washington, D. C.

DIAR SIR: I understand a subcommittee staff of the House Judiciary Coin.

mittee is studying the problem of who judges-and should judge-an ailing
President's fitness to carry out his duties. I am writing a few comments on the
question-comments that are basic and have perhaps already been considered
by your staff.
I suppose the first question-who Judges at present under the Constitution-is clear enough in theory, since the President essentially is the only one with the
power. On the other hand experience has shown that an ailing President is
often not capable of making the decision-or is kept from stepping aside by those
few who have access to him at this time. The result is obviously unsatisafactory.
Quite probably the solution of the problem of the incapacitated President
must be solved by constitutional amendment, if a pattern of solution is desired.
Any amendment, however, should first of all consider the separation of powers
within the Federal Government. This means it seems to me that the decision
on the capacity of the President should not be made either by the Judicial or
legislative branch of government. The Supreme Court, furthermore, is not
equipped to solve a problem such as this which is basically political and medical
in nature. It seems to me also that Congress-or any part of It-would not
have sufficiently close contact with the President and hifs execution of the duties
of his office to be able to make a decision except where the decision was obvious.
In close cases, even if Congress were making a decision on evidence presented to
them, the possibility of political consid,.rations predominating In the decision, or
the fear of it makes Congress a poor choice to make this decision even assuhilng
they can judge better than the Supreme Court as to the actual power of the
President to carry out his essential duties.
A third possibility would involve the creation of a separate body-probably
appointed by Congress-consisting of medical experts and experienced adminIstrators. Any such body, however, tends to complicate government and would
seem foreign to our present government system, except by possible analogy to the
electoral college.
The remaining possibility, of course, is that this decision be made within the
executive branch of Government itself. This branch will certainly be the first to
realize the actuality of any loss of capacity by the President. But, as before
stated, this should not mean that certain persons close to the President should
make decisions in place of the President. This problem really seems to tie in
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with the question of constitutional delegation of Presidential power. Basically
the problems of the Presidency are exceedingly heavy for any one man to handle
even If In the best of health. And tile question of temporary or partial loss of
capacity of the President to govern Is part of this same problem-merely that the
jol whioh Is already beyond the capacity of tile individual President is now
markedly so,,perhaps to tile point where the President cannot even make major
decisions.
Within the present framework of our Government, the Vice Presidefit is the only
elective official other than the President that is even partly connected with the
executive branch. It would seem that whoever directs the 0overnment--or parts
of it that are beyond the capacity of the President to handle-should be responsible for those acts to the electorate. Thus one solution within tlhe present setup
is to make the Vice President a sort of chief administrative officer of the Govern.
mont, and remove from hin his duties as proriding officer of the Senate. Duties
carried by the executive department could then at least be divided between two
men and, if one's capacity to govern diminished the other could take up the slack.
This suggestion, of course, would require a considerably different approach to
selection of Vice Presidents, but, that is not a constitutional problem.
Another possil)le solution is the one favored in many European countriesalthough foreign to our present governmental setup. That is to have a head of
State who does not govern but carries out the routine duties that our President
still has to carry il addition to his pollcymaking burdens. Such a liead of State
could be electea or could be appointed by the IPresident with the advice and eon-.
sent of the Senate, or could b) appointed by Congress. Election would seem
unnecessary and perhaps even unwise, sinoo tile quolffloations of the man selected
for this Job would be best Judged by those in the Governunent rather than the
electorate. This does not solve tho question of Judging the President's capacity

to govern at oil, however, even Itit does mako it more possible for the President to
carry on his Important duties. Consequently, It s•ems best that the President
and Nice President form an administrative team, with the President in the leadership position but the Vice President able to make any or all decisions iII the ease

of Presidential incapacity and responsible to the electorate both for the decision
as to incapacity and for the decisions lie makes while acting o11 the policy level.
This letter is too short to explain my views lin detail but It is certainly very long
for a busy Congressman to read. I apologize for its length, certainly.
Respectfully,
RIcHIARD 0. Iluanmit.
REPLY OF JOSEPI 11. KALLENBACI!, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
JANUARY 23, 1950.
C
Hon. EMANUEL

R,
,LLEI,

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.
DEAR MR. COLLOR: I am enclosing herewith two copies of a statement I have

repaired in response to your questionnaire on Presidential Inability.
|)You vill note that my statement is in two parts. Part I Is(ldvoted to a consideration of tihe general question with emphasis being placed oil State practice
in dealing with the similar problem of gubernatorial inability. Part 11 deals
more specifically with the questions raised in the questionnaire.

I have not undertaken to draw up a draft bill on tie matter; but I have indicated
my belief that a congressional statute on the subject would be desirable and I
have indicated in some detail the nature of the provisions which I think should be
incorporated in it.
Thanking you for the opportunity to express my views oln this Important subject,
Very sincerely,
E. IALLENDAVII.

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY To EXUERCIs

THE POWERS AND DUTIItr op His Omocm

PART I

Implementation of the clause in article II, section 2, of the Constitution providing
for devolution of the powers and duties of the President upon the Vice President,

in the event of disability of the former, remains one of the unused and inoperative
provisions of our Constitution. To date the only Instances of actual devolution
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of Presidential powers and duties have occurred as a result of the death of an
incumbent President. In this connection, for reasons which need not be noted
here in detail, usages have been established that the succeeding Vice President
"becomes" President and ceases to occupy the office of Vice President, rather
than becoming a Vice President exercising the powers and discharging the duties
of the Presidency in the capacity of an Acting President; and that his incumbency
in the office of President continues until the term for which the President has
been originally elected ends.'
These usages have unfortunately given rise to doubts and questions of a constitutional nature which have, in part, been responsible for rendering ineffective
the inability clause in the succession arrangements. Oil at least two occasions,
viz., during the Garfield and Wilson administrations, conditions arose which
undoubtedly warranted an application of the inability clause in the succession
pIan. There have been other instances, the latest of which came about last
eptember when President Eisenhower suffered a temporarily disabling heart
attack, when the inability clause might have been applied had there not been
grave doubts regarding the manner of implementing it and its effect upon the
official status of the two persons most immediately concerned, the President and
the Vice President.
In approaching this problem, certain general considerations must be kept
prominently in mind. The tremendous power and great prestige which have
come to be attached to the office of President of the United States dictate that
the powers and duties of this office, which carry with them an almost immeasurable
importance to the Nation and even to the world, should not be subjected to a
rule which for light and transitory causes would involve its shifting from hand
to hand. Only a situation involving the gravest kind of emergency warrants the
devolution of the constitutional powers and duties of this great office, temporarily
or otherwise, upon a substitute for the elected President. On the other hand, a
cessation, by default, for an extended period of time, of active functioning of the
Presidency is intolerable to the Nation and to the world. The chief executiveship
of the United States supplies too much of the energizing and directive force in our
governmental P--tdem and requires policy decisions, almost from day to day, of too
much consequence, to permit a vacuum to exist in this part of the governmental
organization. Furtherenore, disputes as to who may rightfully exercise the
constitutional powers and duties of the office in a situation wherein'the President's
capacity to act is in question must be guarded against and obviated, so far as
possible. These considerations point to the desirability of taking appropriate
steps to implement and perfect these constitutional arrangements, during a period
of relative calm, rather than to face the problem when it presents itself as an
emergency situation which must be dealt with in an atmosphere of crisis.
The intentions of the framers regarding the meaning and purpose of the inability
clause cannot be clearly ascertained from the records of the debates in the Convention of 1787. This provision was given comparatively little attention by
them. Formulation of a constitutional plan governing succession came relatively
late in the proceedings. The provisions ultimately adopted as was also the case
with those relative to selection, tenure and removal of the Kresident, reflected a
slowly maturing realization that the arrangements included on this point should
insure, in some degree at least, executive independence from the legislative branch.
How far this independence should carry with respect to the implementation of the
inability clause they did not make entirely clear.
According to Madison's Journal, the succession issue was first dealt with in the
tentative draft of a Constitution reported by the Committee of Detail on August 6.
Following the outlined of Hamilton's ideas of a proposed Constitution which the
Committee had at hand for reference, the draft carried a clause stating that in the
event of removal, death, resignation or disability of the President, the President
of the Senate should exercise the powers and duties of the office "until another
President be chosen, or until the disability be removed."'2 This was an entirely
logical proposal in view of the fact that at that point in its proceedings the Convention was committed to the principle of legislative selection of the President.
The framers evidently were influenced in this matter by the prevailing practice of
the States. In most of the eight States which at that time provided for legislative
election of the governor, his temporary successor was either the presiding officer
of the upper legislative house or the council, as it was called in some of these
States, or one of its members to be named for this purpose.
IThe most complete and exhaustive study of these and related questions can be found in Ruth 0. 811vas
Presidential Succession, University of Michigan Press (1051).
s Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States (0. 0. TansilI, ed.) (1927),
p. 479.
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When this clause of the tentative draft was taken up for consideration on August 27 Gouveneur Morris, champion of the principle of executive independence
of the legislative branch, objected to it. He suggested instead that the Chief
Justice be made the provisional successor.3 At this point in the proceedings the
Idea of an executive council on which the Chief Justice would sit was still under
serious consideration by the Convention. Morris preferred that a member of the
contemplated body of official advisers to the President, even though he was a
judicial officer, should be the succeeding officer, rather than to have the succession fall upon the head of one of the legislative houses. Madison added as a
further objection to the committee's proposal that the Senate might be tempted
to delay the choice of a new President while its own presiding officer was in possession of the veto power. He suggested that the Presidential powers should
devolve upon the contemplated executive council as a whole. Dr. Williamson,
of North Carolina, evidently mindful of the possibility of illness and of occasional
absences of the President from the seat of government, pointed out that fuller
provision should be made for "occasional successors;" while John Dickinson, of
Delaware, objected to the vagueness of the term "disability," and raised the question who should be the judge of it.4
No one offered support for tile committee's proposal, and a motion to postpone
consideration of it carried. This action had the ultimate effect of referring this
feature of the Committee of Detail draft to a Committee on Postponed Matters
and Unfinished Business for further study and report. The solution advanced
by this body on September 4 was a proposal to create the office of Vice President
to provide a first successor to the President, with the Vice President to be tile
ex officio President of the Senate. "Disability" as an occasion for succession was
chang ed to "Inability," and "absence" was added as another circumstance in
which the succession rh
rle should operate.'
The proposal to establish as theimmediate successor to the President a Vice
President, to be chosen in tihe same manner as the President, was accepted by the
Convention. On Randolph's motion a clause was included authorizingCongre
to provide for succession beyond the Vice President
in case oftie
thesucceeding
"death, rosigna
tion or disability" of both the President and Vice President,
officer
to serve "until the time for electing a President shall arrive." 6At Maidison's
suggestion, a change in the wording of Randolph's proposal was made. The
change caused the clause added to state that a successor should serve "until the
disability be removed, or a President shall be elected." Madison's evident purpose in proposing this textual change was to make clear that Congress might provide for an Interim election to fill a permanent vacancy, and to clarify the point
of the duration of service of an acting President in the event of disability of both
the President and Vice President. Adoption of Randolph's proposal, as thus
modified resulted In some ambiguity, since as then prove a ýce President
was to succeed in case of thle "death, removal, resignation, inability or absence"
of the Presient, but the next officer in line was to succeed in the event of the
"death resignation or disability" of both the President and Vice President. In
an evident attempt to eliminate this ambiguity the final draft subsequently prepared by the Committee on Style and Arrangement omitted reference altogether
to "absence" as an occasion for operation of the succession rule and substituted
"inability" for "disability" In the clause referring to the succession beyond the
Vice President. These changes were not commented on when the succession clause
of the completed draft was reviewed. The term "inability" mar have been judged
by the Committee on Style to be more comprehensive than disability" and to
include both absences and temporary physical disabilities. On the other hand,
the reference to "absence" as an occasion for operation of the succession rule may
have been deliberately omitted because it was feared that it might impose undue
limitation upon the movement of the President from the seat of government and
give rise to unnecessarily frequent shiftings of the powers and duties of the Presidcency to the Vice President.
There is little or nothing in this history of the formulation of the inability
clause that suggests the proposition, later advanced, that in the event the powers
and duties of the Presidency devolve upon a Vice President he must be regarded
as the permanent occupant of the office, displacing the President for the remainder
I Ibid., p. 621.
4 Ibid., p. 722.

1Ibid., pp. 6"0-81.
* Ibid., p. 680.
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of a term in all instances when the succession rule should operate. It seems very
unlikely that they intended to make the Vice President the permanent successor
to the President in the event of the latter's "inability," while a successor to the
Vice President in the event of his "Inability" should be regarded as a temporary
successor serving only until the Vice President's "inability" should be removed.
Undoubtedly the framers, in devising these arrangements relative to succession,
were greatly Influenced and guided by the example and experience of the States
in their provisions for succession to the office of State governor. Provision for a
"deputy governor" or some other-styled temporary substitute for the colonial
governor was a common feature of the colonial systems. In Rhode Island and
L'nnecticut, where colonial charters dating from 1663 and 1062, respectively,
continued to serve as State constitutions during and after the Revolution, the
deputy governor was authorized to serve as governor in the event of the governor's
inability occasioned by "sickness, absence or otherwise." 7 All of the other
original State constitutions carried clauses making provision in some way for
gubernatorial succession. In most of the States succession to the powers and
duties of the governorship was provided for in the event of the governor's
"absence" from the State or during his "inability." in language which indicated
that there could be a temporary devolution of authority to the succeeding officer
under these conditions.8
It may be assumed that the framers, who were aware of such State constitutional arrangements regarding temporary succession to the powers and duties of
the governor by a designated officer, intended to establish a system under which
the Vice President, as the officer next in line for the Presidency, should exercise
the powers and duties of that office either in case of a temporary, "occasional"
inability or a permanent disability, as well as in case of the President's death,
resignation or removal. In the event of a permanent vacancy in the office
occasioned by death, resignation, or removal of the President, it Is not altogether
clear whether or not they expected that Congress should arrange for election of a
new President. It does'scem clear, however, that they intended to give Congress
the option of making provision for a special election of a new President in the event
that an officer other than the Vice President should succeed to the powers and
duties of the Presidency under the terms of supplementary congressional legislation.
Since the States are confronted by a similar problem of succession to the office
of governor in case of "inability" of the incumbent, and the national constitutional provisions on this point may be assumed to deal with the matter in a manner
similar to that employed by the States, a survey of State practices should shed
light on how the problem could and should be handled at the national level. In
view of the fact that the framers were admittedly influenced by State practice
in the provisions made on other points relative to the executive office, it is a
reasonable assumption that the practice of the States with regard to their arrangements for succession in the event of gubernatorial "inability" should serve as a
guide to interpretation of the corresponding national constitutional provision.
Currently the constitutions of 46 States contain language which clearly or impliedly indicates that in the event the governor is unable to exercise powers and
discharge the duties of his office, there shall be a temporary devolvement of them
upon the officer next in the line of succession. Twenty-eight States also explicitly
or implicitly provide for a temporary succession in case of the governor's absence
I The Rhode Island Charter of6I3 provided: "And further, wowill, and by these presents, for us, our hoira
and succcsors, doe ordeyne and graunt, that the Governor of the sayd Company, for the tyme being, or,
In his absence, by oeca.Ion of sleknegse, or otherwise, by his leace and permlislon, the Deputy.Oovernor,
ffor the tyme being, shall and may from tyme to tyme, upon all occasions, give order for the assemblingo
of
the say•i Company and eallinge them together, to consul and advise of the businesses and affalres of the
iad Company.1•

insiqmlmlr Inguage the Connecticut Charter of 1852 stated:
"Wee will and (toe Ordaine and Oraunt that the Governour of the said Company for the tyme being, or,
in hits abspene by occasion of'sicknes, or otherwise by his lea-te and permission the Deputy-Oovernour for
the tyine being, shah and may, from tyine to tyme upon all occasons give Orde for the asx-niblingoth
said Comupany and calling them together to consult and alviso of time businesses and Affairs of th said
company. * I
I Only Ithe constitutions of Pennsylvania and Maryland contained language Indicating that the sucemssion
rule should operate only in tho event of a permanent vacancy In the office of governor. The I'cnnsyivania
Const itut Ion of 1778 Provided that till vacancies la the Executive Council (which elected one of Its own members to be "Pre.siient" of the Commonwealth) that might happen by death,mresignation or otherwise, should
be filled at the next regular election, unless a special election was called. The Maryland Constitution of
1778 made provision for temporary exercise of the governor's powers. by the "Ifirst named of the council"
(senate) and requimredi appointment of a new governor by the general assembly, in the event of the death,
resignation, or removal of the governor out of the state.
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from the State.0 Upon a governor's return to the State he automatically reassumes
the powers of his office.10 In addition there are at least 14 States in which the
language of the constitution clearly indicates or has been interpreted to mean that
a temporary devolution of the governor's powers upon the succeeding officer occurs
up on the voting of impeachment charges against the governor, with the outcome
of the subsequent trial being determinative of whether he reassumes those powers
and duties or not." In all these situations there is clearly indicated a circumstance in which a temporary devolution of official powers and duties of the governor
may occur, without his permanently surrendering his right to the office for his elective term. During the time his powers are being exercised by the officer next in
line he remains governor,
but the powers and duties of the office are temporarily
in tle hands of another.'2
Instances in which a temporary devolution of gubernatorial powers has occurred through operation of the rule regarding absence from the State are so
numerous and common as to require no documentation. Mere notification of the
officer next in line of succession of an impending absence by a governor suffices
to cause the powers and duties of his office to devolve upon lis successor, and this
is the common procedure followed. State courts have on occasion held, however,
that such notification is not a required stop in causing the devolution to occur,
and that the rule operates automatically upon the given fact of the governor's
leaving the boundaries of the State.'3
There have also been a number of cases of temporary or tentative devolution
of gubernatorial powers because of the illness or physical incapacity of the occupant of the governor's office. One such instance occurred in New Hampshire
shortly before the adoption of the Constitution. Meshech Weare, the first
executive under New Hampshire's constitution of 1784 was unable to take the
oath of office at the beginning of his term, and the president of the senate, Woodbury Langdon, the officer next in line, exercised for a short time the powers of the
governorship in his stead. The next year Langdon again exercised the powers
of the governship during another period of illness by Weare."4 These precedents
were cited by the supreme court of New Hamlpshire in 1890 in a case arising in
that State in which, acting upon a request from the Attorney General made with
the acquiescence of Governor Goodell, who was ill, it issued a writ of mandaitits
to the president of the senate directing him to assume the powers and duties of the
governorship during the period of the incumbent's illness."& Governor Goodell
subsequently recovered and resumed the powers and duties of his office for the
remainder of his term. In still another more recent New Hampshire case, the
Supreme Court rendered an advisory opinion to resolve a question concerning what
0The Oklahoma constitutional provision, which provides for succession of the Lieutenant.Govenor In

the event of the Governor's "removal from the State," wits hold
applicable to an occasional absence from
the State In ftrprte COump, 10 Okla. Cr. 133,135 P'ae. 428 (913). In Alabama the succession rule operates
only in case the Governor is absent for 20 days or longer. The Louisiana Supreme Court has construed the
absence clause of that State's constitution to apply only in case the absence actually interferes with the
Governor's performane of his duties. State ere WIiarmouth v. Graham, 20 La. Ann. =lOS
(1874).
10Cf. People ur rel Tennant v. Parker, 3 Neb. 409 (1873); Rz parte latakins, 10 Okla Cr. 390, 130 Pao. 991
(1913).
I' Cf. State ez rel Trapp v. Chambers, 96 Okla. 78, 220 Pac. 890 (1023); Opinion of the Judge, 8 Nob. 463
(1873); People ex rel Robin v. 1layeo, 149 N. Y. Supp. 250_(1914). See also In the Matter of he Ezecttive
Cmmunicalion Filed the 17th Day of April, A. D. 1878 14 Fla. 289 (1872).
t On this point the
supreme Court of Oklahoma has said: "Such absence from the State isan abdication
for the time being of the constitutional functions of his office, and the effect of that absence Isto suspend
his constitutional functions. Heodoes not ceaseUovernor
to be
by his temrporary absence from the State.
His vested right of tenure In the term of office attaches to his person and Is a istinet from his executive funetion1 It; goes with him, but his constitutional functions of his office belong to the public and ar confined
to the State and cannot be exercised out of the State; when he leaves the State the constitutional functions
of his offlee devolve pro temporo upon the Lieutenant Glovernor; and when fie returns to the state, ipso
facto, he reumes all of the powers, functions, and duties of his office, and the Lioeruant Governor theretofore administering the executive functions temporarily under the Constitution, cosmes tohe Acting dovemor.
"The true distinction Is founded upon the difference existing In the nature of things between a personal
vested right of tenure In the term and the functions of the office created lathe Interest and for the benefit
of the public. We think that this Is the unmistakable meaning of the language used, and that this con-

struction is alike supported by reason, common sense, public policy, known political truths, and the con.
temporaneous and practical construction of the respective departments of our State government and Is
conformable to the history of every State la the Union." E&parte Cramp, 10 Okla. 133, 185 Pao. ;3A (1913),
at Pil. 152-183.
l$e
Bo lVolts v. hall, 2D2 Ark. 99 15458 W (21) 573 (1941); Er ggrl Hawkins 10 Okla Or 390 1311
P"c
991A1913); Aonlgornerisetatv. Cleveland, 134 M'Isn. 132, 98 So. I11 (I92), Stale ea rel Attornev rGeeraland Case
V. arrow, 29 La. Ann. 2431
(1877). Absence of the governor on official business, or for brief period of time
does not necessarily entitle the officer who acts In his place, rather than the governor, to receive the salary
attaching to the office of governor under a constitutional prevision which states that the salary and emolumonts shall be receivedl by the person exerctifin the powers and duties thereof. See Slate or rol IVrmouth
v. Graham, 20 La. Ann. W0(1874); Stateexr el Cr ilenden v. li~alker 78 Mo. 139 (1883).
14These incidents ame noteti In the court's opinion Ia Atiorney deneroi v. To9ggrt, 60 N. 11. 362.29 AM. 102
ISethe case cited in note It, above.
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officer should assume the powers and duties of the governorship in the face of an
impending absence of the governor and the illness of his Immediate successor."4
Other instances of the operation of the Inability rule because of illness have
occurred in Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon and Illinois. Gov. William J. Samford
by reason of Illness was unable to take the oath of office as Governor of Alabama
at the beginning of his term on December 1, 1900. The president of the senate,
William D. Jelks, the next successor under the Alabama constitution at that
time, took the oath as governor and served until December 26, 1900, when Samford,
having sufficiently recovered, took over the office. The next year on June 11,
Samford died and was succeeded for the remainder of his term by Jelks, Jelks
was subsequently elected governor in his own right, but during his term he also
became ill, and was absent from the State from April 25, 1904, to March 5, 1905,
undergoing treatment for his Illness. During this time the lieutenant governor,
R. M. Cunningham, acted as governor. Upon recovery of his health Jelks
returned, resumed the powers and duties of his office, and finished out his term
as overnor.17
In Arkansas In 1907, Governor John S. Little suffered a nervous breakdown
about 1 week after assuming office. The powers and duties of the office for the
remainder of his term were exercised by the occupants of the offices of president
of the senate and president pro teinpore of the senate. Little did not resign and
continued to be regarded as the governor for his full term.' 8 A somewhat similar
situation occurred in Oregon In 1910-11. Following the death of Governor
Chamberlain, Frank M. Benson, as secretary of state succeeded to the office of
governor. Benson subsequently became incapacitated on Juno 17, 1910 and the
president of the senate, Jay Bowerman, served as acting governor in his place
until the completion of the regular term on January 8, 1911.
The incident invol'inp Gov. Henry Horner, of Illinois, in 1i040, is illustrative of
the fact that an assertion of a claim of authority to exercise the powers and duties
of the office of governor by the next succeeding officer on the ground of physical
incapacity of the incumbent is not in itself sufficient to bring about a devolution
of these powers. Governor Horner had suffered a heart attack in November 1938,
apd thereafter he was from time to time incapacitated in some degree by high
blood pressure and threatened recurrence of heart trouble. On April 8, 1940,
Lt. Gov. John Stelle, citing the fact of the Governor's illness and confinement to
his bed and asserting that his powers were actually being exercised by a "bedside
cabinet," laid claim to the powers and duties of the governorship. A statement
was issued over Homer's signature denying Stelle's assertions and maintaining his
own right to continue as governor. For a period of approximately 3 weeks Stello
continued to maintain his position; but eventually, as other State officers ignored
his pretensions to the office of governor, he desisted. Later, in October, when
Horner's condition became critical and he fell into a coma, his secretary issued a
statement announcing to the secretary of state and the State auditor that Horner
was unable to act, and requesting that the Lieutenant Governor assume his
powers until Horner should recover or his term should end. The transfer of power
to Lieutenant Governor Stelle occurred immediately, but the death of Governor
Horner the next day eliminated the question of his right to eventual resumption
of power.1" The incident vividly underscores the need for a regularized procedure
for determining when a situation has arisen calling into play the inability clause
In the event of physical incapacity of the incumbent chief executive.
Three States have adopted constitutional provisions designed to establish such
a procedure. The constitution of Mississippi adopted in 1890 was the first to
contain . provision of this nature. It states in article V section 131 that should
a doubt arise as to whether a vacancy has occurred in the office of governor or as
to whether any one of the disabilities'mentioned therein exists or shall have ended
the secretary of state shall submit the question to the supreme court for an
authoritative determination. The Alabama constitution of 1001 contains a
somewhat similar provision but it is of a more limited scope. It provides in
article V section 128 that upon request of any two of the officers named in the
line of succession to the governorship the supreme court of the State shall determine whether the mental condition of the governor permits him to continue in the
office of governor or permits him to resume it if he has been found to be temporarily
incapacitated because of unsound mind. The last State to adopt a constitutional
provision on the general problem of gubernatorial incapacity was New Jersey,
ISOpinion of fhe Jultices 87 N. II. 489, 177 AtM. U55(1035).
if Cf. Marie iiankhead Owen, Our Stato Alabama, Alabama State Department of Archives and 1Iqtory,

Historleal and Patriotic Series No. 7 (1027), pp. 3"0-307.

isIre is listed as the governor of the State from 1907 to 1000 in the Arkansas Handbook.
t Cf. Now York Times for April 8,9, 28, May 1,October 8,7, 8, 1940.
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which included such a provision in its consitution of 1947 20 outlining a procedure
for judicial determination of the inability of the governor to discharge the duties
of his office. The New Jersey provision unlike that of Mississippi and Alabama,
looks toward a permanent vacation of office upon a judicial finding of incapacity.
The question of gubernatorial incapacity may be presented for determination by
the supreme court by passage of a concurrent resolution by a two-thirds majority
in each house of the legislature. The grounds upon which a vacation of office
may be declared are (1) failure of a governor-elect to qualify within 6 months
of the beginning of his term; (2) continuous absence from the 1State for 0 months
or more; or (3) Inability to discharge the duties of his office by reason of mental or
physical disability for 6 months or more.
The inferences that are warranted from this review of State practice and experience with regard to the problem of gubernatorial disability and its bearing upon
the problem of Presidential inability are rather obvious. State experience reinforces the point observable In national experience that situations of various kinds
can and do arise involving inability of the Chief Executive to exercise his powers
and which require devolution of these powers for an Indefinite period of time upon
the officer next in line of succession. It shows that constitutional provisions on
this point are, in effect, self-executing. It shows that devolution of power in these
circumstances can be brought about by simple acquiescence of the incumbent
when he Is able to recognize his incapacity, lie does not, by so doing, remove
himself from office, but merely acquiesces in the operation of the constitutional rule
that permits and requires the succeeding officer to exercise the powers of the chief
executiveship. The officer named by the constitution or laws as the one upon
whom the authority to act as governor shall devolve has no option but to exercise
the powers and duties of that office, even though his doing so does not oust the
incumbent from the office of governor permanently. His duty to so act is an
ancillary and conditional function of the Incumbent In the office next in line in the
succession. When and If the cause occasioning the temporary devolution of power
has ceased to be operative, there must be a resumption of his constitutional powers
and duties by the temporarily displaced Chief Executive. His assertion of his
right and capacity to reassume the powers and duties of his office is ordinarily
regarded as sufficient to restore them to him.
State experience suggests also that there cannot be such a thing as a partial
of
devolution of the powers and duties of the Chief Executive at the discretion
the incumbent. Unless there is constitutional provision to the contrary,2' the
devolution of powers and functions upon the succeeding officer is complete. The
and all
succeeding officer, and only he, may in this circumstance exercise any
powers vested in the Chief Executive by the Constitution or laws. 2' Finally,
State experience suggests also that there is need for a formalized procedure for
making an authoritative determination of the facts In a circumstance wlhen the
inability of the Chief Executive is such that he cannot or will not allow the mandate of the Constitution to be effectuated with respect to the temporary devolution of his powers and duties.
With respect to Presidential inability of an incapacitating nature, three modes
of action need to be made available for dealing with It. If the disability is of
such nature as to appear to the President himself to be of an indefinite duration,
with little or no hope of his recovery from it, he should have the opportunity to
remove himself from office permanently by voluntary act. This option has been
given him in the constitutional provision recognizing his right to vacate his office
by resignation. This constitutional provision has been implemented by a congressional act of a directive character, indicating the manner in which a resignation is to be given and designating the officer to whom it shall be sent.'8 Secondly,
NArt. V, see. 8.
32 For example the constitutions of Michigan and Now York and several other States except from the
automatic rule oidevolution of power In am of the governor's absence from the State, his powers of coin.
nand over the military forces of the State when the governor temporarily absents himself in the perform.
ance of his military duties.
13 Cf. Fr perle llawkins (10 Okla. Cr. 390, at p. 400): "During his (the governor's) absence, or inability to
hliebusiness of the people requires
act, the lieutenant governor is vested with all the powers of governor.
that a governor should always he in the State to approve bonds, honor requisitions, mitake appointments,
qnell riots, fill vacancies, and transact all other business which pertains to this office, without expense or
lay to the people, or interruptions in the administration of Justice. * * * The constitution provides that
there sholl always be someone within the State clothed with power to perform the duties of chief executive.
The constitution must be obeyed, let it please or displease whom it may. There Is nothing more ridiculous
than to contend that the governor, as a matter of whim or caprice, can leave the State to attend banquetq,
or play golf, in other States, or for any other purpose, and say to those who have business with his oflfce:
..
'Wait until it suits my convenience to return.'
# Title 3, ch. 1,see. 20, United States Code (1952). This legislation was originally enacted nsa part of the
Presidential Succession Act of 1792. Cf. the note by Everett S. Brown in the American Political Science
Review vol. 22, (August 1928), pp. 732-733. No President, of course, has ever resigned for any reason; but
It might be noted that there have been several instances of resignations of gvernors for reason.aof ill health.
The most recent wase appears to have been that of Governor O'Toole, of Montana, who resigned on April 1,
1908.
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if the President regards his inability to be, possibly or probably, of a temporary
nature, lie should be allowed to voluntarily relinquish tile powers and duties of
his office, for tile duration of his inability, to the officer whose constitutional duty
it is to exercise them during his incapacity to do so. These two modes of dealing
with the inability problem could be expected to cover practically all situations
that might arise involving Presidential disability.
However, a third contingency is conceivable. The President's inability may
be of such a nature that he is himself unable or incapable of making the decision
to effect-a temporary devolution of hispowers and duties upon his successor.
Such a situation might arise for example If hits inability resulted from an illness so
incapacitating that he could niot be expected to exercise Judgment it a matter so
grave without endangering his life; or his mental capacities migllt be so impaired
that he would not be competent to make such itJudgment. It is even conceivable
that, as a result of war or revolution his being held it duress would impose a bar to
his free exercise of his will. To deal with a situation of this kind, a Federal
statute should be enacted authorizing the officer upon whom the constitutional
responsibility for acting as President devolves in the event of presidential inability
to obtain authoritative advice regarding the necessity for his assuming temporarily
the powers of the Presidency. rhe advice received by him itn this contingency
could not be made conclusive upom the succeeding officer, nor could the statute
authorizing him to obtain such advice make it mandatory that he seek It. It
would, however, arm him with an authority to secure a political sanction for
exercising his constitutional power and duty which should tend both to restrain
him against taking precipitate action and to induce him to act if the public
necessities require him to do so.
PART It

In the light of foregoing considerations, my answers, more specifically, to the
questions raised in the questionnaire on presidential inability are as follows:
I. The terin "inability" as used in article I, section 1, clause 6 of tlue Constitution was intended to cover any contingency which might render the President
incapable of intelligently, responsibly, and etfectively discharging the powers and
d(itios of his office. Whether absence of tile President from tile seat of government or his leaving the territory of the United states were meant to be covered
by the termn "lmbiaility" is debatable; but precedent and usage have established
that these circumstances do not, in themselves, give rise to an inability requiring
deovolution of executive powers and duties upon the succeeding officer.'4 I see
no compelling reas-on to challenge tihe established usage in this regard, particularly in view of the fact that modern mncans of communication and transportation
have largely nullified any element of disability involved in the mere fact of the
President's'being away from the seat of government. It is conceivable, however,
that a circunmstaneo may arise in which the fact that the President is under a
compulsion for some reason or other to be absent from tile seat of government
for an indefinitely long period of time may be a factor to he weighed in making a
determination on whether lie is unable to( discharge the powers and duties of his
office.
I think that a congressional statute, in the form of a joint resolution embracing
the essence of the constitutional terminology relative to devolution of presidential
power in the event of p residential disability and expressive of the sense of Congress,
should be enacted. It should be permanent, rather than ad hoc, in nature. It
should define presidential inability, but only In the broadest terms. Any definition
more or less restrictive than tie languagee of the Constitution Itself is beyond the
power of Congress to enact. Hence tile statute should merely express congressional
accord with the constitutional rule that there shall be a devolution of presidential
power upon the Vice President, or any other officer properly in the line of the
succession, in the event of an Inability of the President. "Inability," in the
constitutional sense, has reference to a mental or physical condition or any other
condition, which prevents the actual exercise of the powers and duties of the office
of President as the public interest and necessities require. It is my opinion that
Congress has authority under the necessary and proper clause to reinforce the
constitutional provision on this point by legislation of this nature. The constitutional provision is self-executing; but a declaratory act by Congress, recognizing
the constitutional rule, would give further moral and political sanction to the act
of a President who, because of an inability which impairs his freedom to exercise
the powers of his office in the manner required by the national public interest,
" Of. 811M op. cit,, pp. 92-0
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permits and recognizes a devolution of presidential powers upon the person named
)y the Constitution or laws as his substitute in this typo of contingency. Beyond
these limits the statute should not attempt to go In defining and delimiting the
term inability."
Inability" is a matter of fact. It is my belief that Congress
lacks authority to circumscribe In any way the term as it i found in this clause
of the Constitution. It may not dilinift the causes from which inability may be
deemed
to arise,theor devolution
prescribe a period of time during which the inability must
persist before
of presidential power may occur. Nor may It
specify a minimum or maximum period of time during which the devolution of
presidential power shall be deemed effective. The Constitution indicates that it
shall be effective for the duration of the period of actual inability of tile President,
and Congress cannot alter the constitutional rule on this point.
II, I11, IV, and V. The declaratory or directive statute should, In the first
place, make manifest the sense of Congress that it President fit the event of his
inability to exorcise the powers and duties of his office, may so declare on his own
initiative, and thus cause tile powers and duties of his office to devolve upon his
constitutional successor for the duration of his Inability. As In the case of the
statute Inplemnenting the resignation clause the statute night well direct that the
President's Intent to recognize such a devolvement of powers shall be formulated
in writing and signed by him; that It be directed to the officer upon whom tile
duty of voting in his place falls, normally the Vice President; and that copies of it
be sent also to the heads of the other coordinate branches of the Government, viz.,
the President pro tomlpore of the Senate, tile Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of tile Supreme Court, its an official notification to the
heads of the other branches of the National Government that the devolution of
flowers has occurred, and hats his sancti on. The directive statute should provide
urther that in like manner the President should officially Inform the person acting
inI hits place, and the heads of the other branches, of his intent, and ability to
resume hi official powers and duties, when and if the removal of tile cause of his
Inability flasmade possible his resumption of lils official powers and duties as

President.
A provision of this character Ill a statute, It may be argued, lies beyond the
competenco of Congress to enact, Immasinluch as it relates to a matter upon) which
the Constitution is already filial and determiinatlve. It mlay be argued that tile

devolltlon of power upoll the Vice President is oqit.onatlc and self-executing it
the event of the President's inability, anid only tile Vice President ias the
authority to act iii order to implement. this provision of the Constitution. The

ansver to this is that a statute of Congress can be directive and declaratory of
tile sense of Congress, as well its namiaatory. By placing itself "on record)' it)
this miner, the Congress will be indicating its acquiescence IIi And support of
the principle umlerlying the eonstitutioiial arrangement for a temporary devolution of power upon the Vice President. It will be niormalizing the procedure by
which this may be accomlllshed, without in any sense seeking to limit the discretion of either tile President or tile Vice President. In their discharge of their

duties and obligations as constitutlomil officers as they see them.
A more difficult problem is presented in case the Presideint is actually unable
to discharge the powers and duties of hi office, anid is at the same title unable
and/or u illiig to press acquieoiice in the Vice President's assuming the
powers and duties of his office. As tie Constitution snow stands, both the right
and the obligation to assulnio the powers alid duties of tile Presidency are vested
Ill the Vice President. lie cannot escape them, nor can Congress, by statute,
circumscrlbe his authority to exercise his constitutional duty as he sees it. III
ly opinion, however this (lees not foreclose Congress front including in the
impliemeltilig statute a secti o setting III) it procedure 1)b'which the Vice President
may seek, or be given, advice and political support il leaking a determination of
what ills course of action should be it a situation involving a question of
Presidential liability.
Neither the Congress nor the Supreme Court is an appropriate body, under our
system of separated powers, to officially ivltiate inquiry Into tile question of a
President's Inability; although it would clearly be withilnlieprovince of Congress,

at any time, to pals a concurrent resolution expressing its attitude in a situation

giving rise to this question. The officers who are immediately concerned iII such a
situation, amd who, by implication, are recognized as having a right to raise this

question, are those who are niiamied by the Constitution and by the Presidential

Succession Act as officers upon whom tile duty of acting as President may fall.
These officers, under current arrangements, are time Vice President, the Speaker of
the Hlouse, the !President pro temnlore of thie Senate, and the 10 department heads
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of Cabinet rank.fl The statute should provide, therefore, that in the event of the
President's being in a condition giving rise to a question of his ability to exercise
the powers and duties of his office as required by the Constitution, accompanied
by an inability on his part to request a temporary assumption of those powers
and duties by the appropriate succeeding officer, that officer (normally the Vice
President) may request and require the collective advice and recommendation of
the other officers in the line of succession regarding his course of action. For that
purpose he should be authorized to assemble these officers as a special Advisory
Council. Similarly any 1 (or perhaps it should be any 2) of the members of this
Advisory Council should be authorized to initiate and present to it the question of
whether the circumstances are such as to warrant and require that the officer nox t
In the line of succession to the President act as President.
The Advisory Council, so constituted, should be given the authority to examine
Into all relevant facts; to consult expert medical opinion in case the President's
alleged inability arises from mental or physical infirmities; and by majority action,
to make findings relative to the condition of the President based on such evidence
as may be available to it. If it finds that the President is unable to exercise the
powers and duties of his office in the constitutional sense, it may by majority
action, advise and recommend that the officer upon whom the duty of acting as
President would devolve under the Constitution or laws, should assume forth.
with the powers of Chief Executive. Its advice and recommendation to this
effect could not be made binding and controlling upon the officer to whom it is
directed; but it would mobilize moral and political support for his acting in the
manner recommended.
The statute should provide further that the succeeding officer should notify
in writing the heads of the other branches of his intent to assume the constitutional powers and duties of the Presidency during continuance of the President's
inability. His notification should set fourth the findings and recommendations
of the factfindhig group as evidence of the basis of his action, if he is acting upon
the basis of such a recommendation.
VI. The determination which the above-described Advisory Council should be
authorized to make must necessarily be limited to a finding that the President
has incurred a disability of a character that warrants the assumption of his con.
stitutional powers and duties by the next officer in the line of succession. In
other words, it can go only so far as to make a finding that, in its judgment, cir.
cumstances have arisen justifying the operation of the constitutional rule. It
cannot be invested with authority to pass upon the "permanent" or "temporary"
nature of the inability; and it can find an inability to exist only if there is an
Inability in the constitutional sense, I. e., one which impairs the President's freedom and ability to exercise the powers and duties of his office in the manner
which the public interest requires and necessitates. The devolution of powers in
such a situation must be complete; hence the Advisory Council could not recommend a partial devolution of the powers of the office In order to accommodate a
partial disability of the President. There should be no authority to specify that
the disability is to be deemed "permanent" or only "temporary ;" for this would
involve the establish, by statutory arrangement, of a procedure by which a President could, in effect, be removed from office in case the inability is found to be
permanent. The power to authorize such a finding does not ieo in Congress,
since the impeachment procedure, by implication, is the sole and exclusive provision of the Constitution on the point of removal of a President. Furthermore,
to authorize a body of this character to make a determinative finding on the permanent or temporary character of a President's inability would amount to a restriction upon the judgment of the succeeding officer regarding what he alone has
final authority to decide, I. e., his constitutional duty to exercise the powers and
functions of the President only during that time in which the President is actually
unable to exercise them.
VII. The statute, as I have indicated, should merely recognize the right of the
succeeding officer to exercise the powers and duties of the Presidential office during
the period when the President is unable to do so. It should not attempt to set
limits In terms of possi ble causes of Inability or the duration of an inabili ty. IHence
every inability in the constitutional sense should be treated alike, as on'e which in
the course of events may disappear by reason of removal of its cause or caus-ges.
In providing for determination of when a Presidential inability has ceased and
isFor a variety of reasons, constitutional and practical I question the propriety and wisdom of placing the
Presiding
of the two Houses of Congress in the fine of the presidential succession. Cf. my article,
"The Newofficers
Presidential
Succession Act," American Political Science Review, vol. XLI (October 1947), p1 .
931-941. However, since these officers are presently included In the line of succession, they should logically
be Included in the plan which is proposed for dealing with this aspect of the inability problem.
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the temporarily displaced President may reassume his role as President, the
officers most immediately concerned, viz, the President and the officer who has
temporarily assumed the powers and duties of the Presidency, must be recognized
as the ones empowered by the Constitution to make the decision. If these officers
fail to reach an accommodation of their views on the Point, there is nothing that
Congress can do, by statute, to provide for an authoritative and immediate resolution of the issue. Eventually it might fall to the courts to pass upon this
question, if there came to be rval claimants to Presidential powers. Such an
issue might have to be met and decided Judicially In a concrete case which turns
upon a question of which claimant's acts shall be recognized as those of the lawful
Chief Executive.
I see no reason, however, why Congress may not, by statute, provide by way
of directive, that the President or any officer in the line of the Presidential siccession who assumes Presidential powers tinder the succession rule may refer the
question of the removal or cessation of his disability to the above-described
Advisory Council in order to obtain its recommendation and political sanction
for the President's resumption of his official powers and duties. The obtaining
of such advice cannot be made mandatory upon him, nor can the findings and
recommendation of the Advisory Council be made finally determinative of his
right to resume the powers and deities of the office of President. Compliance
with such a procedure would, in my opinion, practically eliminate the possibility
of the rise of a dispute between him and his temporary substitute over whether
the powers and duties of the Presidency should be returned to the President. It
would provide a moral and political sanction for any action taken in conformity

*

VIII. Any succession by the Vice President to the Presidency, as I read the
Constitution, is only to the powers and duties of the office of Pres iden t. Whether
his succession occurs by reason of the death, resignation, removal, or inability of
the President, he becomes merely a Vice President acting as President; he does not
become President. I think it unfortunate that the usage was introduced, in connection with Tyler's succession, that the Vice President vacates the Vice Presidencv and becomes President in the event of the death of the President. There is
no difference in his status when he exercises the powers and duties of the Presidency under the one circumstance and the other. The pernicious consequence
of the usage has been to raise uncalled-for doubts and to give rise to quibbles
about whether the President can relinquish his powers and duties temporarily or
only permanently. If the usage that, the Vice President beomes President were
restricted to those situations where the vacancy has become permanent by reason
of death, resignation, or removal, it would do no great harm. To hold that a
Vice President who takes over because of inability of the incumbent President
succeeds to the office and permanently ousts the incumbent President defeats the
original purpose of the constitutional provision. It is converted into a special
kind of removal or ouster process which was never intended by the framers, in
my opinion. Logic dictates that there cannot be two Presidents at the same time;
but this does not mean that there cannot be a President who is recognized as
temporarily unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office, and a Vice
President who is exercising, ad interim, the powers and duties of the office of
President.
I think some of the difficulties about this problem would evaporate If Congress
were to provide by law, that the salary and certain of the emoluments attaching
to the office of President should be received by any person exercising the powers
and duties of that office by reason of the death, resignation, removal, or inability
of the incumbent for the period of time he shall so act. Present salary legislation
refers only to the President and the Vice President.:$ Many State constitutions
provide for compensation of the succeeding officer at the rate received by the
Governor during the time he exercises temporarily the powers and duties of the
governorship; and other States supplement their constitutions by statutes to this
effect. I suspect that if such a statute had been in effect at the time of Tyler's
accession to Presidential powers and ditties in 1841, the usage that the Vice
President becomes President in the type of situation then presented might never
have become established. Tyler might well have been content with the title of
Acting President for the remainder of the term if it had been clear that lie would
have been treated in other respects as if he were the President.
IX. For reasons already given, I believe that in no case should the Vice President be deemed to have become President by reason of either a permanent or temporary inability of the President to exercise his powers and duties. The only
" Of title 8,oh. 2, nco. 102-104 U.B.Code (1052).

48

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

situation in which this should be deemed to o.cur is that provided for Insection 3
of the 20th amendment wherein it is stated that: "If at the time fixed for the be.
ginning of the term of tie Prosident, the President-elect shall have died, the VicePresident-elect shall become President." The remainder of that section, it might
be observed, clearly controverts the proposition that a Vice President can never
act as President unless he becomes the permanent occupant of the office for the
remainder of his term.
X. The position I have already outlined makes this question irrelevant, since
It is my belief that no distinction should be made between a permanent and a
temporary disability of a President or of any succeeding officer. My view of the
constitutional provision regarding succession arrangements is that Congress may,
if it chooses, provide for election of a succeeding officer for the remainder of the
regular Presidential term in the event that the succession, by reason of the death
resignation, or removal of both the President and the Vice President, should fall
upon any officer named by law to the line of succession. In view of the complexi.
ties of the presidential nominating and election system, I have serious doubts
about the advisability of making provision by law for electing, in the normal
manner by which the President is chosen, an officer to succeed for the remainder
of the regular term. Since the officer so elected could be chosen and designated
as the Acting President, I see no constitutional obstacle to his being chosen for
less than full 4-year term for which a President is elected. For that matter,
Congress could no doubt, provide for his being elected in some other manner
than that by which the President is chosen, Ifit so desired.
XI. As I have indicated, I believe that Congress can, and should, by law act
to resolve some of the doubts and confusion about what should be done with
reference to situations involving Presidential inability. The statute, permanent
In character, and following lines I have suggested, should be directive or declara.
tory in character, and not mandatory. Even though the procedures therein
outlined could not be made mandatory upon the officers most intimately involved,
that is, the President and his immediate potential successor, it would no doubt
be respected and observed by them. If Congress desires to set up a procedure
which will be mandatory, one in which findings and determinations that are
legally binding upon the officers directly involved can be made, I believe, resort
to a constitutional amendment, would be necessary.
REPLY OF JACK W. PELTASON, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
JANUARY 5, 1056.

Hon. EMANUEL CELLER,
United 8tate. House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN CELLER: Enclosed is a memorandum in response to

your letter and questionnaire. I hope that It may be useful to you and your
committee. I also enclose the biographical sketch you asked for.
JACK W. PELTASON.
Sincerely yours,
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

The Constitution stipulates: "In case of the removal of the President from
office, or of his death, resignation or inability to discharge the powers and duties
of said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President * * *." Does
inability include lack of constitutional qualifications? Or is it limited to mental
or physical disability? The framers left us no clue as to how they intended the
word to be interpreted and no Federal court has had occasion to define it. The
dictionary tells us that "inability" is the quality or state of being unable; insufficiency, as of power, strength, or resources. The definitions attempted by State
courts are not of much help either.
State Judges have defined the term broadly. For example, In a Texas Supreme
Court decision the mayor was held "unable" to decide an action brought before
him because of his interest in the subject matter and therefore under the terms of
a statute the president pro tempore of the council was to perform his duties and
receive his salary.' Similarly, the California courts broadly construed the term
IRipogn v. Riearde. ~77.W.948 (ION4).
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and said that it implied, "lack of power * * * to perform; it may suggest lack
of means, lack of health, lack of training, or the like.'2 The problems inherent in
applying such a broad concept of inability to the Presidential office are too obvious
to need comment.3
The dictionary distinguishes inability from disability by saying that the former
"suggests inherent lack of power to perform something" and the latter "now
commonly implies some loss of needed competency or qualifications." But when
the framers substituted Inability for disability in later drafts of the Constitution,
they did so for stylistic reasons and intended no substantive change.4 Disability
is the word most frequently used In State constitutions to describe a condition
when the gubernatorial office is to devolve upon some other person. How have
the State courts Interpreted "disability"?
One group of decisions would restrict disability to exclude lack of legal or constitutional qualifications, especially those discovered after the incumbent had
taken office. In 1889, for example, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that
disability was a personal quality attaching to the Governor and did not cover the
failure of the legislature to declare which candidate had received a majority of
the votes. Hence, the newly elected lieutenant governor should not take over
but the old Governor should continue in office until his successor had qualified.,
In 1801 the Supreme Court of Nebraska ruled that the disability clause covered
only disabilities which occurred after the commencement of the Governor's term
of office and did not apply when there was a failure to elect a Governor because
of the Ineligibility of the person receiving the most votes for the office.*
On the other hand, the North Dakota Supreme Court has given disability an
expansive meaning to Include lack of qualifications. In 1934 when the governor
was convicted of a Federal felony, the court held that he ceased to be a qualified
elector and thus lacked a qualification In order to be governor.' The next year
the same court held that the governor was disabled because he lacked the residen..
trial requirement. The judges ruled that It was of no significance whether the
disability was discovered after the incumbent had assumed office.$
Thus the contradictory holdings of the few State decisions offer little guidance
in determining the scope of the inability clause. Yet it Is clear that a constitution
should provide for all contingencits. It would, therefore, be sensible to define
inability broadly to insure that the Presidency will always be occupied by a
person able to discharge his duties. Death resignation, removal by Impeachment ePr provided for. So, too, does the 20th amendment provide for the failure
of a President-elect to qualify. Since it is highly questionable If the issue of
qualification should be, or could be, raised after an Incumbent takes office, it would
appear that lack of qualification can safely be excluded from the coverage of the
inability clause. But all eventualities other than those elsewhere provided for
should be included.
Any attempt to define inability would be unwise. Inability Is more than a
condition, it is a judgment. It Is a Judgment that cannot be made in advance.
It depends upon the particular demands at the particular time. Under some
conditions, pneumonia might render the President unable to discharge his duties.
At other times, the demands might not be so pressing; a delay In Presidential action
might not result In a failure to discharge his responsibilities.
Inability is as precis(, as any word that might, be chosen. What we need is
agreement about who has the responsibility to determine whether a particular
incumbent is in fact disabled. As it stand-4 a case can be-and h&q been-made
for the President, the Vice President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court.
WHO DECIDES?

In the only three Instances where there has been widespread concern about
Presidential disability, the President's actions have been decisive. In the 1919-20
crisis the President's official family successfully resisted several serious attempts
to raise thle issue of disability, attempts supported by powerful Senators and the
Secretary of State. On the other hand, if a Prsident should declare that he is
unable to discharge his duties, his decision probably would not be questioned.

I

Me)jrm, Inp. v. S.perfor Cour! 194 P. 2•1542, 547 (1048,; 201 P. 2d 511 (1949).
1 For other cases In which Inability has been broadly construed see 20 Words and Phrases, p. 368.
4 Irving 0. Williams, The American Vice.Presldenoy: New Look. New York: Doubleday &Company,
Inc 1954, p. M.
9 8. E. 31, .33(188).
I Nirr v. V101om,
It Stale v. Broady, 48 N. W. 739 (1891).

Mae v. Langer, 2M N. W.377, 383-384 (1934).
',19ale v. Moodle, 258 N,. W. 558, 667 (IO9).
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(What wpuld happen if the President should decide that his disability had been
removed and the Vice President thought otherwise? This can be predicted with
far less confidence.)
In the States too the chief executives have had a decisive voice in deciding their
own inability, especially that which grows out of Illness. The diasbility clause
has removed governors'against their wishes only when the disability is thought
to stem from lack of legal qualifications. For example, in 1938 Illinois Lieutenant
Governor Stelle was unable, despite persistent efforts, to convince the legislature
or the courts that Governor Horner's illness disabled the governor. For over a
year the lieutenant governor tried. He was not successful (except during Horner's
absence from the State). Finally, the governor's secretary filed a certificate of
dLsability, with the secretary of state-the next day the governor died.0
Many have argued that the Vice President is the one to determine the existence
of Presidential disability.10 However, modesty, embarrassment, and tuwillingness to assume this responsibility have characterized the actions of Vice Presidents. Despite pressures, they have played a self-effacing role. The heirsapparent of governors have not been so hesitant and State courts have recognized
the lieutenant governors' right to raise the Issue of disability.
If Federal judges were to follow State precedents they might, like the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire, hold that "the existence of an executive vacancy is a
question of law and fact within the judicial jurisdiction." I Although the court
recognized that a judicial decision was not essential to the assumption of office
by the lieutenant governor, they asserted that a court ruling was a convenient
mode of avoiding embarrassment and doubt and of resolving the controversy.
Willoughby, the celebrated commentator, although recognizing that the Vice
President had the initial responsibility, was 3f the opiilon, that the constitutionality of the Vice President's action could be tested In the courts." Federal judges
have been more reluctant than State judges to assert Jurisdiction and the Presidential Office has ast immunity from judicial proceedings not granted to governors,
but a case could be arranged to raise the facts of disability so the judges too might
"get into the act."
Congress' right to establish disability stems from the necessary and proper
clause which gives Congress the power to pass laws in order to enable the Vice
President to execute his duties. Although it might be argued that this gives
Congress the authority to provide procedures to determine disability rather than
to decide a particular incumbent's disability, Congrers could act in two steps.
First, it could provide that the fact of disability is to be established by a joint
or concurrent resolution of Congress, and then iunle that the Incumbent was diFabled. Certainly sucl a determination would be given great weight.
Thus unless the responsibility for determining disability is clearly given to a
single agency there is danger of conflict. Even more likely, there is danger that
no one will act, believing the others have the duty to do so.
WHICH PROCEDURES?

"The procedures should be Aimply swift, flexible, and acceptable. The decision
as to disability is not only a technical judgment, but also a political decision involving consideration of meny factors and one of highest moment. It should,
therefore, be vested in an agency which has continuing public accountability.
The two most obvious agencies to make this decision are Congress and the
Supreme Court. The former Is more immediately responsible to the electorate,
but is also more unwieldy, not always in session, a.id its decisions, especially if
made by a majority of a political party different from the President's might not
be so palatable. The Supreme Court lacks immediate accountability for its
actions, but it has the advantage of being able to act swiftly and flexibly. Above
all, the respect accorded to the Supreme Court and the general belief that itR
judges are above partisan politics, makes it especially suited to determine the
highly political question of disability. (There is a risk that the Court's own
dignity might be jeopardized by the Justices' involvement in this ticklish task, but
it is aWrisk worth taking.)
* Clyde F. Snider, Gubernatorial Disability, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 5, Nqo. 3,
pp. i621-529, April 1941.
toSee armmcnt of Henry E. Davis, who prepared a monograph for the Senate in the midst of the 1019-21
crisis in which he argued that the Vice President alone is the person to decide when this disability has arisen.
New York Evenlnge Post, March 1, 1920 cited by Edward S. Corwin, The President: OfMice and Powers.
New York: New York University Press. 3d edition. 194I,pp. 398-4399.
11AItornep Oeneral v. Tvgark, 66 N. H. 363, 366 (1890.
IvW.v.Wiq'lloughby, The Constitutional Law of the nnited States. New York: Baker, Voorhls & Co.
2d edition, 1929, ITT, pp. 1470-1471, cited by Corwin, op. cit.
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The Supreme Court could be authorized to investigate, appointing whatever
assistance the justices consider necessary, and to make a determination upon petition of either chamber of Congress or during Congress' adjournment upon petition of any 2 or 3 of the following: Vice President, Speaker President pro tempore
of the Senate, congressional majority and minority party leaders. The Supreme
Court could be authorized to stipulate whether the disability is of a permanent or
temporary nature and on its own motion to restore the President to office when
the disability has disappeared.
There is little State experience to draw upon, but the only three States which
have established procedures to determine disability have given tlbe job to their
State supreme courts. All have done so by constitutional provision. In Mississippi the secretary of state is authorized to' submit the question to the supreme
court which investigates and makes a determination in the form of a written
opinion filed with the secretary of state. The Mississippi secretary of state, it
should be pointed out, unlike that of the National Government, is not chosen by
the chief executive.
In Alabama, any two of the following officers request the State supreme court
to determine whether the Governor suffers from "unsoundness of mind": the
president pro tempore of the senate, speaker of the house, attorney general, State
auditor, secretary of state, and State treasurer. A governor may be restored to
office upon petition b) any of these officers or the governor or lieutenant governor,
if the supreme court determines that he has retained his competency.
In New Jersey the constitution stipulates that the office shallbe deemed vacant
whenever the Governor has been continuously unable for 0 months to discharge
his duties because of mental or physical disability. The existence of this vacancy
is to be determined by the supreme court upon presentment of a concurrent resolution of the legislature approved by a vote of two-thirds of all members of each
house.
As has been noted, other State courts have assumed responsibility for establishing disability through mandamus or quo warranto proceedings, even in the
absence of specific constItutional provisions. NevertlIcelem, a constitutional
amendment would he necessary in order to empower the Supreme Court to act. is
Without an amendment an adversary proceeding-a case or controversywould be required to raise the question of Presidential disability
and it is doubtful
if the issue could be first raised in the Supreme Court.'4 Without an amendment
the constitutionality of the procedures might be left unresolved until it became
necessary to put them to use. Furthermore, e en if the power to decide Presidential inability were vested in others beside the Supreme Court, there would be
constitutional problems.
STATUTE OR AMENDMENT?

Can Congress by law stipulate who is to determine disability? Does the
necessary and proper clause vest this power in Congress? Is the*precedent of
the act of March 1, 1792, binding? By this act Congress provided that the only
evidence of refusal to accept or resignation from the office of President or Vice
President is to be an instrument in writing delivered to the Office of Secretary of
State."8
These questions cannot conclusively be answered until a crisis is u on us, perhaps not until they arise in a legal controversy and are disposed of by ?he Supreme
Court.
The Vice President might refuse to assume the Presidency even if there were
a ruling of disability.16 It is doubtful if Vice President Marshall would have tried
to take over against the wishes of President Wilson's official family, even if sueported by a determination of disability by some designated agency."T On the
other hand, a Vice President has respectable authority to support lis own right
to determine disability even though there had been no action by anyone else.
Hence, an act of Congress would still leave some basic constitutional questions
unresolved and would not decisively clarify responsibility. Only a constitutional
amendment could do these things.
11See the l920 Proposal of Representative Fos of Ohio and comments of Chairman Volstead of the
Rouse Judiciary Committee. Representative Fessintroduced a Joint resolution proposing an amendment
empower the Supreme Court to (etermine disability on the request of Congres by concurrent resolution.
Representative Rogers proposed that the Supreme Court be given this responsibility by law. (He would
permit either chamber to Initiate proceedings.) See CorwIn, op. cit., p. 398.
14 Afarbur v. Aledlon (I Cranch 137 (1803)).
Is3 U. s. . 23.
16See Aftorney (enera/v. Taqrt (66 N. IT.362 (1890)) where the Lieutenant Governor refused to act despite
the Oovernor's announcement of his disability. The lieutenant governor did, however, comply with the
mandamus of the State supreme court.
I•See Williams, op. cit., pp. 0-6li.
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REPLY OF J. ROLAND PENNOCK, SWARTHMORE COLLEGE
JANUARY 3, 1956.

Hon. EMANUEL CELLER,

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
lHouse of Representatives, United States,
Washington, D. C.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN CELLER: Herewith is my reply to your questionnaire on

Presidential inability. I shall give my answers in accordance with the notation
used onSincerely
the original
questionnaire.
yours,
J. ROLAND
PENNOCK,
Chairman, Department of PoliticalScience.

I. I doubt if the fran•ers of the Constitution had a precisely formulated definition of the word "inability" In mind, although I should have thought that there
was little doubt that they" meant to include mental as well as physical disability.
I doubt very much whether it would be desirable to attempt to enact a definition
into law. It seems to me that this is a matter that should be left to the discretion
of whatever agency is charged with the determination of "inability."
II. I think that both Congress and the Cabinet should be empowered to initiate
the question of the President's inability to discharge the powers and duties of his
office by majority vote. Either body should be able to do this without the concurrence of the other.
III. Again, I would suggest that the power to make the determination of inability should be vested in two bodies: the Congress, with the concurrence of the
Vice President; or the Cabinet acting by a majority vote.
IV. I find no constitutional prohibitions relative to questions H1 and III.
VI and VII. I think that any determination of disability should be reviewable
at the instance either of the President or the Cabinet- and that when review is
called for, the determination of cessation should be ma(fe by the Congress and the
Cabinet, requiring a majority of each.
VIII and IX. fn all cases of disability I believe that the Vice President should
succeed only to the powers and duties 61 the office.
X. I do not believe, in the event of the finding of permanent disability, the
language of the Constitution demands the immediate election of a new President.
REPLY OF C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
(A statement by C. Herman Pritchett, professor of political science at the Uni-

versity of Chicago in reply to a questionnaire from Hon. Emanuel Celler,
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives)
The present uncertainty as to the meaning of the term "inability" as applied to
the President in article II, section 1 of the Constitution and the absence of any
constitutional or statutory machinery for determining the fact of such inability,

are potential dangers which the Ifouse Judiciary Committee is fully justified in
examining. On the other hand, there are also dangers in attempting to provide
too explicitly by new constitutional or statutory provisions for circumstances
which are by their nature unpredictable.
The difficulties of the problem are not fully appreciated until concrete proposals
for change are considered. Should a definition of "Inability" be enacted into law?
I would recommend against such an effort, on the ground that it would be impossible to develop anything except a collection of truisms having no real value In
arriving at a find ng of inability.
Should some arrangements be set up by statute for initiating the question of the
President's inability and for making a determination of inability? Serious
objections can be entered against any plan which has been proposed to accomplish
these purposes. While Congress might initiate the question, it is certainly too
large a body and without training for making such a decision; moreover, action of
any kind which it might take would be subject to attack as influenced by partisan
politics. The Supreme Court could not be given such a responsibility without a
constitutional amendment and in any case the judiciary should not be involved
In such a decision. The Vice President has such a direct personal interest in the
matter that any decision he would make would be highly suspect.

The Cabinet
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would have the advantage oi close acquaintance and contact with the President
on which to base a judgment, but their personal loyalty to him and their stake in
continuance in office would probably prejudice them against a finding of disability
if it could be at all avoided. Certainly no independent, ad boc, or expert board,
even of the highest medical authorities, should be given final authority to make a
decision which could remove a President from office.
Clearly the person best fitted to declare the President's inability is the President
himself, and for him to perform this function no new machinery is needed. Setting
up machinery which would definitely place in someone else's hands the responsibilitv for determining inability would open tup the possibility of declaring a
President incapacitated against his will. This is an eventuality of such grave
consequences that it should be avoided if at all possible, and the case for transferring this decision out of the President's hands has not, in my opinion, been
established.
Admittedly there is one factor in the constitutional situation as it now stands
which might motivate a disabled President and his official family to refuse to
admit his disability. That is the uncertainty as to the status which the Vice
President assumes when the powers and duties of the office of President devolve
upon him. A number of capable students of the Constitution have taken the
position that once the .Vice President replaces the President on the grounds of
the latter's inability, the President is foreclosed from ever resuming his post,
even though his disability should be removed. It seems to gave been this uncertainty which caused President Wilson and his personal staff to resist so vigorously any suggestion that he was incapable of performing his duties during his
period of illness in 1919-20.
It is easy to envisage an illness which would completely incapacitate the
President for a temporary period, but from which complete recovery would be
possible within a short time. In a world situation such as exists today, it might
be dangerous to have an incapacitated President for even a week or a month.
It should be possible for the President to devolve his powers and duties on the
Vice President in the complete, constitutional sense, for such a temporary period,
and then to resume them when his disability had passed.
The Constitution can reasonably be interpreted to permit such a temporary
devolving of Presidential powers, and Congress would be fully justified in passing
an act asserting such an interpretation and making arrangements for facilitating
such a temporary transfer. There would seem to be almost no chance that the
Supreme Court would question the power of Congress to enact clarifying legislation of this sort, and the act should substantially remove any reluctance which
might otherwise be felt by a disabled President to turn over his powers to the
Vice President.
Two problems would remain, however, even if such an act were passed. First,
what would be the situation if the President were unconscious, or physically
unable to sign a document requesting the Vice President to take over his powers
and duties temporarily? In such a clear case of inability, where there could be
no possible doubt about the necessity for the transfer of powers the Cabinet
could certify to the facts and request the Vice President to assume the President's
powers and'duties.
Second, there is the problem of determining when, or if, the President's inability has terminated or diminished sufficiently to permit him to resume his office.
In accordance with the point of view already expressed, this decision should be
made by the President himself. Whenever, on the basis of medical advice and
his own judgment and knowledge of his capacities, he determined that he was
able to resume the burdens of the Presidency, he should by written statement
terminate the Vice President's temporary status and himself resume the powers
and duties of the Presidency.
A suggested draft of legislation giving effect to these recommendations is found
below. The proposed statute provides for publication of the finding of inability
in the form of a notification to Congress. It is submitted that a statute along
these lines would have been helpful in handling the three past situations in
American history when problems of inability were raised, and that nothing
further is required.
After President Garfield was shot, on July 2, 1881, hc was clearly incapacitated
for the 2% months until his death. Since he probably could not himself have
signed the notification to Congress, the Cabinet would have been called upon
to make the finding of inability.
In the case of President Wi Lon, the knowledge that he was turning over his
powers only temporarily might have persuaded him that he should make the
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necessary finding as to his inability. Or, if his Cabinet had acted at the time of
his initial collapse when his inability wai perhaps complete, he could have re.
captured his full powers as soon as he hih,-self determined that he waIL capable of
exercising them.
Finally, at tihe time of President Eisenhower's heart attack, the availability of
such a statute might havw' persuaded him to turn over his powers and (lutles to
the Vice President for the duration of his hospital stay.
The plan is a flexible ono which eliminates most of the dangers connected with a
situation of Presidential inability but which does so in a way involving the least
possible danger of ousting a President against his own will and judgment.
This proposal does not atten'pt to deal with the situation where there is no Vice
President because lhe haý succeeded to the Pre.idency on the death of the President.
The problem of succession to the Presidency beyond the Vice President is a matter
deserving of separate study.
A BILL To provide for the discharge of the powers and duties of tile President Iname of the Inability of the
President

SEcTION 1. (a) If the President of the United States shall determine that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, he shall notify the Congress
of that fact in writing, and the powers and duties of the office shall immediately
devolve ip on the Vice President.
(b) If the President is, by reason of his inability, unable to notify the Congress
of his inability, the President's Cabinet shall make the finding of inability and
notify the Congress in writing of that finding, and the powers and duties of the
President shall immediately devolve upon the Vice President.
(c) If the Congress is not in session at the time of the finding of inability, the
notification shall be made to the President pro tempore of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, or to either of them, and the effect of
the notification shall be the same as though the Congress were in session.
Szc. 2. When the Vice President is exercising the powers and duties of the
President during the inability of the President, his title shall be Acting President,
and he shall possess the full constitutional authority of the President.
Ssc. 3. When the President determines that his inability has been terminated,
and that he is capable of exercising the powers and duties 4f the office, lie shall so
notify the Congress in writing, and the powers and duties of the office shall imniediately revert from the Vice President, serving as Acting President, to the
President.
REPLY OF JOHN H. ROMANI, THE B1ROOICINGS INSTITUTION

Hon. EMANUE0L CELLER,

JANUARY

10, 1055.

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, Mouse of Representatives,
United States Conpress, Washington, D. C.
DEAR MR. CELLER: I enclose my statement concerning Presidential inability

which was prepared at your request.' I hope that the manner of presentation is in
keeping with your desires and with other statemenLs which you and the conimittee have received. The statement has been reproduced in'order to facilitate
an internal institutional discussion of the problem, sparked by your questionnaire. It has not been done for public distribution, I assure you.
Also enclosed is a brief biographical statement which you requested in your
original
letter.
*Thank
you again for permitting me to participate in this discussion of an
Important constitutional problem. I shall be most happy to clarify or expand
any of the discussion presented in the statement.
Sincerely yours,
JOHN H. ROMANT,
Research Fellow.

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
Statement by John H. Romanl, Ph. D., research felow, the Brookings
Institution, January 13, 1956
It is perhaps unnecessary to point out the importance of attempting to clarify
the provisions of the United States Constitution regarding the inability of a
President to discharge the duties and functions of his office. The Incrosed fil-
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of the American Presidency not only to our )olitieal system, but to the

world at large, demands serious consideratlotn of this problem.
In crisis tiimes
snelt as these, ant emergency may arise at any moment: and a Presidential littess
which prevents immediate, forceful action 6y the Chief Exectitive to ineet the

Contingency may complicate, and make more grave the difficulties. Under some
conditions, it is conceivable that the inability of the American President to function
aright invite foreign action to create ani emergency. Moreover, any vacuum in
the IPresidency, by the very nature of the office, brings forth complicath101s for the
President's political party as,well as for the op)positioni group. fit its broadest

terms, the issite is not restricted to a few plirases fi thf Constitution and pr-ecedents fit Am.erican conistititutional law, but, in part, is bound up with the whole
iiiattter of political leadership l)iouir Nation. Although this last consideration is
not. the fo. al point here, It must be ke At in mind, for any solution to the problem
of lProsidontial inability will have ramifications it this area as well.
'ite following discussion of the issue Is based on a nuntlwr of presuppositions
alout the problem which should be made explicit. It is assumed that no single
legislative act or constitutional amendment can satisfactorily meet all possible
sittiations It which there mav be a ease of Presidential liability. Any effort to
deal with the question nust be framed hi rather simple, gonera'l rules which will
allow considerable flexibility in handling the difficulty.
It is also assumed, or
recognized, that the major concern is not merely with clear-cut cases of Presidential Inability itt a time of pressing emergency, but also with cases less defined,

and where the etnergency and the necessity for action may not be imtnediate.
Perhaps the central objective is to devise a method by which the temporary
assuttlption of Presidential powers by sotie other governmental ollicer is legititiized at least in more specific terms than has been done heretofore. niqtis is
necessary so that the various political leaders in Govornment, the public, and
the lndivldual official concerned will recognize that under approlristo conditions,
such action is neither a usurpation of authority, nor a displacetment of the right.
filly elected Chief Executive. It is also assutimed that any procedure designed
to provide for leadership under conditions of temporary or permanent Presidentile I
iniability must be consistent with tlte basic principles of separation of powers. It
Is itt those terms that the examination is undertaken.
The problem set before us may be viewed as having three separate, but related
parts, with the solution of each dependent upon the manner itt which the others
are resolved. The first, and perhaps most enicirl, concerns the meaning of the
term, "Inability," and the status of the Vice Presidett, or atty other governmental officer, who might assume the functions of the Presidenc• iii the eventt of
Presidential disability. The second involves the procedure by which the deter.
rtination of Presidential inability should Ie initiated and decided. The third is
how, assuming the temporary existence of Presidential inability, the President
may recover the powers and duties of the office once he Is again able to discharge
these functions.
It the minds of soine other commentators there may be additional difficulties
(I. e., how to lighten the burdens of the P~residcncy; how to strengthen staff
operations to provide for better management) but these questions, although"
extremely important, seem to be subsidiaryy and distinct from the central issue:
flow to Insuire the effective, continuous exercise of Presidential authority even
when the Chief Executive, himself, is prevented, for some reason or another,
either temporary or permanent, from carrying out his duties. Neither an easing
of the President's workload, nor a strengthening of his staff, can relieve him of
his constitutional responsibility for executivee leadership and for decisions on
certain public matters. To allow leadership to lapse, and decisions to be made
in an ad hoc manner by the President's immediate staff (as tinder James B. Garfield and Woodrow Wilson) not only seems suspect, constitutionally, but inconsistent with the democratic principle that governmental authority should be
exercised only by those who have a specific mandate, either by virtue of election
to the office, or by a proper delegation of authority by the elected official. If the
President is unable to act, there must be some other officer to fill In for the Chief
Executive during any period of temporary inability on the part of the Chief
Executive. This substitute must be constitutionally and legally authorized to
perform this function. For this reason, nothing less than a clarification of the
inability clause of the Constitution and the status of any temporary successors
can suffice. The problem of the President's heavy workload and that of Presidential inability should not be confused, even though they may appear to be
related.
The first part of the problem is essentially an exercise in constitutional interpretation, and once it is met, the remaining parts are easily resolved. It appears
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reasonably clear from a reading of the section of the Constitution In point, and
the debates in the 1787 Convention, that the term, "inability", comprehends
both temporary and permanent inability on the part of the President to discharge the duties and functions of his office. Further, it seems that the framers
intended for the Vice President, or other officer provided by law, to assume the
powers of the President under such conditions, and not the office, per se. Implicit here is the argument that the individual who might take over from the
Chief Executive becomes an Acting President, maintaining this status until the
disability is removed, or a new President is elected. Once the disability is
removed, the President resumes the powers and duties of the office, and Is not,
as some have contended, permanently displaced when a Vice President acts
for him.
Constitutional precedent however, has confused and complicated the issue.
Following the death of William Henry Harrison In 1841, it was accepted that
John Tyler succeeded to the Presidency. He was not-in his own mind, that of
Congress, or that of his staff--viewed a an "acting President." The assumption
of the office by Tyler established a procedure which has been followed in later
instances of Presidential death, and has led to the proposition that the Vice
President does not become an "acting President" at any time, or under any conditions. From this has developed the attitude that the Vice President cannot
temporarily discharge the President's duties when the latter is unable to do so.
The reasoning behind this argument, and Its impact may be summarized as
follows:
1. The Constitution provides for only one President.
2. The Vice President becomes the President when he carries out Presidential duties.
3. Since there cannot be two Presidents, assumption of the President's
prerogatives by the Vice President is tantamount to removing the former
from office.
4. The President, therefore, once the responsibilities are taken over by the
Vice President, cannot resume these powers.
5. Thus, only in case of death, removal, or resignation can the Vice President act in a Presidential capacity.
The acceptance of this line of thinking by the Garfield and Wilson staffs was'
largely responsible for their resistance to any moves which would have permitted
the Vice President to take over temporarily during the period of disability. It
appears to have been the belief that such action would have prevented both
Garfield and Wilson from resuming Presidential authority upon recovery. At the
same time, both Chester Arthur and Thomas Marshall, the Vice Presidents concerned, apparently felt that their assumption of Presidential powers would have
been a usurpation of authority. Despite pressures from many quarters, both
men preferred to undertake no action. This precedent, consequently, has tended
to erase what seems to have been the intended constitutional provision for succession in cases of temporary inability. It appeals that no legislation establishing a procedure for meeting this problem can be effective until either the original
intent of the framers is restored and made clear, or there is, at least, a clarification
of the Vice President's status when he acts for the Chief Executive during the
latter's inability.
It is suggested, then that a first step in resolving this issue should be action
to declare explicitly that any officer temporarily assuming the duties of the
Presidency does so only in an acting capacity, and that the President, after
recovery, resumes these powers. Such a move would achieve two objectives:
First, it would reduce the resistance on the part of the President's staff, family
and political advisers to having the Vice President take over. This group would
know, by such clarification, that the President would still retain the Office, and
that there would be no danger of his permanent removal by the Vice President's
actions, as current constitutional precedent seems to imply. Second it would
remove inhibitions on the part of the Vice President to assume the President's
powers. The Vice President would know that his action would not be considered
a usurpation of authority, but merely a legitimate exercise of his own functions
as the constitutional officer next in line to the Presidency. There would be,
as a result, a legitimization of a temporary assumption of the President's duties,
a matter which seems to be lacking under present conditions.
It is not clear whether this distinction can be made without formally amending
the Constitution. One possibility may be to do this by concurrent resolution of
Congress which, although not having the full force and effect of law, would,
nevertheless, carry considerable weight in setting the public's mind at ease.
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Another may be to have the President undertake such a move by a statement
or order to this effect. In this instance, there seems to be no constitutional bar
to his action, for lie would be interpreting the powers and functions of his office
and the executive article as he does under normal circumstances. The gravity
of the problem, however, indicates that it is probably most desirable to accomp lislh this end by a formal constitutional amendment, such an amendment to
nelude not only a clarification of the Vice President's status, but also the procedures by which inability shall be determined.' It should be noted that partial
moves in this direction have already been made by virtue of the 20th amendment
and the Presidential Succession Act of 1947. The 20th amendment provides
for an "acting President" when the President-elect has not qualified by the
beginning of his term, while the succession statute states that In the case of the
disability of a Vice President, when he has taken over the Presidency, the officer
next in line shall act until the disability is removed, or a new President is elected.$
It has been suggested by others, that Congress might undertake a definition
of the term, "Inability," and enact such a definition into law. This approach
seems unwise, not only because It is somewhat unnecessary, but also because it
is impossible to work out a definition that would cover any and all contingencies.
The existence of an inability statute would tend to confuse the Issue when a case
of Presidential inability arose not mentioned in the law thereby creating delay,
rather than promptness, In meeting the situation. Such a 'law, also, is no
guaranty that the procedures designed to deal with the question would be
sufficiently flexible for this purpose. Moreover any effort to define "inability"
would, no doubt, lead to a consideration of whether absence from the seat of
government constituted inability, thus opening another Pandora's box. For
these reasons, it is strongly recommended that Congress not attempt a definition
of the term, "Inability," as It appears in article 2, section 1, clause 6 of the
Constitution.
The second part of our problem concerns the manner in which .he fact of
Presidential inability is to be decided. The proposal outlined here, and that
relating to the third section of the question, both are premised on the assumption
that a Vice President, or other officer, serves only in an acting capacity when he
assumes Presidential authority in the event of a living President's inability to act.
There are two stages to be considered here:
1. The initiation of action leading to the determination of a President's
inability.
2. The actual decision is to whether an inability exists or not.
The central issue is whether the same agency or individual should initiate and"
determine the question of a President's disability, or whether this right should
be shared, with one agency or person initiating the action, and another, separate
group making the decision. Involved here is the matter again of legitimizing
the temporary assumption of Presidential authority. Even with a clarification
of the status of the Vice President, or other officer there is a need for an authoritative judgment on the question to avoid political and other difficulties. At the
same time, the resolution of this problem should not involve us In a detailed and
elaborate procedure that might be self-defeating.
At the outset, it is well to note that there are two general types of situations in
which the necessity for such action may arise:
1. The President, despite being disabled, is still capable of taking limited
action. Two examples are: (1) He is advised to undergo medical treatment
of an extended nature and knows beforehand that he will be disabled for a
period of time; (2) Although he is stricken without warning, he is still In
possession of his faculties and able to do certain things.
2. The President is stricken without warning and is totally disabled.
In the first contingency, the President should announce that he is, or will be,
unable to act; following such proclamation, the Presidential duties would devolve
upon the Vice President, or if no Vice President, upon the officer next in line as
provided by law. There appears to be no constitutional prohibition against such
a procedure. The President is not only the best judge of the situation, but also
the constitutional officer in whom the powers and functions are vested. In more
practical terms, a Presidential statement of this sort would carry sufficient
authority to forestall any political recriminations. Also, the procedure is flexible
and can be used to meet almost all possible situations which might occur under
this first type of Presidential d&-,ability. At the same time, it does not seem that
any action by Congress is necousary before a President could act in this manner.
'See attachmeiit A for suggested dmeiidment.
'See Constitution of the United States, amendment XX, sec. 3; and 61 U. S. Stat. 880 (1947), sc.1.
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It may be desirable, however, to have this procedure outlined either in law or in
constitutional amendment. Since it has been recommended that an amendment
be proposed to clarify the status of successors during a period of Presidential
inability, this procedure could be contained in the same amendment.
The situation in which a President is completely disabled without warning
presents considerable difficulty, and is, perhaps, the crucial issue. Since the
President cannot act, the decision must rest with someone else, or with some other
governmental body. In keeping with constitutional principle, it seems that the
decision, both as to the initiation and determination of the inability, should be
bested in some area of the executive branch, and the most logical place is in the
Vice Presidency. The Vice President is the officer most directly concerned, and
he cannot escape his responsibility as the No. 2 man in our Government. The
office was created with such a situation in mind, and the Vice President must be
presumed to have the discretionary authority to act. Moreover it seems that the
Constitution, now, gives this power of decision to the Vice President.$
Beyond those considerations, this recommendation is but an extension to the
Presidential office of normal administrative practice. When a chief is, incapaci.
tated, his immediate subordinate ordinarily amsumes the former's duties as an acting
chief, at least until there has been opportunity for action by any available higher
authority or governing body. The decision to take over under such circumstances
is made usually by the subordinate, and is accepted as within the realm of his
authority. In the military, this precedent is established with special clarity. A
subordinate officer is required to assume command when his superior officer is
disabled. Where the case Is filled with ambiquity, the power to decide whether
or not the superior officer shall be relieved rests, initially, in military law, with the
officer next in the chain of command.
Viewed in these terms, the recommendation to allow the Vice President the
right to make a decision on the existence of Presidential inability is essentially a
recognition of administrative necessity. It allows for flexibility since the Vice
President may decide not to assume the President's powers because the situation
does not warrant it. It permits prompt action, for it is one man's decision and
not a board decision which would tend to cause delay and possible confusion.
It also seems that no legislation is necessary to recognize that such a power does
already rest with the Vice President. Yet, as noted above, this procedure might,
for clarification, be incorporated into the general amendment concerning Presidential inability.
It may be argued, with some merit, that it is dangerous to permit an immediate
successor to determine when his predecessor is incapable of discharging the duties
and functions of the office, even for a limited period. It may also be suggested
that the Vice President will be motivated by partisan or fractional prejudice.
The point may also be made that to allow this discretion to the Vice President is
politically unwise. In the past, the manner in which the Vice President has sometimes been selected has meant that he may not have the full confidence of his
party in Congress and, therefore, action by him might well lead to severe political
difficulties. Granting the possibility of these contingencies, it must be recognized
that in the three cases of Presidential inability to date, the Vice Presidents concerned have acted with considerable discretion. It would seem that these kinds
of difficulties, although existent, are not as pressing as might appear at first blush.
A further objection to this proposal is the relationship of the Vice President to
the administrative hierarchy. It is argued that the Presidential staff, the Cabinet, and other administrative officials will have been chosen by the President,
and that the Vice President will not necessarily enjoy their full confidence and
vice versa. He will be placed, thereby, in an anomalous position and may not be
able to carry out the President's functions effectively. Why not, therefore, allow
this administrative group, or the institution, to carry on in the best manner
possible? This would insure no disruption or sudden change in administrative
policy which might result from a temporary ascension of the-Vice President.
This approach may be countered, in part, by the argument that to let Presidential decisions be delayed, or made by those who do not have the constitutional
authority to act, is subject to many grave deficiencies. It Is assumed that the
Vice President would not effect serious changes in administrative policy when
acting temporarily as President unless compelled to do so by the situation, but
will attempt to carry forward in the best manner possible. the important consideration Is that provision will be made for the rendering of Presidential decisions,
and a continuance of executive leadership by some one who has the authority to
ISee Ruth 0. Silva,'PrestdentioVSuecess.ionh(AnnArbor,'1951), Pp. 110-111.
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act. The contingency that we will have no one constitutionally capable of making
decisions in a time of emergency will be removed. And this, it seems, is the major
reason for attempting to deal with the problem of Presidential inability.
It has been proposed by others, however, that these difficulties in having the
Vice President take over could be met by providing that Congress initiate the
action, and that the Supreme Court, or some other independent agency, make the
determination of Presidential inability. This approach seems unwise for several
reasons. First, it is doubtful whether Congress, without a constitutional amendnient, has the authority to take such action. In earlier debates on this question,
the issue was raised, and it was generally agreed that this type of action lay outside
the scope of congressional powers. It was noted that the delegation of power to
Congress by the Constitution to provide for succession after the Vice President
excluded all congressional right to deal with Presidential succession in other
circumstances. Second, there is a practical matter of vesting this authority in
the Legislature or some other legislative group. Presidential disability may
occur at any moment, and if Congress is not In session, how can it be reconvened?
Even if this objection is overcome by law or amendment, is there any assurance
that the Legislature by itself, or in conjunction with some other body, can take
action prompt enough to meet the problem? It seems that it could not, for
the convening of Congress would take the better part of a week, and the deliberations of another agency at least an equal length of time, thus leaving the issue
unsettled during a period in which there may be the necessity for action. Third
to vest this power in Congress, or in Congress and the Supreme Court would tend
to establish a trial procedure to determine Presidential inability. Unnecessary
delay might be the result, but the fact of Presidential disability, it can be assumed, will be readily known, and no trial, or judicial determination, will alter
that fact. Fourth it is doubtful that the Supreme Court, even with a constitutional amendment giving it this authority, should consider this question. It is
not a justiciable issue, but a political one. It involves political judgments of the
highest order, and the Court should not be asked to mix in this matter directly.
It is better left to a political officer, such as the Vice President, who must assume
direct responsibility for the consequences of taking the action. Fifth, the suggestion to give this right of determination to some agency, other than the executive branch, is a violation of the separation of powers as well as of administrative
principle. This is not to argue that separation of powers is inviolate, but that If
we really desire a change in our constitutional structure, it should be accomplished
by facing the issues squarely, and not by modifications to deal with a particular
problem which can be met otherwise. Also, the recommendation to allow the
vice President this authority is made In terms of an administrative arrangement
within the executive branch. It is a matter of internal administrative policy,
although It does have ramifications elsewhere.
The third question, how to terminate a period of Presidential inability, can be
handled simply by providing that the President shall make this decision. When
he is able, after consultation with whomever he desires, he shall announce his
resumption of the Presidential prerogatives, and this, in itself shall end the role
of the Vice President acting as President. In the event, however, that the
President is permanently disabled, the Vice President shall continue to function
in an acting capacity until a new President is elected. This procedure car also
be accomplished without legislation, for it appears that the President already has
this authority under the Constitution. Again it vests the power of decision In the
person best able to make this judgment. It Is simple and flexible enough to meet
most if not all, contingencies. It is recommended, however, that this, too, for
clarification, be incorporated into the suggested constitutional amendment.
The first, and most obvious, objection to this recommendation is that it provides
the opportunity for a dispute between the President and Vice President over the
former s capacity to resume his powers. In the case of any dispute, there will
inevitably be justiciable issues which can be decided in the courts, with a consequent clarification of the status of the two men. It must also be recognized that
Congress can impeach either of these officials, If It feels that one or the other has
acted improperly. Beyond this, a Vice President who assumes the President's
powers temporarily would realize that he does just that, and that he must surrender
his authority when the President is recovered. It seems, further, that neither of
the two men could afford to allow a serious dispute of this sort to develop. Such
would be damaging not only to the Nation, but to their particular political group
as well. In all this, It Is assumed that both the President and Vice President
will not make their decisions in a vacuum. Both will avail themselves of good
counsel. Both will be cognizant of the political realities and other intangibles
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involved. The election of a President is largely a matter of faith-faith in his
ability to make judgments concerning the welfare of the country. We accept
this in other circumstances, and his decision here is merely an extension of the
authority conferred upon him by his election.
The question is raised, however, of the extreme case in which the President may
have lost command of his faculties. His decisions under such circumstances might
not be rational, and procedures should be designed to protect against this. Wilt
probably no procedure, however well conceived, can effectively meet this type of
problem. Our only protection lies in, the congressional power to impeach, and to
remove from office by conviction. This same safeguard is available if a Vice
President acts improperly in failing to surrender his position as "Acting President,"
after a President announces his resumption of the powers and duties.
Although there are obvious potential dangers in the recommendations outlined
here, this would seem to be true of any suggestions that could be advanced to deal
with this problem. One cannot hope to provide for all eventualities and complete
security. Such Is not only an impossibility, but inconsistent with the idea of
free government. Additionally, it seems unwise to clutter either our Constitution
or statute books with detailed prescriptions as to the type of procedure and action
to be taken. It seems much better to recognize the existence of the problem, and
to legislate, if necessary, in general terms.
The suggestions outlined here would require no further congressional action if
this line of constitutional interpretation could receive general acceptance, but
because of the confusion surrounding the problem it seems advisable to propose
the adoption of an amendment simply to clarify and spell out this reading or the
Constitution. This would not only restore the original intent of the framers btit
also set the public's mind at ease.
This brief statement of the problem and proposed solution does not and cannot
consider fully all questions relating to executive inability. It seems advisable,
therefore, before action is taken on the proposed amendment to examine the
practices and experiences of the several States. Clues as to the validity or invalidity of the proposals offered here, and in other statements, might be found.
This, it is recognized, would take considerable effort, but its value cannot be
denied.
To summarize the first move should be a clarification of the status of any
governmental officer taking over Presidential functions in the event of a possibly
temporary Presidential inability. Second, the decision as to whether such a
condition exists rests with the President if he is able to act, or with the Vice
President, if not. Third, the period of disability is terminated when the President
announces his resumption of his powers. Attached to this statement is a proposed
constitutional amendment to effect these purposes.
ATTACHMENT

A

H. J.-JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to
cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein) That
the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution
when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:

"ARTICLE "SciioN 1. In case of removal of the President from office, or of his death or
resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"SEc. 2. If the President announces that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall devolve upon the Vice
President.
"SEc. 3. If the President is unable to make such an announcement the Vice
President shall announce that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of the President, and'said powers and duties shall thereupon devolve
upon the Vice President.
"SEc. 4. If the powers and duties of the President devolve upon the Vice
President pursuant to section 2 or 3 of this article the exercise of such powers
and duties shall be resumed by the President upon his announcement of his ability
and intention thereupon to resume them.
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"SEc. 5. The Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the'President and the Vice President, declaring what
officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
"SEc. 6. Clause 6 of section I of article II of the Constitution of the United
States is hereby repealed.
"SEc. 7. This article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this article was proposed by the Congress.
"SEc. 8. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as
an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from the date of its submission."
REPLY OF ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, LAW SCHOOL OF
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DE~CEMBER 31, 1955.

Hon. EMANUEL

CELLER,

Chairman. Comnniiltee on the Judiciary,
United Stales House of lepresentative8, Washington, D. C.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN CELLER: This letter is written in answer to your inquiry

of November 29 concerning Presidential "inability." On December 12 I wrote
you that I wanted a few days to consider the questions you put to me and others,
and I now write to give my somewhat puzzled answers.
Your first question asks what the draftsmen of the Constitution meant by
"inability" in article II, section 1, clause 6, and whether a statutory definition is
now desirable. I do not know of any material which shows us just what the
draftsmen had in mind, and it may be that the absence from the Constitution of
any machinery for superseding tlhe President in case of inability indicates that
comparatively little thought was given to the matter. I should consider an
attempt at legislative definition inadvisable and not helpful. The varieties and
degrees of disability, physical and mental, temporary or permanent, which might
render
President
unable to discharge
his duties, are so numerous that an inventorya would
be impracticable,
and a definition
would end up as a repetition in
different words of what we already know-that inability in the constitutional sense
is inability so serious that it requires that the President's duties be taken over
by someone else.
Your second question asks who should raise the question of disability. The
substitution of another officer for the President, whether temporarily or permanently, is of such grave importance that the arrangements for it should, as far
as humanly possible, achieve at least two ends: A factually correct decision as to
the President's inability; and a decision which will be accepted by all concerned
as having been Impartiaf and without partisan bias. If the question of inability
were to be raised by the House of Representatives, with open discussion (by
analogy to Impeachment) these ends might be attained, though in case of a House
bitterly opposed to a President, suspicion of politics would inevitably attach.
Furthermore the House might not be in session at the time of some such misfortune as the wounding of President Garfield. One of the committees might
have this duty delegated to it by previous legislation. The Cabinet, the President's friends and advisers, would be free of the suggestion of hostile partisanship,
though they would tend to a slow action out of loyalty, unless the disability were
obvious and the need critical. Perhaps this is a good thing. Some special body.
for example like that set up under the act of 1877 (19 Stat. 227) could be set up
to be always in existence. I incline to favor leaving this matter with the Cabinet.
If real need developed, its members would not be deterred, by sympathy for their
chief, from doing what the country needed.
Your third question asks who should pass oti the question of disability, once
brought forward. Of course the Supreme Court has detachment, and profound
respect is given to it by the people of the country; but by the Const t,!ition it
is limited to judicial functions, which would seem to exclude matters such as you
ask about. A standing "Commissio.i on Presidential Disability" could be set
up by statutte to be ready at all times. Either House could make the decision,
if authorized by statute, 6ut the Congress might not be in session. On the whole
I come back to the idea that the Cabinet would be an appropriate body to perform
this task.
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Your fourth question, concerning constitutional difficulties, raises the most
serious problem. "Inability" is so Ill-provided for in the Constitution that the
success of any system of supersession oi the President, if made oply by act of Congress, will depend oa its acceptance by tbe officers of Government and the people.
I am thinking of some national misfortune such as the suspected mental illness of
a President. There might be two factions in the country, one favoring the President's continuance io his functions, the other opposing. The Constitution gives
the President a 4-year term. Might not his supporters assert with much force
that a nonconstitutional body was without constitutional power to displace the
President'
I have already suggested the answer that on the whole seems to me wisest, for
your fifth inquiry, as to the union in one agency of initiation and determination
of the question. On the whole I think the Cabinet should perform both functions.
This is not like a criminal prosecution, where an accusatory function may well
be separate from the task of trial. The Cabinet will be sympathetic, not hostile.
As to the sixth question, whether there should be a finding of the probable duration of the disability, I think the answer is in the negative. Could this have
been determined in the cases of Presidents Garfield or Wilson?
Question 7, what happens when the disability ends? This raises the unpleasant
picture of a Vice President clinging to office, supported by a clique; and if the
termination of disability is left to the Cabinet, this hypothetical Vice President
might have "packed" his Cabinet with his partisans. But this is not a realistic
picture. Government cannot provide in advance for every conceivable set of
untortunate circumstances. And at the next session of the Congress that body
would have a number of ways to circumvent any such unlikely activity as I
suggest. I think I would leave termination of disability for determination by
the Cabinet as well. But here again one has to assume acceptance by all concerned of the decision with reasonable cooperation, in the absence of a constitutional amendment.
As to the 8th and 9th questions, concerning the succession of the Vice
President to duties, or to office, it seems to me that the Vice President should
only become President in case of death, resignation, or removal. In case of
disibilitv the Vice President should merely perform the duties, because the disability mnay be removed. I know that there are difficulties of construction of the
constitutional language here, but the sensible construction seems to me to be what
I suggest.
The Constitution does not provide for an election to replace the President, in
my opinion. I think the phrase "or a President shall be elected" refers to the
next regular election.
Finally, as to your 11th inquiry, I think that legislation will depend for Its
effectiveness on voluntary acceptance, as any statute purporting to stop the
functioning of a President elected for 4 years will run into constitutional obstacles.
I am reassured by remembering that we have only twice had serious trouble of
the sort you ask about-in the cases of President Garfield and Wilson, and those
were handled without new constitutional or statutory provisions. I am particularly happy when I think that for us this matter is now not of immediate
importance, thanks to the fortunate recovery of President Eisenhower. This is
a good note on which to end the year 1955, with my best wishes.
ARTHUR E. SUTIORLAND.
Yours very sincerely,
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SURVEY OF PROVISIONS OF STATE LAWS RELATING TO DISABILITY
OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
LEoISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE,
To: House Judiciary Committee.
From: American Law Division.

Washington 25, D. C., December 14, 1955.

Subject: State by State r6sum6 of constitutional or other provisions relating to
(a) the disability of the chief executive, and (b) any procedure concerning an
officer acting as the chief executive during the disability.
The following survey of the provisions enacted by the States to provide for
succession in cases of "disability"' of the chief executive thereof, shows that word
"disability," as used, has two different meanings. In the greater number of
Instances, it is an inclusive term referring to all eventualities which might prevent
the governor, or the next in succession from serving. In several instances, the
term refers specifically to physical incapacity. Finally, we find also that some
States use the word ""disability" and 'inability" simultaneously, while others
employ only the term inabilityv" or some similar inclusive phrase. One State,
Tennessee, has no provision in its constitution covering disability.
For your convenience we list first the States that employ the term "disability";
then those using "inability " "unable to discharge," etc.; then those using some
other inclusive phrase, anid finally append Tennessee. Succession with respect
to governors-elect and lieutenant governors-elect has not been covered.
STATES WHOSE, CONSTITUTIONs EMPLOY THIEiWVORD "DisABfLITY"

1. Alabama-Code of Alabama (1940)
Constitution (1901), article Vr, section 127, provides that "In case of impeachment, * * * unsoundness of mind, or other disability" the office of governor
devolves upon the lieutenant governor, president of the senate, speaker of the
house of representatives, attorney general, State auditor, secretary of state, or
State treasurer, in that order.
Constitution (1901), article V, section 128, provides an official method for
determining unsoundness of mind. The Supreme Court of Alabama, at regular
or special term, upon request in writing by any two officers named in section 127,
who are not next in succession to the office, may ascertain the mental condition
of the governor or other officer administering the office, and adjudge whether or
not he is of unsound mind. The supreme court may also make an adjudication
that the governor or other person has been restored to his mind, but this is to be
done only where the incumbent of the office denies that such a restoration has
occurred.
2. Arizona-Arizona Code Annotated (1989), 1951 Supplement
Constitution, article 5, section 6 (amendment adopted November 2, 1948):
The order of succession is given as secretary of state, attorney general, State
auditor, State treasurer, or superintendent of public instruction, in that order,
provided such officer is holding by election and is otherwise qualified.
Provision is made for succession in the case of the permanent and the temporary
disability of the governor. In case of permanent disability, the taking of the
oath as governor by any eligible successor constitutes his resignation from the
office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies as governor and he becomes
governor in fact. In the event of temporary disability, the power and duties
devolve on the next qualified person, but only until the disability ceases.
8. Arkansas--Arkansas Statutes Annotated (1947)
Constitution, amendment No. 6, section 4 (superseding art. 6, see. 12), provides
that In the case of the governor's "inability to discharge the powers and duties
of the said office," etc., the office shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor for
the remainder of the term, or until the disability shall cease.
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Constitution amendment No. 6, section 5, provides that the next eligible officer
to succeed to the governorship shall be the president of the senate, and then the
speaker of the assembly.
4. California-West'sAnnotated California Codes
Constitution, article 5, section 16: The California Constitution endeavors to
move up two officers at once so that the offices of both governor and lieutenant
governor are ordinarily filled. Thus it provides that when the governor's office
is vacant, the lieutenant governor assumes that, and the president pro tempore or
speaker of the house becomes lieutenant governor for the residue of the term.
Whenever the offices of governor and lieutenant governor become vacant at the
same time, the office of governor goes to the president pro tempore and that of
lieutenant governor to the speaker. If there is no president pro tempore, the
office of governor goes to the speaker, or, if none, in the following order:
secretary of state, attorney general, treasurer, or comptroller, for the residue of
the term.
If the governor has a temporary disability, the office devolves on the next in
succession until the disability shall cease.
When there is a vacancy In the office of governor, and it cannot he filled tinder
these provisions, the senior deputy secretary of state shall convene the legislature
within 8 days to choose a governor to act until the next general election.
5. Colorado-ColoradoStatutes Annotated (1935)
Constitution, article IV, section 13, provides that "in case of the death, etc., or
other disability of the governor" the lieutenant governor succeeds for the rest of
the term.
Constitution, article IV, section 14, continues the' line of succession through the
president pro tempore of the senate or the speaker of the house, who shall hold the
office until the vacancy is filled or the disqualification removed. The term "disability" is not used in this section.
6. Connecticut-1953 Supplement to the Connecticut General Statutes
Constitution, article IV, section 17, provides that in case of an "inability to
perform" on the part of the governor, the lieutenant governor shall succeed to office
until the next election when a new governor is chosen, or until the "disability be
removed."
Constitution, article IV, section 18, provides that where the governor and
lieutenant governor simultaneously are unable to serve, the president pro tempore
shall so serve until he is superseded by a governor or lieutenant governor.
7. Georgfa-GeorgiaCode Annotated
Constitution article 5, section 1, paragraph 7: Georgia Code Annotated 2-3007:
"In case of the * * * disability" of the governor, the lieutenant governor
succeeds to office until the next general elections for members of the general
assembly, at which a successor to the governor shall be elected for the unexpired
term. This is qualified as follows: (1) If the death, etc., occurs within 30 days
of the next general election, or if the term will expire within 90 days after the
next general election, the lieutenant governor shall serve only for the unexpired
term; and (2) if the lieutenant governor becomes a candidate for the unexpired
term, he shall resign his office as lieutenant governor, effective upon the qualication of the governor elected for the unexpired term, and his successor for the
unexpired term shall be elected at such election.
Further, In case neither the governor nor lieutenant governor can serve, then
the speaker of the house of representatives exercises the executive powers until
thr, removal of the disability or the election and qualification of a governor at a
special election held within 60 days of the date the speaker assumed the powers of
governor.
8. Idaho-Idaho Code
Constitution, article 4, section 12: The office of governor devolves upon the
lieutenant governor in case of the * * * inability of the governor to discharge the
power and duties of the office, for the rest of the term, or until the disability ceases.
Constitution, article 4, section 14, provides that where both the governor and
lieutenant governor are unable to serve, the office devolves upon the president pro
tempore of the senate or the speaker of the house, as necessary, until either the
disqualification of the governor Is removed or the vacancy filled.
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9. Jllinois-Smith-HurdIllinois Annotated Statutes
Constitution of 1870, article V, section 17, provides that the office of governor
shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor whenever the governor is convicted
upon an impeachment, or has any other disability.
Article V, section 19 provides that when there is no lieutenant governor or he
cannot Rerve, the duties shall devolve upon the president of the senate or the
speaker of the house of representatives in that sequence.
10. Iowa-Iowa Code Annotated
Constitution, article 4, section 17, provides that "In case of the death, impeachment, * * * or other disability of the governor," the office devolves upon the
lieutenant governor for the residue of the term, or until the governor shall be
acq uitted, or the disability removed.
Constitution (1954 supplement), article 4, section 19, continues the line of
succession through the president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of
the house of representatives. If none of these can serve, the justices of the
Supreme Court of Iowa shall convene the general assembly by proclamation
and the general assembly shall elect a president pro tempore and a speaker, and
thereupon immediately proceed to the election of a governor and lieutenant
governor in joint convention.
11. Kansas-GeneralStatutes of Kansas Annotated (1949)
Constitution, article 1, section 11, provides that where the governor dies * * *
or suffers any other disability, the office devolves upon the president of the senate
for the residue of the term, or until the disability is removed.
Constitution, article 1, section 12, states that the lieutenant governor is the
president of the senate, but where he cannot perform his duties, or has become
governor, a president pro tempore shall be elected.
Constitution, article 1, section 13, provides that when the lieutenant governor,
'while holding the office of governor, becomes incapable of performing his duties,
the office shall go first to the president of the senate, and then to the speaker of
the house, until the vacancy is filled or the disability removed.
12. Michigan-MichiganStatutes Annotated (Supplement 1958)
Constitution 1906, article VI, section 16, provides that the lieutenant governor
assumes the office of governor whenever the latter is "unable to serve," and continues therein for the residue of the term or until the disability ceases.
Constitution 1906, article VI, section 17, provides that, after the lieutenant
governor, the line of succession shall be the secretary of state, attorney general,
State treasurer, and auditor general. The service of any of these shall be for the
residue of the term, or until the absence or disability giving rise to the succession
ceases.
13. AMississippi-MississippiCode Annotated (1949)
Constitution, article V, section 131, provides for succession to tile office of
governor under the following circumstances: (1) Where the office becomes vacant
through death or otherwise, the lieutenant governor shall possess the powers and
discharge the duties of the office; (2) where the governor is absent from the State,
or suffering from protracted illness, the lieutenant governor shall assume the
office until the governor is able to resume his duties; (3) where the lieutenant
governor, in turn, because of disability or otherwise, is incapable of serving,
the president of the senate pro tempore shall act; and (4) where there is no president
pro tempore, the speaker of the house of representative shall assume the office.

In case none of the foregoing officers is able to assume the office, the secretary of
state shall convene the setiate to elect a president pro tempore.
Whkrever a doubt arises as to whether a vacancy has occurred, or as to whether
any disabilities exist or shall have ended, the secretary of state shall submit the
question to the judges of the supreme court who shall make an investigation and
render an opinion in writing to the secretary of state which shall be final and
conclusive.
14. Missouri-Vernon's Annotated Missouri Statties
Constitution article 4, section 11, provides that upon the death. * **
etc., or other disability of the governor, the office devolves upon the lieutenant
governor for the remainder of the term or until the disability ceases. As necessary, the president pro tempore or the speaker of the house are next in succession.
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15. Montana-Revised Codes of Montana, 1947
Constitution article VII, section 14, provides that the lieutenant governor
shall assume the office of governor in case of * * * the inability to discharge
his duties on the part of the governor, and such assumption of office shall be
for the residue of tile term or until the disability ceases.
Constitution, article VII, section 16, provides that those next in line of succession shall be the president pro tempore of the senate or the speaker of the house.
16. Nebraska-Retised Statutes of Nebraska
Constitution, article IV, section 16, provides that the lieutei.:,nt governor
shall become governor "in ease of the death, * * * etc., or other disability" of
the governor, and he shall serve for the residue of the term or until the disability
is removed.
Constitution, article IV, section 18, provides that those next in line, in case
both the governor and lieutenant governor are unable to serve, shall be the
president of the senate and the speaker of the house, in that order.
Revised Statutes (1951 Cumulative Supplement), section 32-1041, provides
that vacancies occurring in any State Office 30 days prior to a general election
shall be filled thereat.
17. Nevada--Nevada Compiled Laws 1929

Constitution, section 104, provides that the lieutenant governor shall assume
the office of governor in case of the "inability to discharge the duties of the said
office," among other factors, and shall serve for the residue of the term or until
the disability shall cease.
Constitution, section 103, provides that the president pro tempore of the senate
shall act as governor in any case where there is a vacancy in the office of governor
and the lieutenant governor is unable to serve. This provision is supplemented
by Nevada Compiled Laws, section 4808, as amended by Act of Nevada, 1949,
chapter 30, page 39, which carries the line of succession through the speaker of
the assembly and the secretary of state, as need be.
Nevada Oompiled Laws, section 4790, lists eight factors which would result in
an official declaration of vacancy in office. Those which would imply physical
disability are confirmed insanity of the incumbent, found upon a commission of
lunacy to determine fact, and failure to discharge the duties of the office for a
period of 3 months except when prevented by sickness or absence from the
State upon leave. Upon the happening of any of the eight contingencies, if the
incumbent refuses to relinquish his office, the attorney general, with respect to
officers on the State level, is authorized to bring a proceeding In a court of competent jurisdiction for a judgment declaring such office vacant.
18. New Jersey-New Jersey Statutes Annotated

The Now Jersey Constitution contains two provisions which deal with succession to the office of governor in case of vacancy. In both instances the line of
succession is, first, to the president of the senate, then to the speaker of the
general assembly, and then, if necessary, to such officer and in such order as
may be provided by law.
Article 5, section 6, covers, among other things, removals from office. Article
5, section 7, provides that where the governor * * * "is unable to discharge
his duties," etc., the office shall devolve &qabove, until the governor * * * "is
able to discharge his dutie-s," etc.
Article 5, section 8, defines "vacancy in office" of governor as arising when
the governor * * * or the person administering the office * * * shall have been
continuously, unable to discharge the duties of the office by reason of mental
or physical disability. Such vacancy shall be determined by the supreme court
upon presentment to it of a concurrent resolution declaring the ground of the
vacancy, adopted by a vote of two-thirds of all the members of the legislature,
and upon notice, hearing before the court, and proof of the existence of the
vacancy.
19. New Mexico--New Mexico Statutes, 1958
Constitution, article V, section 7, provides that the lieutenant governor shall
act as governor in any case in which the governor is absent from the State, or is
for any reason unable to act as governor, until such disability be removed. The
order of succession thereafter is to the secretary of state, then to the president
pro tempore of the senate, and then to the speaker of the house.
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20. New York-McKinney's ConsolidatedLaws of New York
Constitution, article 4, section 5, provides that in case of the "inability of
governor to discharge the powers and duties of office," the lieutenant governor
shall assume the office for the residue of the term or until the disability shall
cease.
Constitution, article 4, section 6, provides that where the office of lieutenant
governor is also vacant, the temporary president of the senate or his successor
shall assume the office of governor, or, in lieu, the office of governor shall devolve
upon the speaker of the assembly.
McKinney's Public Officers Law section 30, states that every office shall be
held vacant upon the happening of eight cited contingencies, which include the
entry of a judgment or order of a court of competent jurisdiction declaring the
incumbent insane or incompetent; but does not mention any other classification
of physical disability.
01. North Carolina-GeneralStatutes of North Carolina,1943
Constitution, article III, section 12, provides that among other things in case
of the inability of the governor to discharge the duties of his office, or in case the
office of governor shall in any wise become vacant, the lieutenant governor
assumes the governorship until the disabilities shall cease, or a new governor is
elected. The president of the senate is next in line of succession, and whenever,
during a recess of the senate, it becomes necessary for the president of the senate
to administer the government, the secretary of state shall convene the senate
that they may elect such a president.
22. North Dakota-North Dakota Revised Code of 194$
Constitution, section 72, provides that in case of the * * * disability of the
governor, the office shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor until the disability
is removed.
Constitution, section 77, provides that the secretary of state shall serve when
both the governor and lieutenant governor cannot do so because, among other
factors, the lieutenant governor suffers "from mental or physical disease or otherwise" becomes incapable of performing the duties of his office.
28. Ohio-Baldwin's Ohio Code
Constitution, article III, section 15, provides that the lieutenant governor is to
assume the office of governor in case of the * * * disability of the governor, his
service to last until thE disability is removed.
Constitution, article TII, section 17, continues the line of succession through the
president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives.
24. Oregon-OregonRevised Statutes
Constitution, article V, section 8, provides that the order of succession to the
office of governor In case of his * * * inability to discharge the duties of the office
shall be, first, the president of the senate; second the speaker of the house of
representatives; third, the secretary of state; and fourth, the State treasurer.
Such successor shall serve until the disability is removed or a governor is elected
at the next biennial election. The governor so elected shall hold office only for the
unexpired term.
55. Penneylvania-Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated
Constitution, article 4, section 13, provides that in case of the death * * * or
other disability of the governor, the office shall go to the lieutenant governor for
the remainder of the term or until the disability is removed.
Constitution, article 4, section 14, provides that where there is a vacancy in
the office of lieutenant governor, his office shall devolve upon the president pro
tempore of the senate, who in turn shall assume the office of governor if a vacancy
or disability occurs In the office of governor.
2W. South Carolina-Codeof Laws of South Carolina1952
Constitution, article 4, section 9, provides that a vacancy in the office of governor due to * * * disability * * * shall be filled by the lieutenant governor,

or the president pro tempore of the senate, In that order.
Code of Laws of South Carolina, section 1-112, provides that the president of
the senate, performing the duties of governor In the case of * * * disability of
both governor and lieutenant governor, shall act until the disability is removed,
or the next general election at which a governor is elected shall occur. Section
1-113 makes the same provisions applicable to the speaker of the house when he
performs the duties of governor. Section 1-114 provides that when all of the
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previously enumerated officers, for any reason, are unable to assume the office of
governor, the general assembly, by joint vote, shall elect a person to assume the
office of governor, and such person shall serve for the residue of the term.
97. South Dakota-South Dakota Code of 1989
Constitution, article IV, section 6, provides that in case of death * * * or
other disability of the governor, the office shall devolve upon the lieutenant
governor until the disability is removed.
Constitution, article IV, section 7, provides that where the lieutenant governor,
in turn, cannot act "the secretary of state shall act as governor until the vacancy
shall be filled or dhe disability removed."
98. Texas-Vernon's Texas Statutes Annotated
Constitution, article 4, section 16, provides that in case of * * * the inability
or refusal of the governor to serve, etc the lieutenant governor shall be governor
until another is elected, or the disability is removed.
Constitution, article 4, section 17, provides that if the lieutenant governor, in
turn, is unable to serve, the president of the senate shall assume the office of
governor until he is superseded by a governor or lieutenant governor.
29. Utah-Utah Code Annotated 1958
Constitution, article VII, section 11, provides that in case of the * * * in.
ability of the governor to discharge the duties of his office, etc., the office shall go
to the secretary of state, and if he, In turn, for any of the above reasons, cannot
function, it shall go to the president pro tempore of the senate. Such service
shall last until the vacancy is filled at the next general election, or the disability
removed.
80. Vermont-Vermont Statute (Revisions of 1947)
Constitution, section 20, assumes that the lieutenant governor succeeds to
the officer of governor.
Constitution, section 24, states that the legislature shall provide for an officer
to act as governor whenever there is a vacancy in both the offices of governor
and lieutenant governor, and the officer so designated shall exercise the duties
of governor until the disability is removed or a governor elected.
Section 424 of the Vermont Statutes provides that the speaker of the house
of representatives shall act as governor when there is a vacancy in the offices of
governor and lieutenant governor.
81. Washington-Revised Code of Washington
Constitution, amendment 6 provides that in case of the * * * disability of
the governor, the office shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor, and if there
is a vacancy in both offices, in the following order: secretary of state, treasurer,
auditor, attorney general, superintendent of public instruction, and commissioner
of public lands. In any case in which the aforementioned vacancies occur more
than 30 days before the next general election occurring within 2 years of the
commencement of the term, an election shall be held to fill the unexpired term.
88. West Virginia-West Virginia Code of 1955
Constitution, article VII, section 16, provides that in case of the death * * * or
other disability of the governor, the president of the senate shall act as governor
until, the vacancy is filled, or disability removed, and next in order shall be the
speaker of the house of delegates or someone chosen by joint vote of the legislature.
Whenever a vacancy occurs in the office of governor before the' first 3 years of the
term have expired, a new election for governor shall take place to fill the vacancy.
Section 210 of the code (1949 edition) states the above and then provides for the
election as follows: (a) If the vacancy occurs more than 30 days before a regular
election, the vacancy shall be filled at such election; (b) if it occurs less than 30
days before the expiration of the term, a special election shall be held; and (c) if
the vacancy occurs more than 30 days before the primary, candidates shall be
nominated at the primary, but in all other cases the nominations shall be made by
party convention.
83. Wisconsin-Wisconsin Statutes (1949)
Constitution, article V, section 7, provides that in case of the * * * inability
of the governor to serve due to mental or physical disease, etc., the office shall
devolve upon the lieutenant governor until the disability shall cease, etc.
Constitution, article V, section 8, provides that the next in succession shall be
the secretary of state.
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34. Wyoming--Wyoming Compiled Statutes (1945)
Constitution article 4, section 6 provides that if the governor * * * from

mental or physical disease or otherwise become incapable of performing the duties
of his office, etc. the secretary of state shall act as governor until the vacancy is
filled or thie disability removed.
Wyoming Compiled Statutes, section 18-110 provides that the order of succession shall be the secretary of state, the president of the senate, the speaker of
the house of representatives, the State auditor, or the State treasurer, who shall
act until the disability of the governor is removed or a governor elected.
WCS 18-111 requires the person assuming the office to Issue a proclamation to
the effect that the person theretofore an incumbent has ceased to act as such.
WCS 18-112 provides that whenever one of the above persons assumes the
office more than 20 days before an election for county offices, he shall call for an
election of governor to fill the unexpired term, and the person so elected shall
qualify and assume his duties within 30 days after election.
STATES WHOSE CONSTITUTIONS EMPLOY THE WORD "INABILITY"

1. Delaware-DelawareCode Annotated
Constitution of 1897, article 3, section 20, provides for devolution of the office
of governor in three instances, among them, when the governor becomes unable to
discharge the duties of his office after his term has begun, whereupon the office
goes to the lieutenant governor; or when both the governor and lieutenant governor are unable to serve so that the office devolves as follows: upon the secretary
of state, the attorney general, the president pro tempore of tI'e senate, or the
speaker of the house, who are eligible at the time the office devolves upon them, and
who may serve only until the disability of the governor or lieutenant governor is
removed, or a governor duly elected.

There is no direct statement that when the lieutenant governor takes the office
he retains it only so long as the governor is unable to discharge the duties thereof;
but It is directly stated of the other succeeding officers.
2. Florida-FloridaStatutes Annotated

Constitution of 1885, article 4, section 19, provides that In case of the "* * * in-

ability to discharge his official duties" on the part of the governor, his office devolves upon the president of the senate or the speaker of the house. If, however,
there is a general election for members of the legislature during the vacancy, an
election for governor to fill the office shall also be conducted.
8. Indiana-Burns Indiana'oStatutes Annotated
Constitution (19 '5 Replacement Volume), article V section 10, provides that
"in case of the * * * inability of the governor to discharge the duties of office,"
the office devolves upon the lieutenant governor. Where the lieutenant governor,
in turn, is unable to serve, the legislature is to provide for someone to act as
governor until the disability is removed or a governor elected.
Burns, section 49-401, provides where a vacancy occurs in the office of governor
because neither the governor nor the lieutenant governor is able to serve, the
president of the senate shall act as governor until the vacancy is filled; and If
there is no president of the senate, the secretary of state shall convene the senate
for the purpose of electing one.
The lieutenant governor is ordinarily the president of the senate, but when he
becomes governor, or is unable to attend as president of the senate, the senate
elects a president pro tempore (Constitution, art. 5, sec. 11).
4. Kentucky-Kentucky Revised Statutes 1958
Constitution, section 84, provides that the lieutenant governor succeeds to the
office of governor whenever the latter * * * for any cause is unable to discharge
the duties of his office, and serves until the governor * * is able to discharge
the duties of his office.
Constitution, section 85, provides that where the lieutenant governor is unable
to serve. the office shall go to the president pro tempore of the senate. In this
instance, 4hemie~ver a vacancy occurs in the office of governor l'efore the first 2
years of his term have expired, a new election for governor shall take place.
kentucky Revised Statutes 121.010 states that the chief justice of the court of
appeals or, in his absence one of the associate justices shall issue a proclamation
for a special election to fili the office of governor where a vacancy occurs and there
are more than 2 years of his term yet remaining. Kentucky Revised Statutes
122.210 (4) provides that a special election shall likewise be ordered whenever a
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successful candidate in the regular election contest is found not qualified and the
first 2 years of his termn have not yet pas~sd.
5. Louisiana-Constitutionof the State of Louisiana, amended through November

1954

Article V section 0, provides that in case of a vacancy in the office of governor,
the order ofesuccession is, first, lieutenant governor; second, president pro tempore
of the senate; and third, until the election of a president pro tempore of the senate,
the secretary of state. Such vacancy may arise through the inability of the governor to act by reason of his absence from the State or for other cause, and such
officer assuming the powers and duties of the office of governor shall serve ad
interim until the inability be removed.
6. Oklahoma-Oklahoma Statutes Annotated
Constitution, article %,section 10, provides that in case of the governor's * * *
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the office shall devolve
upon the lieutenant governor.
Constitution, article 6, section 15, provides that the further order of succession
shall be the president of the senate or the speaker of tile house of representatives
in that order, who shall serve until the vacancy is filled or the disability ceases.
Annotation: In Fitzpatrick v. McAlister ((1926) 121 Okla. 83, 248 P. 569), it
was held that this section has reference to temporary vacancies only.
7. Rhode Island-GeneralLaws of Rhode Island 1938
Constitution, article VII, section 9, provides that In case of the inability of the
governor to serve, etc., the lieutenant governor shall fill the office, until a governor
is qlalifled or the office filled at the next election.
Constitution, article VII, section 10, provides that where both governor and
lieutenant governor are unable to serve, the person entitled to preside over the
senate for the time being shall fill the office of governor during such absence or
vacancy.
Constitution, article of amendment XI, section 4. provides that if the offices
of governor and lieutenant governor are both vacant by reason of death or otherwise, they shall be filled by the general assembly in grand committee, and the
acting governor shall call a special session for that purpose within 20 days after
both voices become vacant, if a State session is not sooner to occur.
8. Virginia-Codeof Virginia 1950
Constitution, section 78, provides that in case the governor * * * is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of the office, the office shall devolve upon the
lieutenant governor, and the legislature shall provide (or further devolution.
Code, section 24-150, provides that where there is a vacancy in both the office
of governor and of lieutenant governor, the president pro tempore shall act or,
if the senate is not in session, the person who was president pro tempore at the
close of the last session and, where there is no such person, by the speaker of the
house of delegates or the secretary of the Commonwealth, ini that order.
Code 24-151 provides that such acting governor shall, within 5 days after a
vacancy in the offices of both governor and lieutenant governor, issue writs of
election for the unexpired terms, such election to be held within 60 days, and he
shall also convene the general assembly, if necessary, to count the vote.

STATES WHOSE CONSTITUTIONS USE PHRASES SUCH AS "OR OTHERWISE"

1. Maine-Revised Statutes of Maine
Constitution of Maine, article V, part I, section 14: "Disability" here would

have to be included under the phrase "or otherwise" relating to vacancies in the

office of governor. The succession is to the president of the senate and then the
speaker of the house of representatives. When, during a recess of the senate,
none of the above officers is available, the person acting as secretary of state shall
by proclamation convene the senate, that a president may be chosen.
2. Maryland-Flack'sAnnotated Code of Maryland

Constitution, article II, section 0: "Disability" here would have to be included
under the phrase "or other disqualifications,"'whereupon the general assembly,
if in sesion, shall elect some other qualified person governor.
Constitution, article II, section 7, provides that where the vacancy occurs
during the recess of the legislature, the president of the senate or the slpeaker of
the house of delegates shall discharge the duties of the office of governor until
the legislature convenes and elects a new governor for any residue of the term.
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Thi' section also states that the legislature may provide by law for succession to
the office of governor upon conviction under an impeachment or any vacancy
j.ot herein provided for; and, further, if such vacancy occurs without such pro.
visions having been made the legislature shall be convened by the secretary of
state for the purpose of filling such vacancy.
There has been no law passed governing the right of succession apart from the
constitutional provisions.
8. Maasachuseus-Annotatge Laws of Ma6eachuseU8
Constitution, section 72, does not mention disability but it could be included
under the phrase "or otherwise" which permits the lieutenant governor to assume
the chair of governor whenever that is vacant.
Constitution, section 185, provides that the subsequent succession shall be
secretary, attorney general, treasurer and receiver general, and auditor.
4. Minneota-MinnesotaStatutes Annotated
Constitution, article V, section 6, provides that the lieutenant governor shall
be governor during any vacancy arising from "any cause whatever." The senate
shall elect a president pro tempore at the close of each session, who shall be
lieutenant governor in case a vacancy should occur in office.
5. New Hampshire-Revised Laws of New Hampshire, 19110
Article 49 of the constitution provides that when the chair of governor Is vacaLt
for specified reasons "or otherwise," the president of the senate or the speaker of
the house succeeds to the office, as the case may be.
TENNESSEE

Constitution, article 3, section 12, has no phrase under which a vacancy due to
disability could be provided for. Upon a vacancy from one of the specified causes,
however, the office devolves upon the speaker of the senate or the speaker of the
house.
Code (1952 Supplement), section 187.2, creates the office of lieutenant governor
with right of succession to the office of governor.
Code (1952 Supplement), section 187.3, states that the speaker of the senate
shall in all cases be the lieutenant governor of Tennessee.
MARGARET M. CONWAY,

DECEMBER 14, 1955.
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